Accident de Havilland Canada DHC-8-103 LN-WIS, Thursday 14 June 2001
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Date:Thursday 14 June 2001
Time:16:08
Type:Silhouette image of generic DH8A model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
de Havilland Canada DHC-8-103
Owner/operator:Widerøes Flyveselskap
Registration: LN-WIS
MSN: 247
Year of manufacture:1990
Total airframe hrs:23935 hours
Cycles:29469 flights
Engine model:Pratt & Whitney Canada PW121
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 27
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Destroyed, written off
Category:Accident
Location:Båtsfjord Airport (BJF) -   Norway
Phase: Landing
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Alta Airport (ALF/ENAT)
Destination airport:Båtsfjord Airport (BJF/ENBS)
Investigating agency: HSLB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
Widerøe flight WF954 departed Alta at 15:22 for a flight to Båtsfjord. The Localizer/DME approach to runway 21 at Båtsfjord was flown by the co-pilot. After passing the missed approach point the captain took over control because they lost sight of the runway. The approach was continued but the airplane touched down hard on the right hand main gear, which collapsed. The aircraft was shipped to Bodø August 26, 2001 and broken up.

CONCLUSION (Translation from Norwegian):
1 The aircraft was in airworthy condition before landing,
2 The Aircraft Mass & balance was within limits,
3 The Crew was qualified for the flight in question,
4 The Commander had several years of experience on the Norwegian STOL Airport System with DHC-6/300 Twin Otter, and had a total of more than 20.000 hours, but only 320 hours on the Bombardier Dash-8/100,
5 The 1st Officer had approximately 1000 hours on the Dash-8,
6 The Crew deviated from the prescribed procedure,
7 The Crew deviated from the company Standard Operating Procedure - SOP,
8 The Crew's use of CRM did not function as described in the company Flight Operations Manual - FOM,
9 The Crew departed minimum altitude without adequate visual reference,
10 The Crew did not consider "go around" when passing Decision Point without adequate, visual references to the runway
11 The Crew did not consider "go around" during a landing with apparent flight control problems,
12 The Crew completed the landing despite the fact that the aircraft was not in a stabilised configuration,
13 The non-stabilised landing with a high descent rate overloaded the right undercarriage fuse pin to a point at which it collapsed,
14 The Aircraft received considerable, structural damage during the accident,
15 None of the occupants was injured during the accident,
16 The Public Address System did not function when used by the Commander for evacuation,
17 The Cabin Attendant carried out her duties in an exemplary fashion
18 The Airport Fire- & Rescue Service carried out their duties in an exemplary fashion.

Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: HSLB
Report number: HSLB Rap. 2003/42
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 2 years and 2 months
Download report: Final report

Sources:

Thomas Brügge
Air International 5/02
Harald Olsen
Air International 1/02

Location

Images:


photo (c) AIBN; Båtsfjord Airport (BJF); 14 June 2001; (publicdomain)


photo (c) AIBN; Båtsfjord Airport (BJF); 14 June 2001; (publicdomain)


photo (c) AIBN; Båtsfjord Airport (BJF); 14 June 2001; (publicdomain)


photo (c) AIBN; Båtsfjord Airport (BJF); 14 June 2001; (publicdomain)


photo (c) AIBN; Båtsfjord Airport (BJF); 14 June 2001; (publicdomain)


photo (c) via Werner Fischdick; Grand Canyon-National Park Airport, AZ (GCN/KGCN); June 1991

Revision history:

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