Accident Airbus A340-313 OY-KBC, Monday 26 December 2016
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Date:Monday 26 December 2016
Type:Silhouette image of generic A343 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Airbus A340-313
Owner/operator:Scandinavian Airlines System - SAS
Registration: OY-KBC
MSN: 467
Year of manufacture:2002
Engine model:CFMI CFM56-5C4
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 0
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Minor, repaired
Location:København-Kastrup Airport (CPH) -   Denmark
Phase: Pushback / towing
Departure airport:-
Destination airport:-
Investigating agency: HCLJ
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
An Airbus A340-313, OY-KBC operated by SAS, and an Avro RJ100, SE-DST operated by BRA - Braathens Regional Airlines, were both damaged in a ground collision accident at Copenhagen's Kastrup Airport in Denmark.
BRA flight 9078 landed at 15:51 hours following a repositioning flight from Göteborg, Sweden.
Arriving at aircraft stand E77 at 15:57 hours, the flight crew of SE-DST noticed that the ground handling personnel had not yet arrived at the aircraft stand. They attempted to contact their handling agent several times.
The flight crew of SE-DST was concerned that aircraft wing clearance to obstacles outside of the marked aircraft manoeuvring area of aircraft stand E77 was insufficient for moving the aircraft onto the stand and insufficient for the coming departure. For that reason, the flight crew decided to move the aircraft onto the stand guided by the yellow centre line, and the flight crew then stopped the aircraft approximately 14 metres in front of the stopping mark.
While waiting for the ground handling personnel to arrive and waiting for entry guidance, the aircraft engines were running.
At 16:06 hours, a towbarless tractor driver contacted Kastrup Apron by radio and requested towing instructions for towing OY-KBC from hangar 5 to an aircraft stand.
At that point, it was the perception of the apron controller at Kastrup Apron that SE-DST had fully parked at aircraft stand E77.
At 16:07 hours, Kastrup Apron instructed the driver to tow OY-KBC to aircraft stand C29 via taxiway T, taxiway V and to hold short of taxiway S. The driver read back the towing instructions.
An onboard flight deck operator in OY-KBC handled the aircraft auxiliary power unit and the aircraft external lights. No radio communication between the driver and the onboard flight deck operator was established.
When entering taxiway T, the driver observed and perceived SE-DST as standing (aircraft anticollision light on) within the marked demarcation of aircraft stand E77. It was the perception of the driver that SE-DST was outgoing traffic but awaiting taxi instructions and therefore in sequence behind the towed OY-KBC.
The onboard flight deck operator in OY-KBC did not notice the presence of SE-DST, until the right winglet of OY-KBC collided with the tail section of SE-DST.
The driver stopped the truck and reported to Kastrup Apron that the towed OY-KBC had collided with an aircraft at aircraft stand E77 and that no one had suffered any injuries.
The right winglet of OY-KBC suffered minor damages and the aircraft was back in service two days later. The horizontal stabilizer, the elevator and the rudder of SE-DST suffered substantial damages.

A TBL towed OY-KBC on taxiway T, and the winglet of OY-KBC collided with the tail section of SE-DST, which had not fully parked at aircraft stand E77.
Independent expectations led to three diverging mental realities affecting the sequence of events:
1. The TBL driver perceived SE-DST as standing within the marked demarcation of aircraft stand E77 and expected that SE-DST was outgoing traffic but in sequence behind OY-KBC under tow
2. The flight crew of SE-DST awaited and expected aircraft stand entry guidance and stopped the aircraft approximately 14 meters in front of the aircraft stand stopping mark at aircraft stand E77
3. Kastrup Apron expected that SE-DST had fully parked given that approximately nine minutes had passed since the arrival of SE-DST at aircraft stand E77

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: HCLJ
Report number: HCLJ510-2016-322
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 2 months
Download report: Final report



Revision history:


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