NBDP-20-1(1/68)

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

8 JUL 1968

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED: [illegible] LOGGED: [illegible] PUNCHED: [illegible] VERIFIED: [illegible]

CARD 1

RECORD IDENTIFICATION – Date: Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		Source	Don't Count	Enemy Action	Aircraft Model: Mission Modif.		Basic Mission	Design Number			Series Symbol
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
6	8	0	4	0	8	1	0	1	0	1	6					F	A	0	8	B

Model Code		AIRCRAFT BUREAU NUMBER						Reporting Custodian			Type Duty			Major Command	Time of Mishap: CONDITION	LOCAL TIME			
22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
1	7	1	4	5	5	4	4	6	0	4	3	8	6	1	2	1	2	3	1

Acft. Dmg.	Acft. Dmg.	Acft. Inj.	Acft. Inj.	Hull Number			Kind of Flight			Clearance	Location: NAME CODE							Bearing From		Dist. From
42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62
A	A	A	A					A	1	2	B	5	N	A	H	A		2	4	C

FAC. RWAY DESCRIP.: Distance	Area	Runway Heading		Length	WAS DUTY RWY USED?	FAC. SHIP DESCRIP.: Ship Type	Ship Course		Ship Speed		LOC'N: Initial Contact	Final Rest		Trans. Code	Card Number		
63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
														A	0	1	0

CARD 2

RELATIVE WIND: Direction		Velocity		Density Altitude			Alt. of Emergency: Above Terrain			Pressure Altitude			Acft. Gross Weight						Fiscal Year	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
1	3	1	5							0	1	5	0	0	2	1			6	8

Fleets and Maws.																
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

			PROPERTY DAMAGE COST: Gov't.			Non Gov't.			Total Occupants This Acft		Aircraft Injury Summary – TOTAL INJURIES "A" "U" "L": Navy		Non Navy	
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64
			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0

"A" Injuries: Navy		Non Navy		"U" Injuries: Navy		Non Navy		"L" Injuries: Navy		Non Navy		Trans. Code	Card Number		
65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	A	0	2	0

CLOSED
6 AUG 1968

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 1 OF 11

RBDP-20-2(1/68)

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: H REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 3

RECORD IDENTIFICATION

Cal. Yr.		Date: Mo.		Date: Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
2	8	Ø	4	Ø	8	1	Ø	1	Ø	1

Aircraft Injury Summary (cont'd)

"B" Injuries Navy		"B" Non Navy		"C" Injuries Navy		"C" Non Navy		"D" Injuries Navy		"D" Non Navy		"E" Injuries Navy		"E" Non Navy	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø

"F" Injuries Navy		"F" Non Navy		"G" Injuries Navy		"G" Non Navy		Total Injuries Navy		Total Non Navy		No. Occupants All Acft. Involved		
28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	1	Ø	Ø	Ø	Ø	1

ESCAPE SYS. DATA

Sys.	Component		Spec. Data														
43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59
B	Ø	Ø	H													

Component Separated From Aircraft		Pri Acft. Type		Pri Phase of Operation			1st Acft. Type		1st Phase of Operation			2nd Acft. Type		2nd Phase of Operation			Trans. Code	Card No.		
60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
		D	5	4	5		D	5	4	5		G	Ø	4	5		A	0	3	0

CARD 4

		3rd Acft. Type		3rd Phase of Operation			Type Operations		Contributing Causes							Pilot Error Causal Fac.: First		Second		Third		Pilot Factor After Fact	
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35
		B	3	A	2		3		1							H	Ø	H	5	X	H		

Other Personnel Causal Factor: First		Second		Third		Other Pers. Factor After Fact		Inv. Mat. Comp. 1st Causal Factor: Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

Involved Mat. Comp. (cont'd.)

2nd Causal Factor: Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		3rd Causal Factor: Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61

Material Fact. After Fact: Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Acft. Design Comp. Causal Factor: Cross Ref.	Component	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		DESIGN C F: Special Equipment	Pilot Equipment		Trans. Code	Card No.		
62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
															A	0	4	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 2 OF 11

R&DP-20-3(1/68)

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: H REVIEWED: ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 6

RECORD IDENTIFICATION

Date: Cal. Yr.		Date: Mo.		Date: Day		Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number	
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11
6	8	0	4	0	8	1	0	1	0	1

Weather Causal Factor (12–16); Facility Causal Factor (17); Facility Fact. After Fact (18–19); Environ. Factor (20–28)

12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28

Cause + Factor Primary (Misc / Wx Fact / Pers Factor)

Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
29	30	31	32	33	34	35
1					H	5

Cause + Factor 1st Possible (Misc. / Wx Fact / Pers Factor)

Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
36	37	38	39	40	41	42

Cause + Factor 2nd Possible (Misc / Wx Fact / Pers Factor)

Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
43	44	45	46	47	48	49

Cause + Factor 3rd Possible (Misc / Wx Fact / Pers Factor)

Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.	
50	51	52	53	54	55	56

Cause + Factor 4th Possible (Misc / Wx Fact / Pers Factor)

Mat	X Ref	COMP	Ass'y.		Sub Ass'y.		Special Attention
57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64

Special Data and Conditions

65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76
8	A	B	G	M							

Trans. Code	Card Number		
77	78	79	80
A	0	6	0

CARD 8

12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19

Material Special Data

First Code				Second Code				Third Code				Fourth Code				Fifth Code				Maneu. Prior To Occur.	OPERATOR INCAPACITATED C.P.
20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41

42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49

																						Multi. Occurrences			Multi. Maintenance Problems		Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																												0	8	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 3 OF 11

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: 4 REVIEWED ___ LOGGED: ___ PUNCHED: ___ VERIFIED: ___

CARD 9

Record Identification													Aircraft Data																		Power Plant Model Number
Date						Type Report	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number			D.I.S.	Year	Hours Since Acceptance				Since Last Insp.						Since Last Par/O'Haul							
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day														Type	Hours			Days		Activity	Hours				Months		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32–39
[illegible]	8	0	4	0	8	1	0	1	0	1			7	2	1	6	4	C	1	5	5	9	9	C		1	5	5		5	

Power Plant Serial Number		Primary Involved Material Component					Trans. Code	Card Number
		Manufacturers Part Number	Total Hours	Since Last Par/O'Haul				
				Activity	Number	Hours		
40–46	47–49	50–65	66–69	70	71	72–75	77	78–80
							A	0 0 9

CARD 10

Pot. Inv. Mat. Comp. (cont'd) Since Last Check Perf.			Possible or Secondary Involved Material Component								
			Manufacturers Part Number	Total Hours	Since Last Par/O'Haul			Since Last Check Perf.		
Type	Hours	Days			Activity	Number	Hours	Type	Hours	Days
12	13–15	16–17	18–33	34–37	38	39	40–43	44	45–47	48–49

	Trans. Code	Card Number
50–76	77	78–80
		0 1 0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 4 OF 4

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

([illegible] TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 11

[illegible] IDENTIFICATION											Controlling LSO's Carrier Pass Description (Start, Middle, In-Close, Ramp)
Date						Type [illegible]	Log Line Number		Aircraft Number		
Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12–39
2	9	0	4	0	8	1	0	1	0	1	

CLCPD (cont'd) — TOUCH-DOWN (columns 40–46)

Trans. Code	Card Number		
77	78	79	80
	1	1	0

CARD 12

File or Serial Number (Pilot)	Rank/Rate	Gr. of Service	Age	Yrs. [illegible]	Status	Position	Ind. [illegible]	[illegible] A/C	Trans. Code	Card Number		
62–68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
[redacted]	5	2	8	0	E	1	0	2	0	1	2	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 5 OF 4

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(CHECK TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 13

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
6	8	0	4	0	8	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	2			0	0			0	0	0	3	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	3	2	1	1		0	0

42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
0	0	0	0	0	0																														A	1	3	0

CARD 14

12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50

51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
																											1	4	0

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 6 OF 11

NMP-20-9(1/60)

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: H REVIEWED ___ LOGGED: ___ PUNCHED: ___ VERIFIED: ___

CARD 15

RECORD IDENTIFICATION: Date (Cal. Yr., Mo., Day), Type Report, Log Line Number, Aircraft Number; Emerg. Synt. Train. (Last 6 Months, Last 12 Months); Instrument Trainer (Last 6 Months, Last 12 Months); Time All Models (Total, Last 3 Months); Time This Model (Total, Last 3 Months); Inst. Hours Last 3 Months; Nite Hours Last 3 Months; Total Jet or Helo Time; Number of Carrier (Total, Day, Nite, Total Day This Model, Total Nite This Model)

Col	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12–40
Entry	2	8	Ø	4	Ø	8	1	Ø	1	Ø	1	

Landings (This Model Day Last 30 Days; This Model Nite Last 30 Days); This Individual in Acft.; Name (Instr. Plt. in Other Acft.); Number of Personnel Records; Trans. Code; Card Number

Col	41–69	70	71	72–76	77	78	79	80
Entry		Ø	1		A	1	5	Ø

CARD 16

P; File or Serial Number (All Persons); Name; Rank/Rate; Br. of Service; Age; Yrs. Exper.; Status; Position; Inj. to Indiv.; Abandon A/C; Card Code 65

Col	12	13–20	21–26	27–36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47–49
Entry	P		(b) (6) [redacted]	GENHEIMER	5	8	8	Ø	E	1	A	8	6	5	

Equip 1, Equip 2, Equip 3, Equip 4 (Basic Equip., Spec. Equip., Problem or Condition, Phase Related Special Data); Person Sequence Number; Trans. Code; Card Number

Col	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58–61	62	63	64–67	68	69	70–74	75	76	77	78	79	80
Entry	Z	Ø	6	3	I	A	E	8		E	E		H	Ø		Ø	1	A	1	6	Ø

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 2 OF 4

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: ___ REVIEWED ___ LOGGED: ___ PUNCHED: ___ VERIFIED: ___

CARD 17

RECORD IDENTIFICATION											Equip 5						Equip 6						Equip 7						Equip 8						Equip 9					
Card No.	Date: Mo.	Date: Day	Type Report	Log Like Number	Aircraft Number						Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data		
10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
2	0	4	4	0	8	1	0	1	0	1	J	1					M	C					A	1					D	C					B	5				

Equip 10						Equip 11						Equip 12						Equip 13						Equip 14											
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Person Response Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	1	2	3	4	5
N						S	6					S	1					S	2					P	4					0	1	A	1	7	0

CARD 18

Equip 15						Equip 16						Equip 17						Equip 18						Equip 19						Equip 20							
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data				
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49
L	5					R	F					S	F					K	5					O	1					R	1						

Equip 21						Equip 22						Equip 23						Equip 24										
Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Basic Equip.	Spec. Equip.	Problem or Condition	Phase Related Equip. Data			Person Response Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
R	9					Q	6					P	1											4	1	A	1	8	0

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 8 OF 11

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS)   CODED: [illegible] REVIEWED ____ LOGGED: ____ PUNCHED: ____ VERIFIED: ____

CARD 21

Column	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	26	27	28	29	30
Entry	6	8	0	4	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	A	A	I

Record Identification (Date: Cal. Yr., Mo., Day; Type Report; Serial Number; Aircraft Number); Equip 45; Equip 46; Equip 47; Equip 48; Card Code; Egress Problems (Prior, During, Subsequent); Airspeed; Weight; Card Number

Column	41	42	59	61	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	75	76	77	78	79	80
Entry	A	F	C	A	L	H	8	5	0	1	7	5	1	0	1	A	2	1	0

CARD 22

Column	18	19	20	30	31	32	33	36	37	38	39	40	41	44	46	47
Entry	7	A	A	0	1	1	5	5	7	7	7	0	E	H	A	D

Column	50	51	52	54	55	56	57	58	59	75	76	77	78	79	80
Entry	R	V	A	A	D	D	D	D	B	0	1	A	2	2	0

Card Code 07; Air Temperature; Water Temperature; Alerting Factors; Survival Factors; Time Lapse Last Training; Training Factors; Trans. Code; Card Number

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 9 OF 11

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: [initials] REVIEWED ___ LOGGED: ___ PUNCHED: ___ VERIFIED: ___

CARD 25

RECORD IDENTIFICATION (Date: Cal. Yr., Mo., Day; Type Report; Log Line Number; Aircraft Number); Survivor's Problems; Survivor's Condit. (During, After); Card Code 73; Weight; Height; Age

Col	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38
Value	2	8	0	4	0	8	1	0	1	0	1	7	3	1	3	9	6	7	2	7	3	5	3	2	4	2

Card Code 74; Supervisory Factors; Pre-Flight Factors; Experience Trng. Factors; Person Sequence Number; Trans. Code; Card Number

Col	42	43	44	45	46	47	50	51	52	53	54	57	64	68	69	70	75	76	77	78	79	80
Value	8	8	1	3	9	1	1	7	1	7	4	2	5	2	3	4	0	1	A	2	5	0

CARD 27

Design Factors; Communication Problems; Environmental Factors; Card Code 75; Psycho Physiological Factors

Col	39	40
Value	7	5

Psycho Physiological Factors (cont'd); Person Sequence Number; Trans. Code; Card Number

Col	65	67	72	75	76	77	78	79	80
Value	R	T	Y	0	1	A	2	7	0

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 10 OF 11

NAVAVNSAFECEN MISHAP CODE SHEET

(COMMON TO BOTH CARDS) CODED: H REVIEWED ___ LOGGED: ___ PUNCHED: ___ VERIFIED ___

CARD 29

Record Identification / Other Factors To Be Considered / Physical Defects Post Crash Exam.

