Accident Ilyushin Il-62M 5A-DKR, Wednesday 29 March 2006
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Date:Wednesday 29 March 2006
Type:Silhouette image of generic IL62 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Ilyushin Il-62M
Owner/operator:Libyan Government, opb Libavia
Registration: 5A-DKR
MSN: 4053514
Year of manufacture:1990
Engine model:Soloviev D-30KU
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 6
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Destroyed, written off
Location:Moskva-Domodedovo Airport (DME) -   Russia
Phase: Landing
Departure airport:Tripoli-Mitiga International Airport (MJI/HLLM)
Destination airport:Moskva-Domodedovo Airport (DME/UUDD)
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
The Ilyushin Il-62M was operated on a ferry flight from Tripoli, Libya to Moscow, Russia for overhaul.
During the approach to runway 32R at Domodedovo Airport the airspeed was higher than recommended. The aircraft crossed the threshold at an altitude of 12 m and a speed of 304 km/h. During the flare, at an altitude of about 5 meters, the captain instructed the flight engineer to bring back the thrust levers to idle. The flight engineer confirmed selected all four engines to idle. The captain subsequently called for the thrust reversers to be deployed but the flight engineer did not confirm this instruction but asked again: "Turn on the reverse?".
The reverser buckets were then deployed, but the engines were not brought to the maximum reverse thrust. It is possible that at this moment the flight engineer was distracted.
The aircraft floated at an altitude of 1-0.5 m over the runway. As a result, the landing of the aircraft occurred at a distance of 1100 m from the threshold end of the runway at a speed of 258 km/h.
Before landing, the captain again instructed to turn on the reverse of the engines. A misunderstanding between the captain and flight engineer and subsequent actions by the flight engineer caused the two engines to be operated at full power with reversers stowed. The aircraft overran the end of the runway of runway 32R and continued for 680 meters before it collided with a slope of the ravine.

The accident occurred as a result of erroneous actions by the flight engineer during operations to turn on the engine reverse when landing the plane, expressed in shifting the reverse buckets to direct thrust and putting the 1st and 4th engines to take-off mode after landing.
The Commission concluded that the flight engineer’s erroneous actions were facilitated by:
- a low level of technological discipline in the crew due to the weak role of the captain as a leader in the crew, which was manifested in the crew members not fully fulfilling the "Instructions for the interaction and technology of the crew members of the IL-62M aircraft" and Aircraft Flight Manual during descent, approach and landing;
- emotional relaxation of the crew at the end of a business trip and return to base;
- lack of effective control, including according to the data of flight recorders over flight operations with LIBAVIA;
- in the "Instructions for the interaction and technology of the crew of the IL-62M aircraft" there are no control functions on the part of other crew members for the actions of the flight engineer at the stage of aircraft landing and the status of the reverse on/off alarm;
- the absence in the training programs of the simulator of exercises for practicing the actions of crew members in case of erroneous actions by the flight engineer when the reverse is turned on;
- lack of equipment for the flight engineer’s workplace with a radio headset, lack of procedures in the "Instructions for Interaction and the Work Technology of the Crew Members of the Il-62M Aircraft" for the use of a radio headset for flight personnel in flights with a reduced crew;
- excessive volume of the SSU speakers broadcasting external radio communications, which created additional difficulties when listening to the commands given by the captain;
- fuzziness (illegibility) of the commands given by the PIC and the lack of response of the PIC to the non-confirmation of the commands given by him to the flight engineer.


16:30 UTC / 20:30 local time:
UUDD 291630Z 17002MPS 2400 -RA BR BKN004 OVC100 03/02 Q1002 TEMPO 0500 FG =

17:00 UTC / 21:00 local time:
UUDD 291700Z 19002MPS 160V230 1800 -RA BR BKN004 OVC10003/02 Q1002 EMPO 0500 FG =


MAK Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC)
Russian Ministry of Transport



photo (c) via Werner Fischdick; ?; January 2001

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