Runway excursion Accident Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100 PR-UUT, Wednesday 17 February 2010
ASN logo
 

Date:Wednesday 17 February 2010
Time:18:07
Type:Silhouette image of generic E50P model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Embraer EMB-500 Phenom 100
Owner/operator:Air Minas Linhas Aéreas
Registration: PR-UUT
MSN: 50000093
Year of manufacture:2009
Total airframe hrs:22 hours
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 4
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Minor, repaired
Category:Accident
Location:São Paulo-Campo de Marte Airport, SP -   Brazil
Phase: Landing
Nature:Private
Departure airport:Brasília-Presidente Juscelino Kubitschek International Airport, DF (BSB/SBBR)
Destination airport:São Paulo-Campo de Marte Airport, SP (SBMT)
Investigating agency: CENIPA
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
The aircraft took off from Brasília, Brazil on a flight to the Campo de Marte Airport, São Paulo, Brazil with one pilot and three passengers.
During the flight the weather conditions, which initially were favorable, deteriorated. Upon arrival at the destination, the airport started to operate under VFR Special conditions. The pilot was cleared for an approach to runway 30. The landing took place in heavy rain and during the landing roll out, when applying the brakes, the pilot realized that it did not have effectiveness in the braking of the aircraft. He then used the emergency brake.
The aircraft left the runway on the right side and stopped after the left main landing gear broke.

Contributing Factors (translated from Portuguese)
1 Human Factor
1.1 Medical Aspect
Nothing to report.
1.2 Psychological Aspect
1.2.1 Individual Information
Nothing to report.
1.2.2 Psychosocial Information
Nothing to report.
1.2.3 Organizational Information
Nothing to report.
1.3 Operational Aspect
1.3.1 Concerning the operation of the aircraft
a) Adverse weather conditions - contributed
The runway became flooded and impractical due to heavy rainfall that interfered with the operation of the aircraft and led to abnormal circumstances.
b) Airport infrastructure - contributed
There was no efficient drainage system at the aerodrome, allowing the entire runway to be contaminated at the time of the accident, which contributed to hydroplaning and consequent low braking effectiveness of the aircraft.
There was no standardized procedure for the evaluation of the runway in relation to the presence of water (wet or contaminated) and its transfer to the air traffic control units to inform the pilots, which contributed to the pilot not knowing in advance that the runway was contaminated.
c) Instruction - contributed
The aircraft training program did not include specific training for landing on short runways and for varying runway conditions such as wet and contaminated.
d) Pilot judgement - contributed
The pilot judged that he could use the brakes of the aircraft differently than specified in the manuals, which contributed to the locking of the wheels during the run after the landing.
1.3.2 Concerning ATS
Did not contribute.
2 Material Factor
2.1 Concerning the aircraft
Did not contribute.
2.2 Concerning ATS technology equipment and systems
Did not contribute.

METAR:

19:00 UTC / 17:00 local time:
SBMT 171900Z 15008KT 8000 BKN022 FEW035TCU 24/21 Q1015

20:00 UTC / 18:00 local time:
SBMT 172000Z 10006KT 6000 -RA BKN022 FEW035TCU 24/20 Q1016

20:05 UTC / 18:05 local time:
SBMT 172005 12004KT 3000 RA BR BKN008 BKN022 FEW035TCU 23/20 Q1016

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: CENIPA
Report number: A-032/CENIPA/2012
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 2 years 1 month
Download report: Final report

Sources:


Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates

The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:

CONNECT WITH US: FSF on social media FSF Facebook FSF Twitter FSF Youtube FSF LinkedIn FSF Instagram

©2024 Flight Safety Foundation

1920 Ballenger Av, 4th Fl.
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
www.FlightSafety.org