Field	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12–21	22	23–26	27	28	29	30	31	32–37	38	39	40
Heading	Cal. Yr.		Mo.		Day		Type Report	Last Line Number		Aircraft Number					CARD CODE 77		Disposition	Body Position	Direction Facing				
Value	6	8	0	4	0	8	1	0	1	0	1		B		7	7	4	1	1		7		

Autopsy / Lab Toxicological Test On / Internal Injury

Field	41–42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51–57	58	59	60–74	75	76	77	78	79	80
Heading		Pri. Cause of Death				Performed					CARD CODE 78			Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
Value		8	6	5	1	1	8	1	0		7	8		0	1	A	2	9	0

CARD 30

Fractures (Group A, Group B) / Dis-Locations (Group A, Group B)

Field	12–46	47	48	49
Heading		CARD CODE 79		
Value		7	9	

Amputations/Avulsions / Soft Tissue Injuries (Group A, Group B)

Field	50–74	75	76	77	78	79	80
Heading		Person Sequence Number		Trans. Code	Card Number		
Value					3	0	0

PERSONNEL 1 OF 1

AIRCRAFT 1 OF 1

CODE SHEET 11 OF 4

REQUEST FOR DELETION OF RECORD OR CODING MODIFICATION FORM

FROM: L+W DEPT. DATE 7/6/65

TO: (1) CODING SECT BTB
(2) REC. CONT. BRANCH Chg 7/8
(3) ADPE DIV DP 9 JUL 1965
(4) REC. CONT. BRANCH _____

TRANSACTION CODES

D–Deletion of the entire MISHAP Master Record (use only cc 1–11 and code D in cc 77).

M–Modifying contents of any Master Record field. Use "99" in Person Seq. No. field, if field to be modified is in the Gen. Data Sect. of the Master Record. Otherwise use Person Seq. No. for the individual for which the change is to be made. These changes must be in Person Seq. No. order.

IDENTIFICATION NO.					AIRCRAFT NUMBER
YEAR	MONTH	DAY	MISHAP REPT. NO.	LOG NUMBER	
6 8	1 4	1 2	1 0	1 1	0 1

Genheimer FEB 145544

	FIELD NAME	CARD NUMBER	CARD COL. OF FLD. START ADD.	FIELD'S STARTING ADDRESS	PERSON SEQ. NUMBER	FIELD LENGTH	DATA TO BE INSERTED (LEFT JUSTIFIED)	TAPE REC DIV. NO.	TRANS. CODE
1	SOURCE	1	12	0 6 1	2 0	0 1			
2									
3								0 1	M

NOTE: (1) For deletions of codes in a given field, leave the "DATA TO BE INSERTED" field blank and use "TRANS CODE" M in cc 77.

(2) Only corrections applying to personnel in one TAPE RECORD DIV. may be shown on a single CHANGE REQUEST form.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

SIGNATORS SIGNATURE

I.D. Number	2	8	0	4	0	8	1	0	1		/				/						/	K		
	1 2 Yr.		3 4 Mth.		5 6 Day		7 Typ		8 9 Log		10 Typ Brief		13	14	15 Narr File I.D.		69 Cl.	70	71	72	73 Orig. Use		75 76 Tot-Cds		77 Trans. Code	78

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS CODE
1 - Non-Class
2 - Conf.

TYPE BRIEFS
CODES
1 - GEN. MISHAP
2 - BIO-MED
3 - SAF-SURV
4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO. 01 CODED [illegible] REVIEWED _____ KEY PUNCHED _____ VERIFIED _____

01	ACFT STALLED & CRASHED ACFT BROKE FOR LANDING. PLT E
02	JECT AT 100 FT WITH ACFT IN DIVE-FATAL (OUTSIDE EJEC E
03	NVELOPE). ACFT BROKE TO RIGHT WITH A MODERATE RATE OF
04	ROLL. POSIT ANGLE 180 WAS AROUND 2/3 NORMAL. NOSE OF
05	ACFT THEN DRS TO PITCH DOWN & RT WING DROP. IP CALLED
06	EJEC 4 TIMES WHEN HE OBS ACFT STALL. PLT WAITED TOO
07	ADAG TO INITIATE EJEC. TIMES REVLD GEAR DOWN BUT NOT
08	LOCKED, SB BRAKES EXTENDED, WING IN DOWN POSIT. NWT 2
09	WAS NOT FOUND MISSING ON STBD DROOP BELL CRANK NUT IS
10	NOT CONSIDERED TO HAVE CAUSED A DEGP FAILURE. PLT H
11	ISTORY OF LOW GRADES IN TRNG CMD & FAG. PLT RECD EXTR
12	A TIME, HAD 2 STUDENT PLTS DISPOSITION BOARDS. SHOWE
13	D IMMATURITY & GEN LACK OF RESPONSIBILITY. PRI-FLT (AB
14	LED TO RECOVER FROM STALL AT LOW ALT)
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	

CARD NO.

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 Typ Brief	13 Nav	14 File	15 I.D.	69 CL	70 71 72 73 Orig. Use	75 76 Tot-Cds	77 Trans. Code	78 Code
	6 8	0 4	0 8	1	0 1	2				1		1 1	A	

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS CODE
1 - Non-Class
2 - Conf

TYPE BRIEFS
CODES
1 - GEN. MISHAP
2 - BIO-MED
3 - SAF-SURV
4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO. CODED ______ REVIEWED ______ KEY PUNCHED ______ VERIFIED ______

CARD NO. 11 12	16–68
01	ACFT MAKING A VFR TACAN APPROACH WAS INADVERTENTLY ST
02	ALLED & IMPACTED SHALLOW WATER. PLT EJT AT APPROX 10
03	FT, 250 KNOTS & REC'D FATAL INJ. [redacted]
04	
05	
06	INVESTIGATION OF PLT'S PAST HISTORY REVLD AN APPARENT
07	IMMATURE PERSONALITY & EXTREMELY MARGINAL FLYING ABIL
08	ITY. HE WAS INVOLVED IN A PATERNITY SUIT & BASED ON
09	PAST PERFORMANCE & GRADES IN FLT TRAINING & RAG THE F
10	LT SURGEON SERIOUSLY QUESTIONS THE DECISION TO ASSIGN
11	THIS PLT TO HIGH PERFORMANCE JET SQD.
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	

CARD NO.

I.D. Number	1 2 Yr.	3 4 Mo.	5 6 Day	7 Typ	8 9 Log	10 Typ Brief	13 14 15 Narr File I.D.	69 CL	70 71 72 73 Orig. Usa	75 76 Tot-Cds	77 78 Trans. Code
	6 8 0 4 0 8 1 0 1					3	N N N		1 9 8		0 3	A

Common Fields to All Cards

CLASS CODE
1 - Non-Class
2 - Conf

TYPE BRIEFS
CODES
1 - GEN. MISHAP
2 - BIO-MED
3 - SAF-SURV
4 - PSYCHO

CARD NO. CODED M.C.T. REVIEWED _____ KEY PUNCHED _____ VERIFIED _____

CARD NO.	
01	EJT WATER, OUTSIDE ENVELOPE. EJT OCCURRED ESTIMATED //
02	6[illegible] FT, 250 KTS IN A NEAR VERTICAL DIVE. PRCHT DID NOT
03	OPEN. NO KNOWN EQUIP MAL.
04	
05	
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CARD NO.

NAVAL SAFETY CENTER
NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23511

12/hs
Ser 942
6 Aug 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From: Commander, Naval Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Fleet Composite Squadron FIVE

Subj: VC-5 AAR ser 1-68A concerning F-8B Bu No 146844 accident occurring 8 April 1968, pilot GENHEIMER

1. The subject report and all endorsements thereon have been reviewed. Commander, Naval Safety Center concurs with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. The cause of this accident has been recorded at the NAVSAFECEN indicating the PILOT (failed to recognize a stall and initiate proper corrective action) as the single cause factor.

(b) (6) [redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ (AIR 09E) (2)
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMFAIRWESTPAC
OIC VC-5 DET NAHA
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
CO NAVAERORECOVFAC

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ADP-8 (11-67)

DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE OUT" LETTER ON ORIGINAL REVIEW

NOTE:
1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the "close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

MBM DEPARTMENT:

Concur with the rough close out letter

JRB 2318

N/231

INITIAL/CODE

AERO-MED DEPARTMENT:

Concur with rough close out letter. Aeromedical conclusions pretty well sum up why this accident happened. / [illegible]/32

INITIAL/CODE

ABP-7 (11-67)

COMPLETION SHEET

Action to: Correction to:	Action Required	Completed Code/Date
3700-T		/
DIR		/
Misc Items for Action or Correction		

To Code	From Code/Date	
	/	Original received- 6-20-68
	/	CLOSED 6 AUG 1968
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UNIT VC-5
MODEL F8B
BUNO 145544

AAR REVIEW ROUTING SHEET

ADVANCE ROUTING

FRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER DEPT. ROUTING:
	M&M		7-17-68	[illegible]	
	AERO-MED	8 JUL 68		MDC	[illegible] 8B

DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES INITIALS FOR RECEIPT OF REPORTS:

REMARKS:

ORIGINAL ROUTING

DEADLINE DATE OUT OF NASC 23 JUL 1968

EXTENSIONS

DEPT	DATE IN	DEPT DEADLINE	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER DEPT ROUTING
AOA	7/19/68		7/31/68	[illegible]	

NASC ENDORSEMENT ROUTING

FRI	DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT
1	R&S			
2	M&M			
3	ADMIN			

ROUTING AFTER CLOSEOUT

DEPT	DATE IN	DATE OUT	INIT	INTER DEPT ROUTING
AEROMED				

NOTES: 1. No person other than those assigned to the Records Control Branch will remove any part of this document from the folder.
2. Departments will be fully responsible and accountable for documents in their custody until checked back into Records Control Branch.
3. Any department desiring to retain this report longer than five (5) working days must notify Records Control Branch of their need for extension.

3750
Ser/ 4531

17 JUN 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT ON VC-5 AAR ser 1-68A concerning F8B BuNo 145544 accident occurring 8 Apr 1968, pilot [illegible]

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander, Naval Safety Center

Subj: VC-5 AAR ser 1-68A

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3750.6F

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board, as modified by the remarks contained in subsequent endorsements.

2. Although the pilot was weak in the training command and in RAG training, the RAG considered his performance to be satisfactory. However, there appears to be a correlation in the most probable cause in this accident and past performance indicating that the pilot was not a responsible person.

3. The medical officer's report is not signed by the appointing authority as required by reference (a). The second paragraph of the medical officer's aeromedical conclusions and recommendations effectively expresses the reasons for this accident.

(b) (6) [redacted]
Force Aviation Safety Officer

Copy to:
NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
COMFAIRWESTPAC
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
CO NAVAERORECOVFAC EL CENTRO
OIC FLECOMPRON FIVE DET NAHA
CO FLECOMPRON FIVE DET NAHA ?
DIR AFIP

ORIGINAL

3750
Ser: 019/1338
5 June 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VC-5, accident, serial 1-68A, concerning F8B, BUNO 145544, of 8 April 1968, pilot GEMMEIMER

From: Commander Fleet Air, Western Pacific
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VC-5 AAR ser 1-68A

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3750.6P

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by the remarks contained in FIRST and SECOND Endorsements.

2. Paragraph 26 of reference (a) requires the Aviation Safety Officer to be a member of the Aircraft Accident Board. In this instance, the Aviation Safety Officer was the senior member of an accident board investigating an aircraft accident that occurred three days earlier in the squadron. It would have been impracticable for the Aviation Safety Officer to have been a member of two boards simultaneously. Therefore the deviation from the requirement of reference (a) appears warranted.

H. P. LANHAM

Copy to:
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM
NAVPLANTREPO DALLAS
NAVAEROMEDCPAC
ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
CO VC-5

ORIGINAL

VC-5/00/nl
3750
Ser 427A
18 May 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VC-5 AAR Ser 1-68A concerning F8B BUNO 145544, of 5 April 1968, pilot GENHEIMER

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Composite Squadron FIVE
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Fleet Air, Western Pacific
(2) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VC-5 AAR 1-68A; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board and the first endorsement except as follows:

a. LTJG GENHEIMER held a high G level on the aircraft after the break and the stall was approached rapidly. Under this condition, the warning motions of the aircraft prior to the stall are less apparent, and behavior at the stall is more violent. At low airspeeds or Mach numbers, all stall warnings are less intense, and greater caution must be used to prevent inadvertent stalls. When the aircraft was stalled and uncontrolled flight entered at 1500 feet, the pilot's only remaining course of action was to eject immediately. The NATOPS Flight Manual states that the following three major errors of technique are associated with stalls/spins in the F-8:

(1) Getting into the stall/spin initially.

(2) Not using proper recovery technique.

(3) Not abandoning the aircraft when recovery unsuccessful.

All of these errors are easily avoided by eliminating the first one.

b. Although described as a motivated and aggressive individual, LTJG GENHEIMER's flight performance as a student, both in the Naval Air Training Command and the Replacement Air Group, was consistantly marginal. It is considered unreasonable to expect that an individual who has demonstrated a lack of average proficiency in training type aircraft can safely make the transition into a high performance aircraft such as the F-8. The recommendation that aviators of LTJG GENHEIMER's quality and past level of performance be more closely evaluated at all levels is strongly concurred in. If they are to be retained, they must receive additional training prior to assignment to fleet squadrons.

VC-5/00/nl
3750

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

2. All aspects of deployed operations have been re-examined and corrective action taken in the areas of maintenance supervision and quality control. A more positive system of ensuring that required special inspections are complied with when aircraft are deployed has been instituted.

Copy to:
NAVAVNSAFECN (2)
NAVAIRSYS COM, AIR 404
NAVPLANTREPOPC
NAVAERORECPAC
AFIP
COMNAVAIRPAC
OIC, VC-5 DET NAHA

• ORIGINAL •

VC-5NAPA/11:mdw
3750
01 MAY 1968

SPECIAL HANDLING IN ACCORDANCE
WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VC-5 AAR Ser 1-68A concerning F8B BUNO 145544, of 05 April 1968, pilot GENFEINER

From: Officer in Charge, Fleet Composite Squadron FIVE, Detachment NAPA
To: Commander Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, Fleet Composite Squadron FIVE
(2) Commander Fleet Air Western Pacific
(3) Commander Naval Air Forces U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: VC-5 AAR 1-68A; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board except as modified by the following comments:

a. Training Grades noted in the AAR Part VII and enclosure (1) point out that in seven out of 10 areas LTJG GENFEINER's grades were in the lower 15% of all students, and in only 3 areas was his performance in the 50% or better range. While it is realized that fleet requirements frequently necessitate continuing training of proven "borderline" students by the training command, it is recommended that serious consideration be given to assignment of these marginal aviators to other than a high performance jet pipeline; or if already in the jet pipeline, that they be transferred to a reciprocating pipeline.

b. Quality control and thorough maintenance procedures cannot be overemphasized, especially when operating with older aircraft which require additional periodical inspections. As the inspection problem for aircraft which are temporarily deployed away from their home base or ship is common throughout the Navy, it is recommended that standardized procedures covering this problem be delineated.

