Accident Cessna 560 Citation Encore LN-IDB, Wednesday 11 January 2017
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Date:Wednesday 11 January 2017
Type:Silhouette image of generic C560 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Cessna 560 Citation Encore
Owner/operator:Hesnes Air
Registration: LN-IDB
MSN: 560-0637
Year of manufacture:2003
Total airframe hrs:3847 hours
Cycles:2730 flights
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Substantial, written off
Location:S of Oslo-Gardermoen Airport (OSL/ENGM) -   Norway
Phase: Initial climb
Departure airport:Oslo-Gardermoen Airport (OSL/ENGM)
Destination airport:Sandefjord-Torp Airport (TRF/ENTO)
Investigating agency: AIBN
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
The Cessna Citation Encore had flown a passenger from Bern in Switzerland to Oslo-Gardermoen Airport in Norway. The crew had planned a shortest possible ground stop before flying to Torp Sandefjord Airport. The captain flew the aircraft (PF), while the First Officer monitored the flying (PM). During the ground stop at Gardermoen, only one engine was stopped while the First Officer completed an external inspection of the aircraft He did not observe any ice or anything out of the ordinary on the areas of the aircraft that could be inspected.
There were icing conditions at Gardermoen and in the airspace above the airport. After flying from Switzerland for more than two hours in approximately minus 50°C, the aircraft's surfaces (fuselage and wings) were more than likely chilled. When the crew requested taxi clearance, they were assigned a different runway than expected. This entailed a longer taxi time and thus longer exposure to the prevailing weather conditions. The aircraft's ground stop lasted approximately 15 minutes at an air temperature of 0°C. The taxiways and runway were covered with 3-6 mm of slush and it was snowing when the aircraft took off.
Initially, the take-off proceeded as normal. The landing gear was retracted and both pilots observed that the speed was rapidly approaching 200 kt, which is the maximum speed with flaps deployed.
As the flaps were retracted, the crew experienced a violent nose-down movement and the pilots were "hanging by their seat belts", while the aircraft started sharply banking to the left. The aircraft at this moment experienced negative 2.62 G.
The captain did not trust the instruments while the First Officer had better situational awareness. The First Officer quickly took control and started a pull-out from the dive. The aircraft descended below the cloud base, and even though it was dark, the pilots could glimpse the ground. Control was regained and the aircraft levelled off 170 ft above the ground. The aircraft was overstressed to 5.99 G during the pull-out. The crew called "MAYDAY" to the Air Traffic Control. Once control was regained, the "MAYDAY" was cancelled and the flight continued towards Torp where an approach and landing took place without further problems.

The aircraft was overstressed well above Ultimate Load Factor (-2.16 to +5.40 G) and considered not to be economically viable to repair.

Primary conclusion:
1. The probable explanation for the aircraft suddenly diving, is that the tailplane stalled. AIBN has not found other explanations for this than slush spray from the runway and falling snow and sleet settled on the tailplane's leading edge and underside during taxi and take-off. This contamination is presumed to have frozen to ice.
2. The aircraft's anti and de-icing systems on the wings and tailplane were switched on, but the tailplane de-icing system had completed a "cycle" before take-off and was in rest mode during take-off. In the assessment by AIBN, the aircraft's anti- and de-icing systems were not suitable to remove the type of ice and snow that had most likely settled on the aircraft's tailplane. The aircraft should have been de-iced before take-off, in line with the company's de-icing procedure, to avoid potential consequences of contamination on the tailplane.
3. This accident shows the significance of good crew resource management (CRM) in the cockpit when an unexpected and extreme flight situation occurs. In this instance, the First Officer's situational awareness and initial pull-out contributed to the aircraft not crashing.


15:20 UTC / 16:20 local time:
ENGM 111520Z 03005KT 350V100 4200 -SN BR OVC004 00/M01
Q0965 TEMPO 2500 -SN BKN006=

15:50 UTC / 16:50 local time:
ENGM 111550Z 03005KT 010V070 6000 -SNRA OVC004 00/M00 Q0965
TEMPO 3000 -SN=

16:20 UTC / 17:20 local time:
ENGM 111620Z 02007KT 350V050 6000 -SN SCT004 BKN007 00/M01 Q0965
TEMPO 3000 -SN=

16:50 UTC / 17:50 local time:
ENGM 111650Z 36006KT 5000 -RA BR SCT002 BKN015 00/M01 Q0965

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: AIBN
Report number: SL 2020/03
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 3 years
Download report: Final report




photo (c) Flyger83; 21 November 2009

Revision history:


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