



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

File

IN REPLY REFER TO

5720

Ser N09N2/3U532346

AUG 22 2003

Mr. Robert Karniol
Jane's Defence Weekly
399/4 Soi Thonglor 21
Sukhumvit Soi 55
Bangkok, Thailand 10110

Dear Mr. Karniol:

SUBJECT: FOIA REQUEST FOR JAGMAN ON COLLISION BETWEEN U.S.
EP-3 AND CHINESE F-8 OFF HAINAN ISLAND ON 1 APRIL
2001

As previously advised, your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of October 16, 2001, was referred to this office for a release determination regarding the Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) investigation of the circumstances connected with the mid-air collision between the United States EP-3 and the Peoples Republic of China F-8 off Hainan Island, China on 1 April 2001.

We have completed the review of the requested investigation and under the provisions of the FOIA have determined that portions of the information you seek are exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552 for the following reasons:

(b)(1): Some of the information remains currently and properly classified under Executive Order 12958.

(b)(2): Contains information which would, if disclosed, circumvent our personnel rules and security practices.

(b)(3): Contains the names and duty station addresses of individuals that are assigned overseas, routinely deployable or assigned to a sensitive unit and are precluded from release under 10 U.S.C. 130b. [NOTE: We have not withheld the names of the EP-3 crew since their names have been publicly released].

(b)(5): Contains opinions and recommendations that provide for the free and frank exchange of information.

(b)(6): Contains names and social security numbers and other personal information that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

5720

Ser N09N2/3U532346


Because your request has been partially denied, you are advised of your right to appeal this determination within 60 calendar days from the date of this letter to the Judge Advocate General (Code 14), Suite 3000, 1355 Patterson Avenue SE, Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5066.

It is recommended that you include a copy of this letter and provide any supporting justification as to why your appeal should be granted. Also, both the letter and envelope should be marked FOIA APPEAL.

Enclosures (57), (58) and (59) of the JAGMAN investigation have been referred to the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (FOIA Office), Building 435, Suite A, 47076 Lilijencratz Road, Patuxent River, MD 20670-1550 for a release determination and direct response to you.

I am the official responsible for the partial denial of your request. I am enclosing the releasable portions of this investigation and have waived all processing fees in this instance.

The Chief of Naval Operations (N09N2) point of contact is Mr. Jeffrey E. O'Donnell at (202) 433-8862, DSN 288-8862 or e-mail "jodonnell@ncis.navy.mil."



M. F. BROWN

Assistant for Information
and Personnel Security


Enclosure: Released portion of JAGMAN Investigation

Copy to:

CNO (N09B10) (w/o encl)


COMNAVAIRSYSCOM (Attn: Ms. Yates/FOIA Office) (w/o encl)




DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

21A

IN REPLY REFER TO
5830
Ser N09BL/3U506545
17 March 2003

 Unclassified upon removal of enclosures
(77), (78), (79), (80), (81), and (82).

From: Vice Chief of Naval Operations
To: Chief of Naval Operations (N09N2)


Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH
THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE
SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY
LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND
OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE
MINUS SEVEN

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 5510.36
(b) EP-3E Collision: Cryptologic Damage Assessment and
Incident Review Final Report (July 2001) (NOTAL)

Encl: (1) Captain [(b)(6)], USN, [(b)(6)] /1320 ltr of
4 Jun 01 w/ends

1. The proceedings, findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the subject investigation, as modified by the intermediate endorsers, are approved.
2. The investigation focused on three critical issues: preparation for deployment, the collision itself, and the possible loss or compromise of classified material.
3. The aircrew consisted of a VQ-1 Combat Reconnaissance Crew (CRC) and a Naval Security Group (NSG) crew. The aircrew was appropriately trained, qualified, and briefed for its mission in accordance with pertinent directives. The collision was not caused by any deliberate or inadvertent action by the aircrew. Appropriate corrective action in response to the investigation's recommendations, such as greater pre-deployment integration of CRC and NSG personnel and assessment of collision avoidance measures, has been implemented by the chain of command.