2. An Aviation Safety Survey was completed on 22 March 1968. Nothing disclosed in this safety survey was related to the cause or contributory elements of this accident.

R. F. BALLEW

Copy to:
NAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
NAVAIRSYS COM, AIR 404
NAVPLANTREPOFC
NAVAERORECPAC
AFIP
CO VC-5
COMFAIRWESTPAC
COMNAVAIRPAC

ORIGINAL

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev. 3-63) Page 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Para. 46, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.4, effective [illegible]

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART I GENERAL

SECTION A. IDENTIFICATION

1 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY	2 SERIAL NO	3 DTG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP	4 MODEL AIRCRAFT	5 BUREAU NUMBER
Commanding Officer, VC-5	1-68A	081231I April	F8B	145544

6	9 LOCATION OF MISHAP	10 BASING
TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center	260° 10NM NAHA TACAN 26-10N 127-38E	ALPHA

7 VIA:
- Officer in Charge, VC5 NAHA
- Commanding Officer, VC-5
- Commander Fleet Air Western Pacific
- Commander Naval Air Forces U.S. Pacific Fleet

11 TIME OF DAY	12 TIME IN FLIGHT	13 FLIGHT CODE
MID-DAY	1+13	1A1

14 CLEARED FROM NAHA AIR BASE TO NAHA AIR BASE

15 TYPE CLEARANCE	16 AIRSPEED	17 [illegible]
VFR Local	250E	20700 lbs 34.34% MAC

18 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP: Aircraft in 1500 ft break, stalled and contacted shoal water in near vertical attitude, unsuccessful ejection.

19 ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP: 0 TERRAIN: 0

20 LIST MODEL, BUNO, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form ITEMS for each A/C): N/A

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
X	1 PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT		9 SERVICING PERSONNEL		17 WEATHER
	2 PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES		10 LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER		18 OTHER AIRCRAFT
	3 PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM		11 OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)		19 DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
	4 PILOT OTHER (Specify)		12 ADMINISTRATIVE		20 DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
	5 CREW		13 FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN, TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK		21 ROLLING/PITCHING DECK, ROUGH SEAS
	6 MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		14 FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (GCA, GCA, ILS, MIRROR)		22 MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
	7 MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		15 FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or field)		23 UNDETERMINED
	8 SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify)		16 FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)		24 OTHER (Specify)

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA

1 NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	2 RANK	3 [illegible]	4 [illegible]	5 [illegible]	6 AGE	7 [illegible]	8 DUTY	9 [illegible]	10 [illegible]
PILOT (at controls at time of mishap): GENHEIMER, Richard A.	LTJG	(b) (6) [redacted]	1315	USNR	27	4/1967	Pilot	Pilot	A
CO-PILOT (Identify & address separately, page 2): N/A									

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

ITEM			ITEM		
11 ALL MODELS		371.1	17 CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	17 / 0
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
12 ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		204.1	18 FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	ALL	139 / 0
				IN MODEL	0 / 0
13 ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		24.4	19 INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL	1.5 / 0.9
				IN MODEL	1.5 / 0.9
14 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C	15.2	20 NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	ALL	0 /
	OFT/CPT	NA / NA		IN MODEL	0 /
15 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	15.2	21 TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (If jet mishap)		333.4
	OFT/CPT	NA / NA			
16 ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	15.2	22 LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE	05 April 68
	OFT/CPT	NA / NA		DURATION	1.1
23 DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK		2-23-68 QUAL	24 TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD		STAN

OTHER PERS.

25 NAME (Last, first, & middle initial)	26 [illegible]	27 [illegible]	28 [illegible]	29 [illegible]	30 [illegible]	31 [illegible]	32 [illegible]	33 [illegible]
N/A								

OPNAV ** ejection.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1A (Rev 3-83) Page [redacted]

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED in accordance with Para. 66, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6, [redacted] edition

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART II MAINTENANCE MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

A. A/C HISTORY

1. DATE OF MANUFACTURE	2. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	3. NO. OF PAR/OVERHAUL	4. MONTHS SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	5. FLT HRS. SINCE LAST PAR/OVERHAUL	6. LAST/PAR OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	8. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	9. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
6-25-59	2163.9	6	5	155.0	FAMPRA JAC-Atlanta	CAL	155.0	142

B. ENGINE HISTORY

NA

	1. ENGINE MODEL	2. ENGINE SERIAL NUMBER	3. FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	4. NUMBER OF OVERHAULS	5. HRS SNR REQUESTED?	6. FLT HRS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	7. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	8. TYPE OF LAST CHECK PERFORMED	9. FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	10. DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
(1)										
(2)										
(3)										
(4)										

C. COMPONENT HISTORY

NA

	1. COMPONENT INVOLVED NOMENCLATURE	2. MANUFACTURERS PART NUMBER	3. TOTAL HRS ON PART	4. NO. OF O/H HAULS	5. HOURS SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	6. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY	7. HRS SNR REQUESTED?	8. SER. NO. FOR REPAIR
(1)								
(2)								
(3)								
(4)								

D. INCIDENTS & GROUND ACCIDENTS

NA

1. PARTS REPAIRED		3. DIRECT MANHOURS INVOLVED	2. PARTS REPLACED	
PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE		PART NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE

E. ENGINE FAILURES

NA

JET ENGINE FLAMEOUT (Include intentional securing to prevent engine damage)

AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	1. ALTITUDE	2. IAS	3. RPM	4. EGT	5. MANEUVER AT TIME OF FLAMEOUT	6. FUEL FLOW	7. ATTITUDE

8. G FORCES	9. RELIGHT ☐ ATTEMPTED ☐ ACCOMPLISHED	10. ALTITUDE	11. IAS	12. MAX EGT	13. FUEL CONTROL ☐ PRIMARY ☐ MANUAL	14. NO RELIGHT ATTEMPTS

INTENTIONAL SECURE	15. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	16. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS

RECIPROCATING ENGINE FAILURE

17. ALTITUDE	18. IAS	19. ATTITUDE	20. RPM	21. MAP	22. TORQUE/SHP	23. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE	24. OIL PRESSURE

INTENTIONAL SECURE	25. ENGINE SYMPTOMS	26. CAUSE OF SYMPTOMS

F. OTHER REPORT

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS MISHAP

1. ASSIGN SERIAL NUMBER: NA
2. DIO MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP: NA
3. OTHER
4.

NA G. SHIPS DATA

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED: CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR ☐	2. PRESSURE SETTING	3. WIND OVER DECK	4. RELATIVE WIND	5. APPROACH/END SPEED
6. MARK NUMBER	7. MODEL NUMBER	8. LOCATION OF SHIP	9. LAUNCHING ENGLE AND ENGLE ARRESTED	
10. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR MEMORANDUMS USED				

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or ... damage to ... and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS — CONSTANT PRESSURE: DONE (P.S.I.)	RATIO	CONSTANT RUNOUT (WT. LBS.)	15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS (for cable failures specify no. landings and results in service)
DECK PENDANT							
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER/ BARRICADE							

NA H. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED CONUS	3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	4. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD		
5. INST. HOURS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT AERIAL/SIMULATED	6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LAST 30 DAYS

I. WEATHER

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING
1/80ω3000	6+	130/15	RUNWAY NA / OUTSIDE AIR 25°C	17°C	30.18

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (...)
Horizontal visibility good enough to see Kerama Islands 12 miles west Naha.

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	1. REMARKS
1	A	18	ejection

2. COPY DISTRIBUTION
SOC ...
////////////////
1cc NAVAIRSYSCOM (AIR 404)
1cc NAVPLANTREPOFC
1cc NAVAEROREGFAC
1cc AFIP
1cc CO, VC-5
1cc COMFAIRWESTPAC
1cc COMNAVAIRPAC
1cc OINC, VC-5NAHA

COST DAMAGE TO: 3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY (b) (6) [redacted] 4. PRIVATE PROPERTY NA

5. DATE SUBMITTED TO CO: 24 APRIL 1968

SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD

1. [redacted] UNIT BILLET

2. (b) (6) [redacted]
Administrative Officer UNIT BILLET

3. FLIGHT ... (b) (6) [redacted]
LT [redacted]

3. (b) (6) [redacted]
Training Officer UNIT BILLET

When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indic... (b) (6) [redacted] ...d corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

4. [redacted]
Public Affairs Officer

THE ACCIDENT

LTJG GENHEIMER was scheduled for a local FAM flight on the morning of 8 April 1968. The flight was his third FAM flight in model since reporting aboard Fleet Composite Squadron FIVE Detachment NAHA on 18 March 1968. His chase pilot was LT (b) (6), a well qualified pilot in F-8 aircraft with over 600 hours in model. The flight was scheduled for a 1030 estimated time of departure on the squadron flight schedule (Enclosure 8). Estimated time enroute was 1+45. The flight and briefing were delayed for an all officers' meeting with the pilot and chase pilot briefing at 1000 in the Ready Room. After briefing, the pilots checked the yellow sheets and pre-flighted their aircraft. LT (b) (6) (Instructor Pilot) was assigned "Checkertail 39" and LTJG GENHEIMER (FAM Pilot) was assigned "Checkertail 12".

The aircraft were manned and taxied to the duty runway, becoming airborne at 1118 local. After a normal familiarization flight, the two aircraft returned to Naha Air Base for landing runway 18. The weather was 3000 scattered with 6+ miles visibility. LTJG GENHEIMER had been experiencing transmitter difficulty but was able to receive; he was signaled to join up on the right wing and break first as briefed for an aircraft with communications difficulty. (Enclosure 4-2).

At 1230 the two aircraft entered the break for runway 18 at 1500 feet. LTJG GENHEIMER broke first and LT (b) (6) followed with an interval placing him approximately 500 feet from the first aircraft. During this turn the aircraft was observed by the Instructor pilot to continue in a turn to a close abeam position where it assumed a nose down position and continued until striking the water in a near vertical dive. The seat was observed leaving the aircraft approximately 100 feet prior to aircraft impact.

THE WRECKAGE

UE 12 struck the water in approximately an 80° nose down heading approximately 170° magnetic. Enclosure (10-1) and (10-2) show the crash scene. After impact the fuselage broke off between the cockpit and the ammunition cans. The initial impact threw debris that consisted of three 20 mm cannons, radar screen, gunsight, nose gear and many small components. The area from the center of the cockpit to the ammunition cans, although twisted and unrecognizable, remained intact and constitutes the northern most piece of wreckage (Encl. 10-1)

The remainder of the aircraft still traveling south then deposited both main landing gear assemblies, generator, speed brake and associated parts. Since both main landing gear and speed brakes were found on the port side of the estimated track of the aircraft, it is believed that the aircraft was facing a more south westerly direction. This is substantiated by the fact the port wing received more damage than the starboard and the ejection seat was found west of the extended track of the aircraft.

Next in the secuence the fuselage and engine broke again between the high speed and low speed compressor sections discharging the wings and the low speed compressor section.

At this time the empenage, high speed compressor, turbine and after burner section remained intact. This section continued south and came to rest on the port UHT and vertical stabilazer snapping the vertical stabilazer off throwing it farther south and crushing the port UHT. The final resting place of the tail section was approximately 30 yards heading 170° magnetic from the initial impact point (Encl. 9)

The track of the aircraft was determined from the location of the cockpit, main portion of debris, tail section and the canopy. A line drawn through these items indicated a heading of 160° - 170° magnetic. The canopy was located approximately 100 yards from the initial impact point. It should be noted that the location of the canopy is not reliable due to its ability to float and the action of the tides.

The engine appeared to have power on it at the time of impact. The main shaft broke from a twisting force between the high speed and the low speed compressor sections (Encl. 10-4). In both the high and low speed sides the compressor blades were either sheared or bent opposite the direction of engine rotation (Encl. 10-3). The guide vanes were bent in the direction of engine rotation. Investigation which was confirmed by the Pratt Whitney Technical Representitive (Encl. 6) indicates that the engine was operating above 80% RPM. It is also the concensus of the board that the aircraft was intact, except for the canopy and ejection seat, prior to impact. The starboard outboard droop was found about five yards north of the initial impact area

INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

At the time of the accident the Accident Board members were in the squadron area and were immediately assigned various tasks. Statements were obtained from all available witnesses. A member was dispatched to the crash site where a wreckage diagram and photographs were obtained and salvage operations were commenced. The wingman was met at his aircraft after landing and isolated in order to get his statement (Encl 4-2).

The USAF SAR helo with the pilot's remains was met at the Naha Air Force Operations ramp in order to get statements from SAR personnel. Statements were not given but were to be forwarded to VC-5 Naha through Air Force channels.

Initial wreckage parts and pieces arrived from the crash site at 1915 hours on the day of the accident. The ejection seat and associated survival equipment was recovered the first day, along with a part of the starboard outboard droop and attaching fittings. The fitting bolt indicated that the nut was missing prior to impact (Encl 10-19). This presented the possibility of a material failure. —

Salvage operations were completed two days after the accident with all of the major components and most of the associated debris having been recovered at this time.

Examination of crash diagram and the overhead photograph of the crash scene revealed that the aircraft contacted the water in a nose down attitude on a heading of 170 degrees. The path of the wreckage and the scatter pattern indicated an extreme nose down attitude.

Initial impact ripped the nose section and cockpit from the aircraft, the wings and landing mounts separated at this time. The engine was broken in two with such force that the shaft was extremely deformed and sheared (Encl 10-4). Investigation indicated that the engine was turning at a power setting above 80% RPM (Encl 6).

The seat was located 70 yards from the initial impact. Because of the nature of the accident in which an ALFA injury occurred during the ejection sequence, considerable attention was placed on recovery of all sections of the seat and the escape system. The seat, pilot, drogue and main chute were found approximately 50 feet south of the main aircraft wreckage in three feet of water. The seat was broken into four main pieces which were laid out in order for identification (Encl 10-5).

