Accident Embraer ERJ 190-100 IGW (ERJ-190AR) HC-COX, Thursday 28 April 2016
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Date:Thursday 28 April 2016
Type:Silhouette image of generic E190 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Embraer ERJ 190-100 IGW (ERJ-190AR)
Owner/operator:TAME Ecuador
Registration: HC-COX
MSN: 19000372
Year of manufacture:2010
Total airframe hrs:11569 hours
Cycles:9707 flights
Engine model:General Electric CF34-10E6
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 93
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Substantial, written off
Location:Cuenca-Mariscal Lamar International Airport (CUE) -   Ecuador
Phase: Landing
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Quito-Mariscal Sucre Airport (UIO/SEQU)
Destination airport:Cuenca-Mariscal Lamar International Airport (CUE/SECU)
Investigating agency: JIA Ecuador
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
An Embraer ERJ-190, registration HC-COX, operated by TAME as Flight EQ173 from Quito's Mariscal Sucre International Airport experienced an apparent intentional emergency ground-loop during a runway overrun in light rain weather conditions at Mariscal Lamar International Airport (SECU), in Cuenca, Ecuador. The airplane sustained substantial damage and there were no reported injuries among the 6 crew and 87 passengers onboard.
The aircraft departed Quito at 06:51 hours local time.
During the landing preparation briefing, at 07:34, the pilot indicated that they would hold the glide slope until they had a runway in sight, inhibit the glide slope alarm, and continue visual. Four minutes later the flight was cleared for the VOR ILS ZULU approach for runway 23. The runway was wet due to drizzle and the braking efficiency reported by an Airbus A319 was good to average. The A319 had landed on the runway in Cuenca 36 minutes before flight 173.
At 07:46, the flight radioed that they were ten miles out and established on the localizer. They were cleared to the ILS approach for runway 23. Three minutes later the controller reported that they had flight 173 in sight and informed that the wind was calm, and cleared the flight to land on runway 23. T
At 07:50, the pilot indicated that he had three red and one white lights on the PAPI system. The aircraft crossed the runway threshold at 37 feet high instead of 50 feet, which meant the aircraft approached below the normal glidepath. It touched down 277 m past the threshold at an airspeed of 127 knots. Spoilers were deployed 585 meters from the threshold, followed by reverses at 643 m.
The pilot, not feeling an effective braking of the aircraft, tried to activate the autobrake system but this did not work. The aircraft was hydroplaning and could not be brought to a halt on the runway. The pilot groundlooped the aircraft on the grass.

Runway 23 is a 1900 m long runway with an upslope of 15 m (+0.78%). Distance from the centre of the end of the paved runway to the boundary fence and an active road is 31 m. The Operational Landing Distance calculations with manual braking for the weight of the aircraft with wind on touchdown, indicate that a runway length of 2,122 meters was necessary.

PROBABLE CAUSES AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (translated from Spanish language report)
The Accident Investigation Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were:
1. The condition of the runway at Cuenca airport, which at the time of the plane's landing was contaminated with water and slippery.
2. The landing was made after a non-stabilized approach with a tailwind.
3. The non-application of the Maximum Performance Landing procedure recommended by the aircraft manufacturer for landing on contaminated runways.
The following factors contributed to this event:
1. The dispatch of the flight with 1,500 kg of fuel more than the amount of fuel usually used for this flight.
2. Omission of the runway length calculation necessary to perform the landing using the braking efficiency information.
3. The crew's decision to make the final approach with three red and one white lights, using the PAPI system, induced by the information in the Terminal Information document issued by the company, which authorised this procedure.
4. The use of confusing terminology in the Terminal Information document, which used terms applicable to the Airbus fleet, instead of Embraer's.
5. The crew's decision not to perform the thwarted approach maneuver after the maximum allowable vertical speed was exceeded and visibility was apparently limited after the minima were exceeded.
6. Incorrect use of aircraft braking aids, in this case reverse braking aids
7. The application of the emergency brake that inhibits the antiskid system.
8. Lack of implementation of adequate management of crew resources, particularly within the cockpit.
9. Lack of training in the use of tables for track distance calculation.


12:00 UTC / 07:00 local time:
SECU 281200Z 35003KT 9999 -RA FEW010 OVC030 13/12 Q1027

13:00 UTC / 08:00 local time:
SECU 281300Z 33003KT 8000 -RA FEW010 OVC030 13/12 Q1028
Wind: 330 degrees at 3 knots; visibility 8000 m in light rain; few clouds at 1000 feet, overcast at 3000 feet; Temperature 13°C; Dew point 12°C; QNH 1028 mb

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: JIA Ecuador
Report number: Final report
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 3 months
Download report: Final report


Cuenca Airport statement


Revision history:


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