Accident Airbus A310-308 JY-AGK, Monday 27 December 1999
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Date:Monday 27 December 1999
Type:Silhouette image of generic A310 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Airbus A310-308
Owner/operator:Royal Jordanian Airlines
Registration: JY-AGK
MSN: 573
Year of manufacture:1991
Total airframe hrs:27114 hours
Cycles:10661 flights
Engine model:General Electric CF6-80C2A8
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 198
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Minor, repaired
Location:Shannon Airport (SNN) -   Ireland
Phase: Landing
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Amman-Queen Alia International Airport (AMM/OJAI)
Destination airport:Shannon Airport (SNN/EINN)
Investigating agency: AAIU
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
The aircraft conducted a right hand approach to runway 06 at Shannon. During the descent to 3,000 feet, ATC gave the aircraft a right turn onto 030°, to intercept the localiser for runway 06. This instruction was accepted by the Pilot-In-Command. At 3000 ft., the leading edge slats were set to 15° and flaps were at 0°. Engine power setting was 62% N1. ATC then informed the aircraft that they were 10 miles from touch-down. The first officer pointed out "very red WX radar Active CB activity to the left". The captain then informed ATC that he wanted to go on a right heading of 040°. ATC informed the aircraft "I won’t be able to intercept you from that heading. Let me know when you can take a vector for the approach". The captain answered "No problem we just take a break to the left and intercept, just give me thirty seconds". At this point the captain took the controls and manually flew the aircraft to intercept the ILS. Engine power was then reduced to approx 30% and a right turn was made onto a heading of 055°, and the ILS was captured. At 2,600 ft., the leading edge slats and flaps were extended to 20°. During the descent from 3,000 feet to 2,100 feet the vertical load factor fluctuated between 0.8 and 1.15 g, and lateral loads fluctuated between 0.035 and 0.02 g. These fluctuations were consistent with air turbulence. The glide slope was not correctly maintained during this period. At 2,300 feet the undercarriage was lowered, power increased briefly to 47% and pitch attitude was increased. The power was then reduced to 30%. At 1,900 feet, the slats were extended to 25° and flaps to 40°. Fluctuations of vertical G increased from 0.75G to 1.25G while lateral loads were 0.055G to 0.085G. There were significant aileron and rudder inputs. At about 300 feet power was increased to 64%, and was then varied between 72% and 56% for the remainder of the approach. The speed increased, reaching 156 knots (Vref +20 kts) when the aircraft was at 60 feet. Between 350 feet and 60 feet, the rate of descent was approximately 965 ft/minute. The vertical accelerations reduced slightly during this phase to a range of 0.75G to 1.1G and the lateral accelerations ranged from -0.05G to 0.05G. The aircraft pitch oscillated between 0.5° and 4°, finally stabilising between 2° and 2.5°. The heading of 055° was maintained, and the aircraft systems recorded a wind of 320° at 10 knots. In the later stages of the approach, at a radio altimeter indication just above 300 feet, approximately 30 seconds before the initial touch-on, the auto call alert called "Glide Slope" three times. Between 60 feet and the ground the rate of descent was approximately 500 ft/minute. Engine power was increased from 56% to 62% N1. The flare was initiated at an altitude of about 18 feet as indicated by a change in elevator deflection. During the flare the pitch increased from 2.5° to 5.5°. Just before touch down, the aircraft rolled 5° left. This was countered by a right aileron input, which resulted in a 3° right wing down attitude. 4° of left rudder were also applied at about the point of touchdown. The aircraft touched on at 4.5° pitch, at 146 knots (Vref +10) initially on the right main leg with 3° right roll and 58% N1. A vertical load factor of 1.9 G and lateral load factor of 0.32 (sideslip to the right) was recorded during the touch down. The aircraft then bounced on both main wheels. The ground spoilers, which had opened on the initial touchdown, retracted. While airborne during this bounce the throttles were briefly advanced and an elevator input of 9° nose down was made. The aircraft pitch angle decreased from 5.5° at a rate of 6°/sec. The aircraft then landed on the nose wheel, with a nose pitch-down rate still of 6°/sec., and an aircraft pitch angle of 3° to 4° nose-down. A vertical load of 1.65 G and lateral load of 0.195 G was recorded at this point. The main gear then came into ground contact and a vertical acceleration of 1.36 G was recorded. At this point the ground spoilers deployed, the pitch attitude increased to 2.5°, an elevator nose down input of 11° was made and the aircraft bounced again. During in this second bounce, it is probable that the main undercarriage reached full extension of the shock absorbers and that the aircraft did not become airborne again. However due to the pitch attitude of 2.5°, the nose wheel was airborne. The aircraft then "landed" again and a vertical load of 1.5 G was recorded. An elevator nose down input of 14° was made during this bounce and the nose wheel made ground contact again, recording 1.2G. With all three undercarriage legs on the ground, thrust reversers were selected and the aircraft stopped normally. During the rollout the crew reported to ATC that they experienced wind shear at touchdown.

CAUSES: "1) The aircraft experienced a hard landing following an un-stabilised approach, combined with a late flare, increased engine power prior to touchdown and high speed at touchdown.;
2) The aircraft bounced as a result of the hard landing. The bounce was aggravated by the closing of the ground spoilers, which was in turn due to the selected throttle position.;
3) During the bounce there was an inappropriate control input. This resulted in the aircraft landing again heavily on its nose-wheel thereby damaging the nose structure of the aircraft.;
4) The decision of the PF to continue the approach and landing from an unstable approach, aggravated by moderate turbulence and light wind shear, and possible downdrafts."

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: AAIU
Report number: AAIU Report No. 2001-005
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 3 months
Download report: Final report



Revision history:


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