The canopy was recovered and it was determined that it had properly separated from the aircraft. The canopy interrupter had not been utilized and the canopy plexiglass was not broken. The primary and auxiliary seat cartridges had fired and both drogue gun and timed release mechanism trip rods were pulled free. The drogue gun had fired extracting the drogue piston, the controller drogue and the stabilizer drogue. The timed release mechanism had operated releasing the seat kit, leg restraint lines, shoulder restraint lines and the drogue shackle scissors. Almost simultaneously the seat and pilot struck the water. The force of the impact threw the pilot forward approximately ten feet pulling out some of the pilot's parachute. Although the drogue shackle scissors had released, impact took place before the drogue assembly could pull the linkline, retainer pins and withdrawal line free, therefore the linkline was still routed through the guillotine and the face curtain was still retained by a retainer pin (Encl 10-6).

From eye witness reports the ejection sequence was initiated at approximately 100 to 150 feet above the water with the aircraft in a near vertical dive with approximately 250 knots of airspeed. The aircraft was observed to impact the water followed shortly by the seat (1 to 2 seconds). Damage to the pilot's APH-6 and the back of the seat (the drogue chute container) indicate the pilot was in the seat on impact (Encl 10-6 & 10-7). This is again pointed out by matching damage and red paint on the oxygen mask yoke and the face curtain handle (Encl 10-8). Damage to the hard survival kit matching the seat damage also indicates the kit had been released by the timed release mechanism but was still in the seat on impact. These facts are confirmed by injuries sustained by the pilot (Encl 1).

The investigation concluded that the landing gear had been selected to the down position, the port main gear was full down, but not locked (the length of the cylinder was 40.5 inches, which is 1 inch from full down). Starboard main mount was full down and locked (the length of actuator was 39.5 inches). The nose gear actuator was 29 inches which was part way between full down of 21.3 inches and full up on 34.6 inches. The wing was mechanically unlocked but the wing actuator was found in the down position. The speed brakes were fully extended.

The right hand outboard droop bell cranks (PN CV15-81056-006) had failed at the short leg of the bell crank assembly (Encl 10-20). Cotter pin (AN 381-4-20), nut (AN 320-C-10) and washer (AN 960D 1016L) were missing from the outboard short leg of the bell crank. The failure was ductile tensile type failure as evidenced by the 45 degree edge, distortion and necking down (Encl 10-21). It was an instantaneous failure caused by an overload.

The possibility of an inflight failure of the bell crank was investigated. The forces necessary to fail this part were not encountered during this flight excepting the unknown stall loading and impact forces. The bell crank in question was disconnected on another aircraft which allowed the outer droop to hang ten to twelve degrees lower than normal and allow for excessive play.

PERSONNEL FACTORS

LTJG Richard GEMHEIMER reported aboard 3/18/68 and thus was known by squadron personnel for only 21 days. He impressed the officers with whom he spoke for any length of time as being well motivated, enthusiastic and eager to fly. His previous two hops in the F8-B were without incident and went smoothly. LTJG GEMHEIMER had successfully taken the local course rules examination and F-8 Natops examinations.

Several sources of information do shed some light on possible pilot factors. In a tape recording dictated to his mother the night before the accident he expressed his desire to be in a fighter squadron, but he did not want to go to RVN. He told of his disdain for "prop pilots" and the "VC attitude here". He then spoke of his performance in his FAM-2 flight in flowing terms. During routine briefings before FAM-1 and FAM-3 he seemed to be impatient with the instructor pilot. His knowledge of the aircraft displayed during briefings and informal discussions was not considered impressive.

LTJG GEMHEIMER graduated from Ohio State University in 1965 after 6 years of intermittent academic effort. His grade point average was 2.03 on a scale of A=4.0 B=3.0 C=2.0 D=1.0 and F=0.0. He was warned by the dean ten times and placed on scholastic probation once. This information was obtained from his college transcript.

Perusal of LTJG GEMHEIMER's log book and flight jacket reveals that at VT-1 he had to repeat his presolo check. In the T-2 he had 5 hops that were graded "Incomplete" and 13 hops labeled as "Extra Time". In the F-9 he repeated 6 hops. He sat in front of a Student Pilot Disposition Board on two seperate occasions. Examination of the Naval Aviator Training Stage Grade CNATRA Form 1542/5 in his flight jacket reveals that in advanced jets his performance fell in the following percentile areas:

	PERCENTILES	(GRADE)	GEMHEIMER'S GRADE
FAM	85% (3.08)	50% (3.01)	3.02
BASIC INST	15% (3.00)	2% (2.94)	2.97
INST NAV	15% (2.94)	2% (2.85)	2.89
ADV FAM	85% (3.07)	50% (3.00)	3.01
FORM TACT	50% (3.03)	15% (2.97)	3.02
NIGHT FAM	15% (2.99)	2% (2.92)	2.98
OPTL NAV	15% (2.96)	2% (2.86)	2.93
AIR GROUND	50% (3.04)	15% (3.01)	3.03
TACTICS		15% (3.03)	3.03
CQ	98% (3.08)	85% (3.00)	3.01

In VF-126 while flying TA-4's he had two flights graded as unsatisfactory and had one hearing before the Human Factors Committee which awarded extra time. Pertinent comments by instructors on his evaluation sheets include "no scan" and "instructor had to handle the radios while the student flew the aircraft".

No records were received from VF-124 the F-8 R/G other than that he had achieved a final grade of 2.95 and had a total of 11.4 hours in the F-8. This time was in the F-8C and E not the F-8B, the model in which he flew the three flights at VC-5.

Not much is known of LTJG GERHEIMER personal life other than the fact that he had impregnated the same girl twice; the last pregnancy was 4-5 months along at the time of the accident. The girl in question reportedly desired to marry him despite the fact that she, after learning of her impending motherhood, planned to marry another man as soon as possible. She later broke off her engagement of convenience and informed LTJG GERHEIMER that she had announced to all of her friends that she was married to him. LTJG GERHEIMER reportedly stated that he didn't "love" this girl, would not marry her and was concerned only with what his financial responsibilities would be.

Based on the above evidence only, LTJG GERHEIMER's efforts and achievements can tentatively best be described as poorly planned and marginal if not truly inadequate, despite his enthusiasm and motivation. He cannot be characterized as responsible. Historically there is no trace of a truly professional approach toward any endeavor he had recently pursued. Based on his performance in the training command and later in the R/G it can be stated that this man was an inferior aviator.

CONCLUSIONS

It is the opinion of the board that the primary cause of the accident was the failure of the pilot to recognise a prestall buffet or actual stall entry and failure to initiate proper recovery procedures. From examination of the wreckage it was determined the aircraft was in a configuration with gear, wing and speedbrakes in the down position. The wingman stated that the aircraft was "two-thirds the normal distance abeam" and shortly thereafter saw the nose pitch down and the right wing drop. In the F-8 type aircraft the stall is marked by a definite wing drop, roll, or snap roll. Proper recovery is accomplished by immediately relaxing all stick and rudder forces, allowing controls to return to normal, then pushing the stick forward of neutral as required to reduce angle of attack. At a low altitude and increasing rate of descent there may have been some hesitation on the part of the pilot to reduce back pressure or push the stick forward. Any use of aileron during the stall or stall recovery would not have been effective and might have developed sufficient yaw to result in a spin.

The possibility of a material failure or maintenance factor in regards to a missing nut and washer on the starboard droop bell crank must be considered, although it is the conclusion of the board that the missing nut would not have caused a droop failure by itself. The forces and stress placed on the aircraft during buffet, stall and uncontrolled flight may have caused a failure prior to or on impact. The starboard droop was found only five yards from the initial impact area and this in itself does not substantiate an inflight failure.

The pilot's failure to initiate a timely ejection despite four voice commands to do so by the instructor pilot may have been the result of his being pre-occupied with his stall recovery efforts or the fact he was behind the aircraft as he had been many times in the past. The investigation could find no malfunction in the escape system and must conclude that the ejection sequence was initiated at too great a dive angle and rate of descent for the remaining altitude to successfully obtain pilot/seat separation or pilot chute deployment.

RECOMMENDATION

1. It is recommended that aviators of LTJG GENHEIMER's quality and past level of aeronautical performance (i.e, two student pilots disposition boards in the Naval Air Training Command coupled with extra time flights in the Replacement Air Group) be more closely evaluated at all levels. If they are to be retained, it is recommended that they receive additional training in the Replacement Air Group on an individual evaluated basis as a matter of procedure.

2. It is recommended that VC-5 review procedures in Maintenance Control and insure compliance with all special inspections. Quality control of workmanship should be improved. The responsibility for compliance with special inspections must remain with the reporting custodian. A review of the aircraft records prior to TAD assignments and a periodical review while detached is mandatory in order to insure that inspection requirements are met.

VC-5 Serial 1-68A, 8 April 1968, F-8B, BUNO 145544, pilot [redacted]

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

ENCLOSURES

ENCL.	TITLE
1	Medical Officer's Report
2	Rescue Report, OPNAV Form 3750-13
3	Maintenance Officer's Statement
4	Witness Statements
5	Aviation Equipment Resume
6	Technical Assistance Statement
7	Resume of Pilot Experience
8	Copy of Flight Plan
9	Wreckage Diagram and Sketches
10	Photographs

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

GENHeimer 4-8-68
VC-5 F8B

ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
WASHINGTON D. C. 20305

REPORT OF POST-MORTEM BIOCHEMICAL FINDINGS ON AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT FATALITY

IDENTIFICATION

GARNER, RICHARD A 1277512
LTJG USN (b) (6)
USSN FPO SF 96662
16 APR 68 A-6A-3B AP FROZEN T Lab

TO
Chief, Laboratory Service
U.S. Naval Hospital
FPO San Francisco 96662

cc CO, USSAAC, Norfolk, Va. 23511
CNO OP-05F, Wash., D. C. 20360

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA: AIRCRAFT TYPE: AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER:

2. TOXICOLOGY:

A. CARBON MONOXIDE

BLOOD OR TISSUE CONCENTRATION EXPRESSED AS CARBOXYHEMOGLOBIN SATURATION IS . . . . . Blood - less than 1

TEST NOT PERFORMED (SEE REMARKS BELOW) . . . . . [redacted]

CARBOXYHEMOGLOBIN SATURATIONS OF 10% OR ABOVE ARE CONSIDERED ELEVATED VALUES.

B. LACTIC ACID

THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM LACTIC ACID CONCENTRATION IS . . . . . Brain - 145 mg%

TEST NOT PERFORMED (SEE REMARKS) . . . . . [redacted]

VALUES OVER 200 MG% ARE CONSIDERED TO BE INDICATIVE OF CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM HYPOXIA. THIS MAY BE DUE TO ONE OF SEVERAL CAUSES: (1) HIGH ALTITUDE EXPOSURE TO LOW OXYGEN TENSION; (2) REDUCED OXYGEN SUPPLY; (3) PROLONGED SHOCK; (4) TRAUMATIC INJURIES WHICH IMPAIR ADEQUATE OXYGENATION AND/OR CIRCULATION OF BLOOD TO THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM.

NON ELEVATED VALUES DO NOT RULE OUT HYPOXIA AS A CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT

C. ALCOHOL

ETHYL ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION IS . . . . . Blood and Brain - None found

TEST NOT PERFORMED (SEE REMARKS) . . . . . [redacted]

D. DRUGS

DETERMINATION FOR DRUGS OR POISONS WILL BE DONE ON REQUEST FROM THE SUBMITTING FACILITY.

E. REMARKS

Condition of specimen: Good

NOTE: FROZEN TISSUE WILL BE HELD FOR TWENTY (20) DAYS. IF SPECIAL STUDIES OR FURTHER INFORMATION ARE DESIRED, SUBMIT REQUEST BY MOST EXPEDIENT MEANS. CONSULTATION SERVICE FROM THE AEROSPACE BRANCH, AFIP, IS AVAILABLE ON 24 HOUR BASIS. CALL WASHINGTON, D. C., RANDOLPH 3-1500 OR RANDOLPH 3-1000, EXTENSION 33.

3. EVALUATION AND REPORT BY: (b) (6) [redacted]

4. DATE OF REPORT: 25 April 1968

5. [redacted]
FOR THE DIRECTOR:
ROBERT H. GRACE
Captain, MC, USN

6. SIGNATURE (b) (6) [redacted]

AFIP FORM 68 (1 OCT 66)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PART I

OPNAV FORM 3750-8 (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of activity)	2. SER NUMBER	3. LEAVE BLANK
VC-5 Det; NAHA FPO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 96670	1 - 68	

4. TYPE OF MISHAP	5. TIME & ZONE	6. DATE	7. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION
[X] ACCIDENT [ ] GROUND ACCIDENT [ ] INCIDENT	1231 I	8 April 68	½ mile west NAHA AIR BASE

8. MODEL A/C	9. BUNO	10. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	11. DAMAGE CODE	12. UNIT OPERATING A/C
F8-B	145544	ONE	A	VC-5 Det; NAHA

13. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED NAME (Last, first and middle initial)	14. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	15. RANK/ DATE RANK	16. FILE/SERV. NO. DESIGNATOR	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT AT A/C	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT AT MISHAP	18. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL	19. PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED FOR FLIGHT	20. BRANCH OF SERVICE	21. MILITARY CODE	22. DISPOSITION
a. GENHEIMER, Richard A.	VC-5 Det;NAHA	JG	(b) (6)	A		25Jul 1967	YES	USNR	A	F
b.										
c.										
d.										

23. CLASSIFICATION OF ITEMS 13-22 WHEN NECESSARY

24. MODEL-OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED	25. BUNO	26. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	27. UNIT OPERATING A/C	28. DAMAGE CODE	29. SER NO.

30. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP (Use additional 8 x 10½ sheets if required)

31. PRIMARY CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

PILOT ERROR

32. CONTRIBUTING CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

33. POSSIBLE CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

34. HAVE ALL FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE A/C ACCIDENT BOARD? IF NO, EXPLAIN. YES [ ] NO [X] Complete pathologic findings not forwarded

35. REPORT PREPARATION CHECK LIST

[X] ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED [X] DRAWINGS SKETCHES, PHOTOS [X] SURVIVORS' NARRATIVES [X] WITNESS STATEMENTS [X] CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS [X] ENDORSED COPIES FORWARDED

36. (Name & signature of medical officer)	DATE	37. FORWARDED (Name & signature of appointing authority)	DATE
(b) (6) USNR	4/25/68	(b) (6) CDR USN	

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE (1)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—712052

The pilot had been in the squadron for but three weeks. He was a first tour pilot, having just completed 11.4 hours in the F8 RAG, VF-124. A letter of evaluation from the CO of VF-124 describes him as "excellent attitude, cooperative, serious, and aggressive." His FAM-1 and FAM-2 hops in VC-5 on 4/5/68 were without incident. LTJG Genheimer had successfully taken the local course rules examination and F8 NATOPS examination.

Although little is known at this command of LTJG Genheimers abilities, aspirations, and personality, several sources of information exist that shed considerable light on this area. In a tape recording dictated to his mother the night before the accident he expressed his desire to be in a fighter squadron, but he did not want to go to RVN. He told of his disdain for "prop pilots" and the "VC attitude here." He then spoke of his performance in his FAM-2 in glowing terms. During routine briefings before FAM-1 and FAM-3 he seemed to be impatient with the instructor pilot. His knowlege of the aircraft displayed during briefings and informal discussions was not considered impressive.

LTJG Genheimer graduated from Ohio State University in 1965 after 6 years of intermittent academic effort. His grade point average was 2.030 on a scale of A=4.0 B=3.0 C=2.0 D=1.0 and F=0.0. He was warned by the dean ten times and placed on scholastic probation once. This information was obtained from his college transcript.

Perusal of LTJG Genheimers log book and flight jacket reveals that at VT-1 he had to repeat his presolo check. In the T-2 he had 5 hops that were graded "incomplete" and 13 hops labeled as "extra time." In the F9 he repeated 6 hops. He sat in front of a Student Pilot Disposition Board on two separate occasions. Examination of the Naval Aviator Training Stage Grade CNATRA Form 1542/5 in his flight jacket reveals that in advanced jets his performance fell in the following percentile areas:

	PERCENTILES (GRADE)	GENHEIMER'S GRADE
FAM	85%(3.08) 50%(3.01)	3.02
BASIC INST	15%(3.00) 2% (2.94)	2.97
INST NAV	15%(2.94) 2% (2.85)	2.89
ADV FAM	85%(3.07) 50%(3.00)	3.01
FORM TACT	50%(3.03) 15%(2.97)	3.02
NIGHT FAM	15%(2.99) 2% (2.92)	2.98
OPER NAV	[illegible]	2.95
AIR GROUND	50%(3.04) 15%(3.03)	3.05
TACTICS	15%(3.03)	3.03
CO	98%(3.08) 85%(3.00)	3.01

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 65 OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

ENCLOSURE (1)

In VF-126 while flying A-4's he had two flights graded as unsatisfactory and had one hearing before the Human Factors Committee which awarded extra time. Pertinent comments by instructors on his evaluation sheets include "no scan" and "instructor had to handle the radios while the student flew the aircraft." No records were received from VF-124 or the F8 RAG other than that he had achieved a final grade of 2.95 and had a total of 11.4 hours in the F8. This time was in the F8-C and F8-E not the F8-B, the model in which he flew the three flights at VC-5.

Not much is known of LTJG Genheimers personal life other than the fact that he had impregnated the same girl twice; the last pregnancy was 4-5 months along at the time of the accident. The girl in question reportedly desired to marry him despite the fact that she, after learning of her impending motherhood, planned to marry another man as soon as possible. She later broke off her engagement of convenience and informed LTJG Genheimer that she had announced to all of her friends that she was married to him. LTJG Genheimer reportedly stated that he didn't "love" this girl, would not marry her and was concerned only with what his financial responsibility would be.

Based on the above evidence only, LTJG Genheimer's efforts and achievements can tentatively best be described as poorly planned and marginal if not truly inadequate, despite his enthusiasm and motivation. He cannot be characterized as responsible. Historically there is no trace of a truly professional approach toward any endeavor he had recently pursued. Based on his performance in the training command VF-126 and the F8 RAG it can definitely be stated that this man was an inferior aviator.

The aircraft F8-B BUNO 145544 was on its seventh tour of operation. The only retrospective mechanical discrepancy was that the starboard droop bell crank had not been inspected on March 11, as required. There were no recent "gripes" of a pertinent nature.

Little is known of how LTJG Genheimer spent the evening and morning preceding the accident (see Section E). His instructor pilot briefed him for some mild acrobatics and formation practice (see enclosure#4,2) They were then to shoot a VFR TACAN approach, [illegible] depart, check slow flight characteristics [illegible] break for touch and go landings. They had projected a full stop with 1300 lbs of fuel remaining. At 1115 they took off and proceded as planned, due to fuel limi tions however the TACAN approach was

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 55

deleted. Slow flight in a dirty configuration was then demonstrated. At this time LTJG Genheimer seemed to be having trouble with his transmitter; a ground radio check confirmed this. At no time was there any evidence that his receiver was malfunctioning as he always responded to voice in an appropriate manner.

The instructor had briefed for a full stop in the event of radio failure. LTJG Genheimer was rebriefed in the air and joined in parade on his instructors right wing as commanded. On the pilots FAM-1 it had been noted by this same instructor that he had arrived at a high close 180 position upon entering the break. Accordingly the instructor pilot purposely lined up very slightly right of centerline on the run-way edge to allow for a "comfortable" pattern. At 1500ft and 310 knots LTJG Genheimer acknowleged the breakup signal with his left hand and broke to the right with a moderate rate of roll. The instructor followed. Investigation of the wreckage revealed that the speed brakes were extended, the gear down and the wing unlocked. In the break, if he had been following NATOPS he would have extended his brakes, reduced power to 80% and at 220 knots lowered his gear and then unlocked and raised his wing. Note; the wing had not been raised which would have given him the added lift necessary in this high G "dirty" configuration. Higher G were probably on the aircraft as the instructor pilot noted that LTJG Genheimer was too close abeam for a safe landing. As the instructor keyed his mike to warn him of his position "the nose pitched down and the right wing dropped" (see enclosure # 4). The instructor "instinctively felt that he had stalled" and transmitted "eject, eject, eject, eject" as the aircraft descended nose down, wings perpendicular to the run-way and canopy upwind (see enclosure # 4). The command to eject was initiated as the aircraft descended through about 1000ft. and was stopped as it had gone to 50ft. Unable to keep up with the aircraft the pilot probably did remember to add power as the controller was at 100% and the engine at 85% upon impact(see enclosure # 4). Whether or not he remembered or had time to neutralize his stick and rudder as part of routine stall recovery, is purely a matter of conjecture, in any case an altitude of 5000f is necessary to successfully recover from a stall in the F8 (vice 1500ft. LTJG Genheimers failure to initiate a timely ejection despite four voice commands to do so by the instructor pilot may have been the result of his being preoccupied with his inappropriate

stall recovery efforts and/or the fact that he was flying way behind the airplane as he had many times in the past. One of his instructors in VF-126 described him as being "very slow in responding".

Post accident investigation revealed that the Right droop was 10 feet north of the nose section when found. The cotter key, washer and nut attaching the short leg of the bell crank to the droop were missing. The wear on the threads of the bolt was such that it is surmised that violent G forces in the stall caused it to separate from its shackle (see photo #19+20 Absence of crush damage on the droop is furthur evidence that it parted the aircraft while in the air. It is not felt that droop failure precipitated the stall but vice versa.

At 100 to 150 ft. ejection was noted (see enclosure 4). It is felt that the aircraft was descending at 250 knots with its nose coming up; that is the nose was swinging in an arc from north east to south west. The aircraft landed on its nose and back, the wings separated and the tail section being the only portion left relatively intact, and thus able to protrude out of what was probably only 4 ft. of water, burst into flame.

Upon ejection at 250 knots at 100 ft. the pilots fate was sealed. Taking into account rough vectors of acceleration he probably struck the four foot deep water at 275-325 knots. The canopy was recovered and it was determined that it had separated from the aircraft in proper sequence. The seat was broken into four pieces, it was found with the pilots deployed drogue chute, deployed auxiliary chute and partially unpacked main chute 50 ft. south of the wreckage. The seat had functioned "as advertised"; the sequence had progressed to the point where the timed release trip rods had pulled free thus releasing the seat kit, leg restraint lines, shoulder restraint lines and the drogue shackle scissors. The face curtain which was pulled down was still attached to the seat (see photos #5-6 #8+10). The force of impact threw the now released pilot out of the seat forward for approximately ten feet (see enclosure #4-rescue).

It is felt that the seat landed upright with the pilot in it. (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Paint marks on

ENCLOSURE (1)

the seat and shattered helmet confirm this (see photo # 6).

(b) (6)

[redacted]

An USAF H-43 call sign "pedro 1" on a routine training flight was radioed by Naha tower at 1237. At 1244 it was at the accident scene (see enclosure # 4). A "concentrated patch of sea dye marker was observed not far from the tail section of the aircraft" and "a helmet and one boot could be seen through the dye on the water"

A man was lowered into the 3 ft. deep water, located the body and cut through the harness. The body was then placed in an "evacuation bag". An attempt was made to hoist the body up to the helo but "the handles broke off." Two other men were then placed in the water and "they pulled the evacuation bag to the nearest reef area and it was loaded aboard "pedro 1." It was not until 1332, one hour after the accident that the body was delivered to NAF base operations and LTJG Genheimer was pronounced dead.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

ENCLOSURE (1)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 2 — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-8A (REV. 3-63) — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. — See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.

SECTION B - FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OR RELATING TO MISHAP BY PHASE OF MISHAP (List in order in accordance with Section B of inst.)

PHASE CODE: A - ACCIDENT; E - ESCAPE/EGRESS; S - SURVIVAL; R - RESCUE

FACTOR WEIGHT: M - MAJOR; C - CONTRIBUTING; Q - QUESTIONABLE OR POSSIBLE

1. FACTORS	2. PHASE OF MISHAP (See code at right) A	E	S	R	REMARKS
Faulty pilot technique, a tight break in a dirty configuration producing an accelerated stall.	M				
Failure to initiate a timely ejection.		M			Commanded by instructor to eject four times - stalled at 1500 feet, did not eject until 100 feet.

SECTION C AIR CREW DATA

1. FLIGHT TIME LAST 30 DAYS (All models)	11.8
2. FLIGHT TIME LAST 24 HOURS (All models)	0
3. NO. FLIGHTS LAST 24 HOURS (Include present flight)	1
4. TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	1.2
5. TOTAL FLIGHT TIME ALL MODELS	369.9

FLIGHT TIME THIS MODEL	6. TOTAL	7. LAST 30	8. 60 DAYS	9. 90 DAYS
	14.0	2.6	11.2	14.0

10. NO. GROUNDINGS PAST YEAR	0
11. NO. DAYS GROUNDED PAST YEAR	0

12. DATES AND TYPES OF PRIOR MISHAPS

none

13. NO. HRS. IN A DUTY STATUS LAST 24 HRS. 4

14. DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF MISHAP north

15. LOCATION AT TIME OF MISHAP

½ mile west midfield of NAB

SECTION D ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA (Compare with health record)



AGE 28/27

HEIGHT (b) (6) [redacted]

WEIGHT (b) (6) [redacted] LB.

A. SITTING HEIGHT (b) (6) [redacted]

B. TRUNK HEIGHT (b) (6) [redacted]

C. FUNCTIONAL REACH (b) (6) [redacted] /not avail

D. BUTTOCK - KNEE (b) (6) [redacted]

E. LEG LENGTH (b) (6) [redacted]

F. SHOULDER WIDTH (BIDELTOID) (b) (6) [redacted]

16. LABORATORY TESTS AND RESULTS

SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
(b) (6) [redacted]					

17. X-RAY RESULTS

MDR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-68	F-8 B	145546	LTJG USNR (b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

GENHEIMER, Richard A.

GP-007 ENCLOSURE ( ) — ☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-6B (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED -- *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.*

SECTION E — INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

SEE PAGE 6 PARA. 10 OF INSTRUCTION
TO BE COMPLETED ON PLANE COMMANDER, PILOT, CO-PILOT, OTHER INDIVIDUAL IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP, AND/OR INDIVIDUAL CAUSING THE MISHAP

USE LOCAL TIME AND BRIEFLY RECORD ACTIVITY WITHIN EACH COLUMN

48 HOURS PRIOR TO MISHAP

TIME	
4/6/68 1230	Questionably seen at squadron area-normal duty day. Nothing known of meals, activity, hour of retiring, etc.
4/7/68 1045	Arose-no breakfast
1200	Unknown lunch consumption Played catch-sunbathed Loafed in BOQ area
1830	Dinner-hamburger & coke then to a movie
2230	BOQ-wrote letters and dictated a tape to his mother. Time of retiring is unknown.
4/8/68 0700	Still in bed Breakfast not observed-usually had "just a glass of juice."
E 0930	Brief commenced
1115	Flight-take off
1230	Entered traffic pattern Into the break at 1500ft.

TIME	
ACCIDENT PHASE 1231	Stall command to eject given.
ESCAPE PHASE	Ejected at 100ft.
1244	PEDRO-1 (H43) arrived.
1251	Men from PEDRO-1 descending ladder and begin dragging body through the water after body bag broke.
1332	PEDRO-1 arrives at Base Ops. with body.
SURVIVAL PHASE	

TIME OF RESCUE

BUR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-68	F-8 B	145544	LTJG USNR (b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL
GENHEIMER, Richard A.

