Accident Boeing 757-2K2 PH-TKC, Wednesday 24 December 1997
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Date:Wednesday 24 December 1997
Time:22:48
Type:Silhouette image of generic B752 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Boeing 757-2K2
Owner/operator:Transavia Airlines
Registration: PH-TKC
MSN: 26635/608
Year of manufacture:1994
Total airframe hrs:13629 hours
Cycles:4645 flights
Engine model:Rolls-Royce RB211-535E4
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 213
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Substantial, repaired
Category:Accident
Location:Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport (AMS) -   Netherlands
Phase: Landing
Nature:Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi
Departure airport:Las Palmas-Airport de Gran Canaria (LPA/GCLP)
Destination airport:Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS/EHAM)
Investigating agency: RVTV
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
The crew of the aircraft executed an autopilot coupled ILS approach for runway 19R at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol under strong and gusty wind conditions (at 600 feet the FMS read wind 240deg at 50 kts). The autopilot was disconnected at approximately 100 feet in order to make a manual landing. The aircraft touched down hard with its right main landing gear first. When the nose gear touched down hard with the aircraft in a crab angle, the nosegear doghouse broke out of the nose section and rotated backwards. The collapse of the doghouse resulted in serious damage to the electric/electronic systems and several flight- and engine control cables. The aircraft slid down the runway for approximately 3 km, veered to the right and came to rest in the grass. The passenger evacuation was initiated by the cabin crew and all occupants of the cabin left the aircraft via the escape slides. The cockpit crew evacuated the aircraft via the opened cockpit side windows. A small fire at the left inner brake units was quickly extinguished by the airport fire brigade.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "i) Runway allocation system at Schiphol Airport resulted in strong crosswind conditions
for the landing runway in use.; ii) By the omission to state clear and definite crosswind limitations in the Transavia Operations Manual a defence barrier against unsafe operations was lost.; iii) Non calculation and/or discussion of crosswind component resulted in continuing the approach in adverse weather conditions.; iv) Disconnect of the auto pilot in the align mode under the existing wind conditions
resulted in an out of trim condition of the aircraft.; v) The low altitude of the auto pilot disconnect in relation to the existing wind conditions allowed the pilot insufficient time to gain complete control of the aircraft which resulted in a hard traversing landing.; vi) The hard nose-wheel touch down exceeding the certified design limits resulted in a failure of the nose gear construction."

Accident investigation:
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Investigating agency: RVTV
Report number: Report 97-75/A-26
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 10 months
Download report: Final report

Sources:


History of this aircraft

Other occurrences involving this aircraft

7 August 2012 G-LSAN Jet2 0 over North Sea min
10 August 2020 G-LSAN Jet2 0 Manchester Airport (MAN/EGCC) min
Bird strike

Location

Images:


photo (c) Noord-Hollands Archief, collectie Fotopersbureau De Boer; Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport (AMS); 24 December 1997


photo (c) Noord-Hollands Archief, collectie Fotopersbureau De Boer; Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport (AMS); 24 December 1997


photo (c) Noord-Hollands Archief, collectie Fotopersbureau De Boer; Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport (AMS); 24 December 1997


photo (c) Noord-Hollands Archief, collectie Fotopersbureau De Boer; Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport (AMS); 24 December 1997

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