Accident Vickers 813 Viscount G-OHOT, Friday 25 February 1994
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Date:Friday 25 February 1994
Type:Silhouette image of generic VISC model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Vickers 813 Viscount
Owner/operator:British World Airways
Registration: G-OHOT
MSN: 349
Year of manufacture:1958
Total airframe hrs:50995 hours
Engine model:Rolls-Royce Dart 530
Fatalities:Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 2
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Destroyed, written off
Location:7,5 km SW of Uttoxeter -   United Kingdom
Phase: En route
Departure airport:Edinburgh-Turnhouse Airport (EDI/EGPH)
Destination airport:Coventry-Baginton Airport (CVT/EGBE)
Investigating agency: AAIB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
The aircraft was en-route to Coventry in severe icing conditions when the no. 2 engine failed and the prop auto feathered. The no. 3 engine also ran down. The crew, at that moment descending from FL150, were cleared for an immediate descent to FL70 and then to FL50. The crew elected to divert to Birmingham since the engines wouldn't restart. They managed to restart the no. 2 engine a little later, but then the no. 4 engine failed. Just 5 minutes short of Birmingham load shedding occurred and radio and intercom were lost. The Viscount struck trees on down sloping terrain and broke up.

CAUSAL FACTORS: "i) Multiple engine failures occurred as a result of flight in extreme icing conditions. ;
ii) Incomplete performance of the emergency drills by the crew, as a result of not referring to the Emergency Checklist, prejudiced the chances of successful engine re-starts. ;
iii) Crew actions for securing and re-starting the failed engines, which were not in accordance with the operator's procedures, limited the power available. The drag from two unfeathered propellers of the failed engines and the weight of the heavily iced airframe resulted in a loss of height and control before the chosen diversion airfield could be reached. ;
iv) Poor Crew Resource Management reduced the potential for emergency planning, decision making and workload sharing. Consequently, the crew had no contingency plan for the avoidance of the forecast severe icing conditions, and also was unaware of the relative position of a closer diversion airfield which could have been chosen by making more effective use of air traffic services."

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: AAIB
Report number: AAIB AAR 3/95
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 12 months
Download report: Final report


FSF Accident Prevention Vol. 52, No. 6 (June 1995)
ICAO Adrep Summary 2/94 (#23)



photo (c) via Werner Fischdick; Southend Municipal Airport (SEN); March 1992

Revision history:


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