OP-507 ENCLOSURE (1 B)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—713060

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 4 — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-6C (REV. 5-63) — SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - *See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.*

SECTION F — **PATHOLOGICAL DATA** — *(Refer to Section F of Instructions.)*

1. INJURY CODE AND DISPOSITION: A-F

2. PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS: (b) (6) [redacted]
(b) (6) [redacted]

3. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: [X] NO [ ] YES DURATION:

4. DROWNED: [X]

5. ASPHYXIATED: [X]

6. SHOCK: [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

7. EXPOSURE: [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

8. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: 0

9. IF ADMITTED TO SICK LIST, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: NA

10. PLACE OF HOSPITALIZATION: NA

11. GROUNDED? IF YES, GIVE REASON: [X] NO [ ] YES

12. DURATION *(See Instructions)*:

13. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: (b) (6) [redacted]

14. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH:

15. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: [X] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER PRESENT [ ] PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER NOT PRESENT [ ] MEDICAL OFFICER

16. [ ] PROTOCOL ATTACHED [X] WILL BE FORWARDED

17. WAS "AUTOPSY MANUAL, NAVMED P5065" USED? [X] YES [ ] NO

18. IF NO AUTOPSY CONDUCTED, GIVE REASON:

19. INJURIES	PHASE SUSTAINED A	E	S	R	CAUSE AND MECHANISM *(If unknown, theorize)*
(b) (6) [redacted]		E			(b) (6) [redacted]
		E			
		E			
		E			
		E			
		E			
		E			

20. REMARKS

SEQ NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-68	14 F-8 B	145544	LTJG USNR (b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: GENHEIMER, Richard A.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 4A OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-5D (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION F (Continued) SURFACE INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING AND SHADING AFFECTED AREAS
ALL LACERATIONS, ABRASIONS, CONTUSIONS, PUNCTURE WOUNDS, SPRAINS AND BURNS

(b) (6) [redacted]

DETAILS OF SKULL FRACTURES AND BRAIN INJURY. DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY.
1. ALL FRACTURES, BY TYPE (*Simple, depressed, or indirect, etc.*) 2. SITES OF BRAIN LESIONS, IF ANY. 3. DISLOCATIONS OF MANDIBLE.

(b) (6) [redacted]

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-68	F8-H	145544	LTJG USNR (b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL
GENHEIMER, Richard A.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 4B

OPNAV FORM 3750-6E (Rev. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED See OPNAVINST 3750-6E for instructions.

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION F (Continued) SKELETAL INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING
ALL FRACTURES BY TYPE (Simple, compound, comminuted, etc.) AND DISLOCATIONS INDICATING DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT.

(b) (6)

[redacted]

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY: 1. ALL FRACTURES OF SPINAL COLUMN (Simple, compressed, etc.)
2. DISLOCATION AND DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT. 3. SITES OF CORD DAMAGE, IF ANY.

DETAILS OF SPINAL INJURIES

X-RAYS NOT AVAILABLE

BUNO NO.	MODEL A/C	SQUAD	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-68	F8-B	145544	LTJG USNR (b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

GENHEIMER, Richard A.

NP-4GE

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964—713336

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5 OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-5P (REV. 2-68) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION G ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION G OF INSTRUCTION: PHASE CODED: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP B-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE C-SURVIVAL D-RESCUE PHASE

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	2. MODIFICATION	3. RE-QUIRED	4. AVAIL-ABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. REMARKS (Explain failure, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10½ plain paper if needed.)
Boots, flying safety	None	Yes	AESR	AESR	AESR		Small tears toe right boot. (See photo #)Right glove not found-doubt pilot wearing gloves as there was a laceration on right thenar eminenence.
Gloves, nomex	None	Yes	No	AE			
Helmet AFH-6	Aircrew systems change #105 (survival light) Clothing and survival equipment change #30- Earphone cushions Clothing equipment change #29- Edge roll					E	Visor missing, visor housing torn off, both phone assemblies torn off. 8" long fracture of shell (See photo #)probably occurred when helmet struck head rest on impact. Note photo # Reveals pieces of helmet stuck to fiber of distal legs of MK-2A coveralls.

SECTION H NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

SQDN NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-68	F8-B	146546	LTJG USNR (b) (6)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL: GEBHARDER, Richard A.

OP-050F ENCLOSURES (1)

EQUIPMENT	MODIFICATION	RE-QUIRED	AVAIL-ABLE	NEED	USED	FAIL	REMARKS
MASK A13A	Aircrew system change #39 Clothing and survival equipment Bulletin #18 (Mask retention system)	YES	AESR	AE	AE	E	3" cut left side, right inhalation valve missing. Exhalation valve cracked. Microphone missing. Mask adapter cracked, left retainer cracked.
COVERALLS, FLYING SUMMER Type CS/FRP-1 (Nomex)	None	YES	AESR	AESR	AESR	E	Right arm torn, right leg torn, zipper torn off upper torso, lower back ripped (Photo#10-12)
HARNESS, TORSO SUIT Type MA-2	SDU/5E holder on right upper side and MK-79 flare kit holder on right center Aircrew systems change #122 (cutaway) Aircrew systems change#41 (fitting)interim aircrew system change #125 (chest straps	YES	AESR	AESR	AESR	E	Zipper tore loose (Photo#10-13)
COVERALLS, ANTI G Type MK-2A	Local modification of pockets around lower bladders	YES	AESR	AE	AE		Right thigh bladder torn,Both lower bladders partially separated from suit. Both pockets torn from suit (Photo#10-14)
LIFE PRESERVER MK-3C	Clothing & equipment, survival Change #21 (Adjustment envelope)						Adjustment strap torn, all swivel hooks snapped off
SURVIVAL VEST SV-1	Local modification of survival knife pockets & adjustment straps	YES	AESR	SR	NO	E	6" tear in left pocket containing MC-1 survival knife (Photo#1045)
SURVIVAL KNIFE SHROUD, CUTTING MC-1		YES	AESR	S		E	Safety lock missing-knife open probably causing laceration in SU-1 vest (Photo #10-15)
FLARE KIT MK-79	NONE	YES	AESR				
MHEU 950 Drogue ASSEMBLY	NONE	YES	AESR	E	E		Both controller and stabilizer chutes opened
MHEU 42002 PA PARACHUTE	NONE	YES	YES	E			Auxilliary chute deployed.Main chute only half way out of pack Removed without difficulty when inspected- Main chute hadn't time to deploy fully

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 4[illegible] OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

[illegible]

EQUIPMENT	MODIFICATION	REQUIRED	AVAILABLE	NEED	ISSUED	FAILED	REMARKS
Receiver transmitter ACR RT-10		YES	AESR				
Soft aux. survival Kit packs		YES	AESR				
1&2 Survival knife camillus		YES	AESR				
Mini Regulator Firewel F-1732-2		YES	AESR	AE	AE		
Seat pan assembly fire F 49232000		YES	AESR	AE	AE		
PK2 Life raft		YES	AESR				
Radio AN/PRT-3		YES	AESR	E		E	Not heard in tower or on tower tape
Solar Still Class B		YES	AESR				
Nylon Line 100ft		YES	AESR				
Sea Dye Markers #2		YES	AESR	S	S		Green stained water about body identified from the air
Sponge		YES	AESR				
Signalling Mirror		YES	AESR				
Sunburn Oint 2 MK 13 MOD 0		YES	AESR				
Day-Nite Flares		YES	AESR				
Ration Packet		YES	AESR				
Desalter Kit MK-2		YES	AESR				

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 86 OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

ENCLOSURE (1)

LTJG Genheimer ejected out of the seat envelope at 100 feet utilizing the primary firing mechanism (face curtain-see photo #10-9, while the aircraft was traveling straight toward the ground at an estimated speed of 250 knots. He and the partially unpacked main chute (see photo # 10) were thrown 10 feet beyond the shattered seat (see photo #5), which in turn was 50 feet south of the tail section. Utilizing rough acceleration vector analysis, it is felt that the seat with the pilot there-in, impacted the ground at 275-300 knots. The canopy was found floating undamaged. The primary and auxiliary seat cartridges had fired, and both drogue gun and timed release mechanism trip rods were pulled free. The drogue gun had fired extracting the drogue piston, the controller drogue, and the stabilizer drogue. The seat kit, leg restraint lines, shoulder restraint lines and drogue shackle lines had been released. The nature of the pilots injuries (see photos # B and section F) would indicate that they were sustained while in the seat; thus the release mechanism trip rods probably pulled free immediately before or upon impact. This portion of the seat sequencing takes place 1 3/4 seconds after ejection is initiated.

An H43 helo call sign "pedro 1" (see enclosure #4) on a routine training flight had been dispatched from NAB. As this was a training flight this aircraft which normally carries a litter did not have one aboard. The pilot was found floating submerged in 4 feet of water with only his right foot out of the water, 20 minutes after impact, with dye marker surrounding him.

A man was lowered into the water who cut the dead pilot free from his harness. The body was then placed in an "evacuation bag" and an attempt was made to hoist. The bag ripped loose however and two more men were lowered into the water. "Pedro 1" proceeded to a nearby coral reef and landed. There the three men pulled the evacuation bag with the body inside of it to the waiting helo. Considerable difficulty was encountered in this move as the bottom which is 3 to 6 feet deep is composed of sharp coral. The body was put into the helo and "pedro 1" delivered it to NAB base ops at 1332.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 6 OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

OPNAV FORM 3750-6G (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. *See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions*

SECTION I DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE

[X] WATER [ ] LAND [ ] OTHER

2. TYPE OF EGRESS

[X] EJECTION [ ] BAILOUT [ ] UNDERWATER [ ] NORMAL [ ] OTHER (State type)

B	E		REMARKS
		3. NOT ATTEMPTED	
	X	4. ATTEMPTED	
	X	5. ACCOMPLISHED	
		6. THRU CANOPY	
YES	NO	EGRESS DIFFICULTIES	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
	X	7. PRIOR TO EGRESS	
	X	8. DURING EGRESS	
X		9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS	Ejected out of envelope of seat

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED: Martin Baker MK5

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT: [X] PRIMARY [ ] SECONDARY [ ] OTHER

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION:

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN [ ] FORWARD [ ] AFT [X] OTHER Unknown

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT: Vertical to ground

15. AIRSPEED: 250 E

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (FEET): approx 100 ABOVE SEA LEVEL; approx 100 ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING: Didn't open

18. WEIGHT: E - 175

19. TIME IN WATER:

20. TIME IN RAFT: 0

21. WIND VELOCITY: 130° / 15 knots

22. WAVE HEIGHT: Negligible

23. WAVE INTERVAL: Negligible

24. AIR TEMPERATURE: 25° C

25. WATER TEMPERATURE: 27° C

26. VISIBILITY: unrestricted no horizon

27. ALERTING FACTORS: Visual

28. MEANS OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE: Visual

29. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR: Visual

30. NA

31. NA

32. NA

33. NA

34. NA

35. NA

36. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE? *(If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue)*

[X] NO [ ] YES

SECTION J TRAINING FACTORS

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC 4/10/67 EJECTION TOWER 4/10/67 EJECTION SEAT 4/10/67 SURVIVAL 4/10/67

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? *(If yes, explain)*

[ ] NO [X] YES Definitely - This pilot had but 14 hours in F-8 type aircraft. Coupled with his previously proven inferior ability, disaster resulted.

MDR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-68	F8-B	145544	LTJG USNR (b) (6) [redacted]

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

GENHEIMER, Richard A.

OP-05F ENCLOSURE (1)

SUMMARY AND AEROMEDICAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Quite simply this accident can be attributed to the deceased pilot's inferior ability as a Naval Aviator. He stalled the aircraft which sealed its fate; he did not eject when he should have and was commanded to do so and thus sealed his own.

(b) (5)

[redacted]

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

ENCLOSURE (1)

ORIGINAL

REPORT [illegible]

[illegible]

1. FROM: FIRST COMPOSITE SQUADRON FIVE DETACHMENT NAHA		2. DATE OF MISHAP: 6 APRIL 1966	2A. DATE OF RESCUE: 6 APRIL 1966
3. LOCATION AND DUTIES OF RESCUE VEHICLE: DET 6 PAC ARRC (USAF) KADENA AB, OKINAWA		4. RESCUE VEHICLE (Type/model): HH-43	
5. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL: SIX; 5A. IN RESCUE VEHICLE OR ON RESCUE TEAM: FIVE	5B. TO BE RESCUED: ONE; 5C. RESCUED: ONE	6. RESCUE BACK UP AIRCRAFT: HU-16B OVERHEAD	

7. TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Local Date Time Group)	
7A. Alert Received: 061236I	Method: NAHA TOWER SAW CRASH ALERT TO SAR HQ (USAF)
7B. Vehicle Departed: 061239I	Distance to Scene: ONE MILE
7C. Arrived on Scene: 061244I	Search Required: NONE
7D. Located Survivor: 061244I	Method of Locating: VISUAL SIGHTING OF PILOT
7E. Began Retrieval: 061246I	What Was Sighted First: AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE AND DYE MARKER
7F. Ended Retrieval: 061307I	Subsequently: RETURNED NAHA AIR BASE
7G. Survivor(s) Discharged: 061330I	Location (If different from Item 3): INJURED TAKEN TO NAF NAHA DISPENSARY

8. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT RESCUE SITE		
8A. WATER TEMPERATURE: 70 °F	AIR TEMPERATURE: 77 °F	WIND VELOCITY: 15K
8B. SEA STATE/WAVE HEIGHT/FREQUENCY, TERRAIN DESCRIPTION: THREE TO EIGHT FEET OF WATER OVER CORAL BOTTOM WITH [illegible] SEA STATE.		

9. EQUIPMENTS ACTUALLY USED DURING RESCUE: HELICOPTER HOIST AND EVACUATION BAG.

10. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (List all difficulties and effect on final outcome of rescue attempt, i.e., ALERTING PERIOD, SEARCH/LOCATION, RETRIEVING, POST-RETRIEVAL)

FIRST AIRCRAFT TO ACCIDENT SCENE WAS USAF HU-16B FROM NAHA AIR BASE WHICH ORBITED DOWNED PILOT UNTIL AN HH-43 HELICOPTER FROM KADENA AIR BASE ARRIVED AND PLACED THREE CREWMEN INTO THE WATER TO RETRIEVE THE INJURED PILOT; AIRCRAFT CONTAINED NO STOKES LITTER BASKET AND HOIST ATTEMPTS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. THEY WERE REQUIRED TO LAND ON A NEARBY CORAL REEF WHILE CREWMEN PULLED THE INJURED PILOT IN AN EVACUATION BAG THROUGH THE WATER TO THE WAITING HELICOPTER.

11. PERSONNEL REQUIRING RESCUE (NAME-LAST, FIRST, INITIAL)	GIVE REASON FOR RESCUE	FACTORS COMPLICATING RESCUE ATTEMPT (Physical condition, adequacy of equipment, apparatus, etc.)
[illegible], Richard A.	CRASHED [illegible] AIRCRAFT AT SEA	PHYSICAL CONDITION OF PILOT AND LACK OF STOKES LITTER BASKET.

12. REMARKS (Training of rescue teams or crews, communication equipments/techniques, retrieval equipments/techniques, rescue vehicle)

RECOMMEND ALL SAR HELICOPTERS CONTAIN A STOKES LITTER BASKET AND CREWMEMBERS FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES IN THE PROPER USAGE.

13. ATTACH ENCLOSURES: Narratives of search, location and retrieving—Survivor's statements

14. NAME AND TITLE OF SUBMITTING OFFICIAL: (b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted]

15. NAME AND TITLE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL: (b) (6) [redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
DET 6, PACIFIC AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY CENTER (MAC)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96328

REPLY TO ATTN OF: PARRCS

19 April 1968

SUBJECT: Aircraft Accident

TO: VC-5

1. As requested, this is a summary of the conversation that was tape recorded during a meeting with the accident investigation board. It is understood that this is privileged information and will be used solely for the investigation of the accident.

2. The alert helicopter was airborne at the the time of notification and it proceeded directly to the crash scene. Upon arriving at the scene, a concentrated patch of sea marker dye was observed not far from the tail section of the aircraft. There were numerous erroneous reports generated from the orbiting HU-16 concerning the location of the survivor but a helmet and one boot could be seen through the dye on the water so I assumed that he had not managed to separate from the aircraft.

3. SSgt (b) (6) was lowered into the water with the hoist to verify that the survivor was under the patch of dye. The water was approximately three feet deep and he had no problem reaching the area and making the determination. The remains were still attached to the harness and Sgt (b) (6) was forced to cut it as the dye made it impossible to see how to unfasten the harness.

4. After recovering the remains, Sgt (b) (6) placed them in an evacuation bag(a large zippered bag with handles) and an attempt was made to recover the bag by picking it up with the hoist. The weight of the remains and water in the bag caused it to be too heavy and the handles broke off the bag. At that time, two other crew members were placed in the water(SSgt (b) (6) and Sgt (b) (6) and they pulled the evacuation bag to the nearest reef area and then lifted it aboard the helicopter. Considerable time was spent(approximately 30 minutes) in the operation as they had quite a distance to traverse and there were several areas of deeper water that required them to swim.

5. The remains were taken to Naha AB and transferred to a military ambulance.

6. Crew members aboard were:

Captain (b) (6)	Rescue Crew Commander
SSgt (b) (6)	Rescue Specialist
SSgt	Rescue Specialist
Sgt (b) (6)	Medical Technician

(b) (6)

(b) (6) Captain, USAF
Rescue Crew Commander

MAINTENANCE OFFICER'S STATEMENT

F8B, BUNO 145544 was accepted by the Navy on 25 June 1959, at NAR Dallas under contract No. a(s)[illegible]. The aircraft had completed its 6th Progressive Aircraft Rework by FAMFRA-JAC Atsugi on 18 November 1967, and had been considered in satisfactory condition to continue on to its 7th tour/ period of operation.

April 1968 was the 5th month in period and the aircraft had flown 155 hours since completion of PAR. Total time for April was 15 hours. Since new, the aircraft had a total of 2163 hours.

Engine, J57-P-4A, Serial No. 629724 was installed. Total time on the engine since new was 1411.8 hours; since overhaul 458.8; since last inspection 156.3. The engine was accepted on 4 November 1958. It had undergone two overhauls and completed repair at AMD Atsugi, Japan on 29 September 1967, and was installed by FAMFRA-JAC Atsugi at PAR.

Low Level Escape System, Martin Baker, Model MKF5A, Serial No. 155 was installed. The seat inspection was completed on 18 November 1967, by FAMFRA-JAC Atsugi.

On 4 January 1968, the aircraft was deployed to Cubi Point, Philippines for operational commitments.. Enroute it stopped at VC-5 DET NAHA and made one local flight on 6 January, and proceeded to Cubi Point on the 7th of January. It completed five operational flights at Cubi Point and returned via Naha to Atsugi, returning on 12 January. On 29 January, it was inducted into FAMFRA-JAC Atsugi for repair of the center wing section DAM seals and returned to service. On 5 February 1968, the aircraft was deployed to MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan for several tow flights involving air to air gunnery and returned to NAS, Atsugi on 1 March 1968. On 10 March, it departed Atsugi for RVN via Naha and Cubi Point and arrived at Danang, RVN on 12 March for a HAWKEX. Completing the HAWKEX on 25 March, it departed for home via NAS, Cubi Point where it performed one operational flight prior to departure and arrived at NAS, Atsugi on 27 March. On 4 April, it departed NAS, Atsugi for NAF Naha, Okinawa and arrived the same day.

Bell crank inspections were performed on 17 January, and 19 February with no discrepancies noted. The bell crank inspection for 11 March was not performed due to aircraft being enroute to Danang. No record of work order or completion is in evidence for this period.

FAMFRA-JAC Atsugi incorporated the following during PAR: Installed DELMAR wiring kit No. 216 and AAC No. 398, and installed wiring for LAU-37/A launcher light. Also incorporated at PAR were AFC 501 and A2 which replaced bell cranks, inboard LH & RH and outboard LH, but outboard RH bell crank not replaced due to non-availability of parts. (Complied with F8 1AFB 90A & A1 on outboard RH bell crank which states it must be inspected each 28 day inspection thereafter until incorporation of F8 AFC 501 and A2.)

2152 COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON
AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96253

STATEMENT

I have been advised in accordance with the provisions of AFR 127-4 that the purpose of this investigation is to determine all facts relating to the above accident/incident and in the interest of accident prevention to prevent recurrence. I understand that it is not to obtain evidence for use in disciplinary action, or for determining pecuniary liability or line-of-duty status, or to revoke commission or remove from the active list under the provisions of AFR 36-2 for use before a Flying Evaluation Board.

I relieved TSgt (b) (6) on local after Checkertail 54 flight reported Sand Island. I told Checkertail 54 to report initial and Checkertail 54 advised me that Checkertail 53 had a receiver but no transmitter and that Checkertail 53 would be first to break. I told Checkertail 54 to report break and he did. The break appeared to be a normal break and there were no signs of trouble from either aircraft. Checkertail 53 broke first just past mid field and Checkertail 54 spaced himself accordingly. When both aircraft were established on downwind Checkertail 54 told me Checkertail 53 would land and Checkertail 54 would be a low approach. I said Roger. Aircraft were both due west of the tower and then Checkertail 53 went out of control. The aircraft were approximately 1000 feet MSL. Almost instantly Checkertail 54 told Checkertail 53 to eject four times and Checkertail 53 went straight down into the water. About 150 feet above the water, the pilot of Checkertail 53 ejected and both the aircraft and pilot went into the shallow water. At impact the aircraft burst into flames. From beginning to end it took five (5) to eight (8) seconds from the time Checkertail 53 went out of control till he hit the water.

/s/ (b) (6) AIC, USAF
Local Controller

8 April 1968

AUTHENTICATED BY:

(b) (6)

(b) (6) LCDR, USN
Senior Member

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

Encl 4-1 -

8 APRIL 1968

STATEMENT

LTJG GEHHEIMER and I took off on a FAM-3 flight at about 1115 hours. We had briefed for a basic engine take-off, a simulated instrument climb to FL 200, some mild acrobatics (rolls, wingovers) to warm up; and then, after changing the lead, some formation practice. At 5000 lbs. of fuel remaining, we were to shoot a VFR chased TACAN approach to RWY 18 at Naha Air Base, depart VFR on a missed approach, check the slow flight response stabs ON and stabs OFF at 5000 feet altitude; at 3000 lbs. of fuel we were to enter the break for touch and go landings (LTJG GEHHEIMER leading) to a full stop landing with 1300 lbs. remaining.

The flight proceeded as briefed through the formation practice; however we had less than 5000 lbs. of fuel, so I passed the lead and practiced slow flight at 11,000 feet, both straight and level and in a turn, stabs ON and OFF. I instructed LTJG GEHHEIMER to accelerate to 180 knots stabs OFF to check the instability while in the dirty configuration. At this time it became evident that UE-12 was experiencing difficulty with his transmitter so I told him to clean up and that I would join him to get a fuel check. He signalled that he had about 2700 lbs. in the main and 600 lbs. in the transfer. Although he appeared to be hearing me loud and clear, I switched us both to Naha Ground Control 284.6, for a radio check. Ground read him very weak, so I switched us back to 281.9, the tactical frequency which we had been using and briefed the return to base.

We had pre-briefed for a full stop landing in case of a radio failure with the good radio leading into the break, calling for a green light from the tower. In case LTJG GEHHEIMER had the failure, I was to remain airborne and he was to land, assuming a fuel weight of 3000 lbs. or less. Since UE-12 had experienced a partial radio failure I felt that we should return to base and land. I rebriefed over 281.9 that I would steer toward home planning to arrive with 2500 lbs. of fuel. UE-12 was to follow in a cruise position while I conducted mild turns. The altitude was about 11,000 feet, and LTJG GEHHEIMER signalled that he had about 2700 lbs. in the main and 400 in the transfer at 70 miles on about the 120 radial from Naha. We headed home and I stated that I would enter the break with checkertail 5-3 (UE-12) on my right wing. He was to break first. LTJG GEHHEIMER acknowledged with thumbs up. On the way home, I dipped my right wing (pre-briefed to mean "join in parade "on my right wing"), and we made some parade turns into and away from the wingman. About thirty miles south of Naha, I signalled for a power reduction and speed brakes; we descended to 2500 feet and proceeded to Sand Island, practicing cross unders. About five miles from Sand Island, I put him on my starboard wing, signalled for channel two (tower 308.6) and checked in. I could hear a mike key and a weak, garbled transmission in reply. At Sand Island, I transmitted to the tower that checkertail 5-4 (UE-39) and 5-3 would be entering the break for a full stop - that 5-4 would be leading and that 5-3 would land first. Calling the initial at three miles on the TACAN, we were informed that we would be cleared to land upon calling the break. I called the break at 1500 feet MSL, 310 knots and was

told to report "wheels down". I had purposely lined up very slightly right of centerline on the runway edge to allow for a comfortable pattern. On LTJG GERHEIMER's first flight he had arrived at a high close 180 position upon entering the break. The wind was 120 degrees at 15 knots which would further tend to blow him out to a normal 180. At mid-field, I signalled for breakup and kissed off. He acknowledged the breakup with his left hand and broke to the right with a moderate rate of roll. I commenced a semi-fan break about a half to a full second later, and extended speed brakes and reduced power after ten degrees of turn when UE-12 extended his.

LTJG GERHEIMER had flown about seven or eight hops in VF-124 and two at VC-5 NAHA. On the two hops previous to 8 April, the instructor pilot had chased LTJG GERHEIMER in the landing pattern in reasonably tight wing position to check for any unusual problems with slow flight. We had pre-briefed that he should conduct touch and go landings while I would maintain enough clearance to make touch and go landings also. He agreed that this situation would be adequate, and conveyed the feeling that he felt comfortable enough in the landing pattern without requiring a chase. After extending the speed brakes I transmitted my intention to make a low approach on this pass. Glancing at my instruments and trying to keep checkertail 5-3 in sight, I started to feel uneasy about the situation. Looking back at the runway, it appeared that we had approximately two-thirds of the normal distance abeam. My airspeed had fallen off to about 230 knots after about 120 degrees of turn with a moderate amount of "G" on the aircraft (estimate 3 G's). I lowered the landing gear at 220 knots and looked back to the other aircraft. He was now about 30 degrees to the right of my aircraft's heading and about 500 feet away. I started to key my mike to transmit that he was too close abeam for a safe landing when the nose pitched down and the right wing dropped. After what seemed about two seconds I keyed my mike and instinctively felt that he had stalled so I started yelling "Eject, eject, eject, eject, eject" until the aircraft was about 50 feet off the water. When his aircraft was passing about 1000 to 1200 feet altitude, I believe, I started transmitting. At this time, however, I could not swear that my mike was keyed although I could hear myself yelling. The aircraft appeared to be pointed straight down with the wing UP upon impact. Just before striking the coral reef, at about an altitude of about 100 to 200 feet, what appeared to be the canopy or ejection seat separated from the forward fuselage which had now rotated about the longitudinal axis about 180 degrees and was pointing toward me. In other words, I saw a plan view of the aircraft which was now in an extreme nose down attitude. There was no parachute deployment that I could see. The fuselage hit the coral reef sending up a large splash, followed shortly by the smaller splash of the object which had separated from the airframe. There was an explosion with smaller objects, apparently pieces of the aircraft, which came down in the general vicinity shortly afterward. The second smaller splash hit about 100 feet from the aircraft. Immediately, the wreckage caught fire and burned with a moderate amount of black smoke for about five minutes. I went back to my gauges

and added full power while raising my gear and lowering the wing, and accelerated to 250 knots. At no time did I descend past about 800 to 1000 feet and it was difficult to see details from that altitude.

Making a turn to the south I made a pass at 500 feet past the burning wreckage at 180 knots wing up. At about 100 feet southwest of the main wreckage could be seen a bright orange submerged object in about five to ten feet of water in a small depression in the coral. About ten feet south to southeast of the orange object was a bright yellow object also submerged and what appeared to be a tan colored object which I had first thought to be LTJG GEBHARDER's flight suit. There was green dye marker in this area but no sign of movement. The pilot was wearing a green Nomex flight suit. After about three or four passes at 500 feet I directed the Pedro helicopter to go to the 260 radial at about one mile from the channel 96 TACAN. I turned downwind and executed a full stop landing with about 1300 lbs. of fuel remaining when the HU-16 and helicopter arrived on the scene.

/s/ (b) (6) [redacted]

LT [redacted]

2152 COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON
AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96253

STATEMENT

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I was on duty as local controller at the time Checkertail 54 called for landing instructions. Checkertail 54 advised tower that Checkertail 53 his wing man will not have a transmitter and will be landing first. I briefed Airman Mayfield of what traffic and he relieved me at that position (time 0330Z). I was in back of the tower cab when I saw the F8 go in. (b) (5) [redacted] As soon as the aircraft hit the water a fire broke out. It didn't last long but the aircraft's tail still appeared above the water. At this time I wasn't certain if the pilot got out or not. The pilots wing man Checkertail 54 orbited the area and said he sees a raft. Also at the time of the ejection I heard on the radio "Eject" called four times.

(b) (6) [redacted] USAF
Local Controller, Tower

8 April 1968

AUTHENTICATED BY:

(b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6) [redacted] LCDR, USN
Senior Member

Encl 4-3

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

2152 COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON
AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96253

STATEMENT

I have been advised in accordance with the provisions of AFR 127-4 that the purpose of this investigation is to determine all facts relating to the above accident/incident and in the interest of accident prevention to prevent recurrence. I understand that it is not to obtain evidence for use in disciplinary action, or for determining pecuniary liability or line-of-duty status, or to revoke commission or remove from the active list under the provisions of AFR 36-2 for use before a Flying Evaluation Board.

Checkertail 54, a flight of two Navy F8 made a 360 overhead approach to R/W 18 at Naha Okinawa. Checkertail 53 was flying wing and had no UHF Transmitters. Checkertail 53 broke first and crashed one (1) mile west of the LYN TACAN. When I heard Checkertail 54 transmit about four times on tower frequency 308.6 for the pilot in Checkertail 53 to eject. I looked up and Checkertail 53 was in a nose dive about eight (8) to six (6) hundred feet above the water. I did not see the pilot eject because I activated the primary crash circuit. When the aircraft hit the water a fire broke out at once.

/s/ (b) (6)
TSgt, USAF
Watch Supervisor, Tower

8 April 1968

AUTHENTICATED BY:

(b) (6)

(b) (6) LCDR, USN
Senior Member

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

Encl 4 -

STATEMENT

At about 1230, 8 April 1968 I saw 2 F-8's enter the break at Naha AB. I watched them thru about 110 degrees of turn then looked away toward another object, when I looked up again, I saw one F-8 in a slow spiral with its nose pointing straight down. The attitude of the A/C never varied until it hit the water. There was a large splash and I turned to run into the Duty Office when I looked back again I saw fire and smoke coming from the area of impact.

I am a Naval Aviator with 930 hours of flight time.

(b) (6)

/s/ (b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

Encl 4-5

STATEMENT

1230, 8 April 1968 2F-8's entered a right break. They appeared to be slower than normal. After about 90 degrees of turn the lead aircraft entered into an extreme nose down attitude. I did not notice any flames or trailing smoke. At an altitude of about 100-200 feet the seat separated from the aircraft while the aircraft was in an extreme nose down with 90-100 degrees of right bank. No chute was seen. I am a qualified F-8 pilot, and was designated a Naval Aviator on 1 September 1965.

(b) (6)

/s/ [redacted]

LTJG USNR

Encl 4-6

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

AVIATION SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT RESUME

The Martin Baker F5A Ejection Seat Serial No. 155 was examined along with accompanying squadron survival equipment records and logs. All applicable air crew system changes and bulletins were incorporated. The rigid seat survival kit (Rsak-6) was used and incorporated air crew system Change No. 97. The kit contained the following items:

Sponge
Dye Marker
Flares, MK-13 MOD-0
Rations
Desalting Kit
Sunburn Ointment
Nylon Cord (100 ft. Type I)
Water Storage Bag
Seek Kits, Nos. 1 & 2
Signal Mirror
Poncho
AN/PRT-3 Pilots Emergency Beacon Radio
PK-2 Life Raft

In addition, the pilot carried two soft auxiliary survival kits, a survival knife and a shroud line cutter (MC-1). Although the MK-3C life preserver was worn, it was never inflated. The pilot was wearing all the specified items of flight gear with the exception of flight gloves, one of which was found in the aircraft wreckage. The only personal survival equipment malfunction that was noted was a failure of the safety lock on the MC-1 survival knife/shroud cutter. The blade had come open causing a laceration of the SU-1 survival vest (Encl 10-15).

STATEMENT

On April 11, 1968, I was called to VC-5 at Naha Air Facility, Naha AB, Okinawa to view the wreckage of engine P-629724 - J57-P4A which had been recovered from the crash site.

Upon examining the engine inlet area, there was conclusive evidence to indicate the engine (N1) compressor was rotating at impact. The first two stages of the N1 compressor were void of blades. The third stage blades for the most part remained in the disk and were bent severely opposite the direction of rotation: all indications of substantial rotation on impact. The inlet guide vanes had been severely bent against the ID of the outer weldment of the inlet case assembly in the direction of the compressor.

The high compressor (N2) was exposed up to the 13th disk or stage. No blades remained in the 10th through 13th disks. Several blade roots from the 10th and 12th stages were found, and both exhibit shear opposite the direction of rotation of the high compressor. The low compressor drive turbine shaft was found sheared at the rear hub of the low compressor. There is evidence here of high RPM on impact. The compressor intermediate case has a heavy wrinkle/twist in the vicinity of one of the inter-compressor bleed ports indicating the extreme twisting moment so to speak on impact - most probably caused by the gyroscopic action of the compressors when sudden stoppage occurred. The remains of the stators and exit guide vanes in the compressor intermediate case also further show that the high compressor was rotating at high RPM on impact.

The main fuel control assembly was examined, and while the input shaft to the accelerating cam was sheared off, examination of the cam inside the body of the control shows that it was demanding high fuel flow - probably in the order of normal rated power. This evidence while not conclusive, does support the findings on the general condition of the compressor sections.

In my opinion, and based on examination of other crash engines in the past, this engine was turning in excess of 85% N2 RPM on impact. Engines of the same design but different models (Air Force J57s) have been examined numerous times in the past during crash investigations where the circumstances were similar, and they too displayed generally the same distress in the areas mentioned above.

AUTHENTICATED BY: /s/ Robert G. Mather
Robert G. Mather
Pratt & Whitney Aircraft
Field Service Representative

(b) (6)

Encl 6 (b) (6) LCDR, USN
Senior Member

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

Resume of Total Flight Time for LTJG R. A. GENHEIMER

COMMAND ATTACHED	PERIOD ASSIGNED	MODEL AIRCRAFT	FLIGHT HOURS	OPERATIONAL PROFICIENCY
VT-1	01 JUN 66 03 AUG 66	T-34	28.5	Operational
VT-7	24 AUG 66 24 FEB 67	T-2A	110.8	Operational
VT-4	13 MAR 67 25 APR 67	T-2A/B	27.7	Operational
VT-25/26	20 JUN 67 22 OCT 67	TF-9J	156.0	Operational
VF-126	27 DEC 67 17 JAN 68	TA4F	23.7	Operational
VF-124	05 FEB 68 23 FEB 68	F8C/E	11.4	Operational
VC-5	22 MAR 68 08 APR 68	F8B US2C	3.8 9.2	Operational Operational

TOTAL FLIGHT TIME ALL MODELS, ALL YEARS	371.1
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME LAST 3 MONTHS	24.4
TOTAL JET FLIGHT TIME	333.4
TOTAL JET FLIGHT TIME LAST 3 MONTHS	15.2
TOTAL F-8 FLIGHT TIME (ALL SERIES THIS MODEL)	15.2

Encl. 7

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

FLECOMPRON FIVE DET HAHA
FLIGHT SCHEDULE

[redacted] 7 APR 66
[redacted]

NO FLIGHTS SCHEDULED

SUNRISE: 0616
SUNSET: 1848

[redacted] 8 APR 66
[redacted]

SUNRISE: 0615
SUNSET: 1849

DEP	ARR	TIME	AC TYPE	AC TYPE	PILOT/CREW	AC CALL	ETE/FOB	FTC	VFR/IFR	CAMPL	OP AREA	CHRT	MISSION
1.	[redacted]	1000	[redacted]	S-2	*FUETZ/HICKMAN D'ANDREA	5-1	3+00/5+30	1A1	VFR	6(B)	LOCAL		[redacted]
2	[redacted]	1030	[redacted]	S-2	*CROUCH/SWEET HASLINGER	5-2	3+00/5+30	1A1	VFR	6(B)	LOCAL		[redacted]
3	[redacted]	1030	[redacted]	2F6	*MICHAEL/GEMMEKER	5-3/5-4	1+45/2+30	1A1	VFR	6(B)	LOCAL		[redacted]
4.	[redacted]	1330	[redacted]	2F6	*V.NLANDINGHAM/TARR	5-5/5-6	1+45/2+30	1A1	VFR	6(B)	LOCAL	ANNUNCIATE	S-G-CI
5	[redacted]	1600	[redacted]	P-2	*STEBBETT/MCCUBB CREW #2	5-7	3+00/6+30	1A1	VFR	6(B)	LOCAL		CAPTIVE

NOTE 1. *INDICATES PILOT IN COMMAND/SECTION LEADER
NOTE 2. S-2 [redacted] PROCEDURE REVIEW/PARTIAL OR U[redacted] LANDING
NOTE 3. [redacted] BRIEF IN [redacted] ROOM AT 0830.
NOTE 4. LT CROUCH AND QC PERSONNEL WILL CONDUCT AN 11 DAY INSPECTION ON UE31.

DISTRIBUTION:
WC-5 HAHA INST 5216.1C
LISTS II, III, [redacted] 602
HAP OPS, HAB OPS, BOG 809, BKS 705
HAP FUEL FARM, HAP .WCTC LAB

SUBMITTED [redacted] (b) (6)

APPROVED [redacted] (b) (6)

AUTHENTICATED BY: [redacted] (b) (6)

[redacted] (b) (6) LCDR, USN
Senior Member

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

WRECKAGE DIAGRAM

ALL DISTANCES ARE GIVEN FROM INITIAL POINT OF IMPACT

ORIGINAL DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT DOWNWIND →



SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA. 65, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6F

SHEET (9)

COCKPIT
SECTION

ENCL. 10-2

ENCLOSURE

ENCL IC-8

RELEASE

ENCL 10-12


10-15


ENCL 12 16



ENC. 10 17


ENCL 10-19


ENCL. 10-21

.add

ANNN

ZCZCNASC074/CZCSLB729
PTTUZYUW RUAODDA1358 1221413-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P R 091539Z APR 68
FM FLECOMPRON FIVE DET NAHA
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUAUDA/FLECOMPRON FIVE
INFO RUEBBHA/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUAUDA/COMFAIRWESTPAC
RUEBBHB/CHNAVMAT
RUWJAPA/RCVW ONE TWO
RUEBPDA DIRAFIP
RUEBJFA/BUPERS
RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
RUWTAIB/NAVPLANTREPO LTV
BT
UNCLAS FOUO
NAVY SUPPLEMENTARY NR 2 MESSAGE REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6F (OPNAV REPORT SYMBOL 3750-1)
B. MY 080753Z APR 68
1. 8 APRIL 1968/1231I/DAY

741 A/68

SUPP #2 AAR

PAGE 2 RUAODDA1358 UNCLAS FOUO
2. 260 DEGREES/ONE-QUARTER NM NAHA TACN
11. UPON RETURNING TO NAHA AB AFTER A LOCAL FAM FLIGHT, PILOT MADE A RIGHT BREAK AT 1500 FEET MSL FOR LANDING RWY 18. AFTER APPROX 130 DEGREES OF TURN, CHASE PILOT (APPROX 500 FEET ASTERN) OBSERVED RIGHT BANK INCREASE AND NOSE DROP. AIRCRAFT CONTINUED RIGHT ROLL, UNTIL CONTACTING SHOAL WATER IN NEAR VERTICAL ATTITUDE. PILOT EJECTED (EST 100-200 FEET ALTITUDE) BUT HAD NOT SEPARATED FROM SEAT UPON IMPACT. MARTIN BAKER SEAT APPEARS TO HAVE FUNCTIONED NORMALLY.
BT

AR
091539Z

F-8B/145544 VC-5-169A NAHA TACAN 4-8-68

NNNNZCZCNASCA621CZCSLA581
PTTUZYUW RUAODDA1185 0990740-UUUU--RUCILSA.
ZNR UUUUU
P 080755Z APR 68
FM FLECOMPRON FIVE DET NAHA
TO RUENAAA/CNO
RUCILSA/NAVAVNSAFECEN
RUAUDA/FLECOMPRON FIVE
INFO RUEBBHA/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
RUAUDA/COMFAIRWESTPAC
RUEBBHB/CHNAVMAT
RUWJAPA/RCVW ONE TWO
RUEBPDA/DIRAFIP
RUEBJFA/BUPERS
RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
BT
UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
NAVY PRELIMINARY/SUPPLEMENTARY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
A. OPNAVINST 3750.6F
1. ~~8 APR 68~~ 12511 DAY. 4-7-68 our time
2. 260 DEGREES ONE-QUARTER NM NAHA TACAN.
3. F-8B 145544.

A621/68

AAR
ALPHA

PAGE 2 RUAODDA1185 UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
4. VC-5 1-68.
5. ALPHA.
6. GENHEIMER, RICHARD A., LTJG, (b) (6) USNR, ACTIVE, VC-5NAHA ALPHA TOTAL PILOT TIME 379 TOTAL THIS MODEL 14 TOTAL LAST 90 DAYS 43 MARTIN BAKER.
7. N/A.
8. NONE.
9. FAM 1.2 VFR LOCAL NAHA AIR BASE.
10. BETWEEN BREAK AND 180 DEGREES IN LANDING PATTERN.
11. AT APPROXIMATELY 1230 AIRCRAFT ENTERED BREAK FOR LANDING. AFTER 130 DEGREES IN TURN, AIRCRAFT STRUCK WATER WITH INITIAL FIRE. FIRE WENT OUT AFTER THREE TO FIVE MINUTES.
12. 130 DEGREES 15KTS ONE-EIGHT CU 3000 FT UNL 25DEGREES C 17DEGREES C 6PLUS.
13. UNKNOWN.
14. UNKNOWN.
15. NONE
16. ACCESSABLE SALVAGE IN PROGRESS. P040801
17. (b) (6) LCDR, OFFICER IN CHARGE WA-6240.
BT

APR
080753Z

F-8B/145544 VC-5 1-68A 4-8-68