Unclassified



Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

4. The scope of the investigation into the possible loss or compromise of classified material was limited to identifying the procedures used and the utility of existing emergency destruction directives governing the aircrew. The impact of any loss or compromise of classified information was beyond the scope of this investigation. Reference (b) was conducted simultaneously by Commander, Naval Security Group (COMNAVSECGRU) and details the impact of a possible loss or compromise of classified material. Reference (b) satisfies the requirements of reference (a) and has been provided separately to Chief of Naval Operations (N09N2).

5. I agree with the recommendation that no disciplinary action be taken. The aircrew performed well in dire circumstances.

6. Enclosure (1) is forwarded for retention purposes per the requirements of reference (a).



WILLIAM J. FALLON
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Copy to:
COMPACFLT
COMNAVSECGRU
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMPATRECONFOPAC

[

1 (b)(6)

Fleet Judge Advocate



Facsimile Transmittal

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Fleet Judge Advocate (N00J)
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Pearl Harbor, HI 96860-3131

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Phone: Comm: (808) 471-0624 DSN: 471-0624 Fax: (808) 474-6791 DSN: 474-6791

To: CAPT [] From: N00J COM [(b)(6)]
Fax: [] Pages: 2 (INCL. COVER PAGE)
Phone: Date: 16 JAN 03
Re: CC:

Urgent For Review Please Comment Please Reply Please Recycle

*Comments:

[(b)(6)]: AS REQUESTED. PLEASE CALL IF
YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS.

TX/VR, [(b)(6)]

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
780 MAKALAPA DRIVE
PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII 96860-3131

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5830
Ser N00J/225
10 Jan 03

From: Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (N09N2)

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

Ref: (a) CINCPACFLT ltr 5830 Ser N00J/SX0113 of 22 May 02

1. The following substantive change is made to reference (a):

a. Add paragraph 2.e to reference (a): Modify Recommendation 1 under the Recommendation Section entitled "Aircraft Collision" to read as follows: "Pursue collision avoidance measures for future safety enhancement in the event of airborne intercepts." [Delete the second sentence, which reads: "These mutually agreeable safety measures should include minimum standoff intercept distances and safety of flight communication channels."]

J. W. Greenert
J. W. GREENERT

Deputy and Chief of Staff

Copy to:
Director, Navy Staff (DNS)
COMNAVAIRFAC
COMPATRECONFAC

[] (b)(6)

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] Unclassified upon removal of enclosures (77), (78), (79), (80), (81) and (82).

104 JUN 2001

From: Captain [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] 1320
To: Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
(COMPATRECONFORPAC)


Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

Ref: (a) JAG Manual, Chapter 2
(b) SECNAVINST 5510.36, CHAPTER 12

Encl: (1) COMPATRECONFORPAC ltr 5830 Ser NO1J/283 of 03 Apr 2001
(2) Request for extension
(3) Extension request ltr dtd 09 May 2001
(4) FAIRECONRONONE ltr 5811 Ser N1 of 09 Apr 2001
(5) Designation ltr ICO AE3 Blocher, dtd 03 May 2000
(6) Designation ltr ICO CTTSN Borland, dtd 30 Nov 1999
(7) Designation ltr ICO AT2 Cecka, dtd 01 Feb 2001
(8) Designation ltr ICO LT Comerford, dtd 22 Feb 2001
(9) Designation ltr ICO AT3 Guidry, dtd 21 May 1999
(10) Designation ltr ICO CTT2 Hanser, dtd 04 Apr 2000
(11) Designation ltr ICO LT Honeck, dtd 19 Sep 2000
(12) Designation ltr ICO AT2 Mercado, dtd 03 Aug 1999
(13) Designation ltr ICO ADCS Mellos, dtd 08 Nov 1999
(14) Designation ltr ICO LT Osborn, dtd 22 Feb 2001
(15) Designation ltr ICO LT Osborn, dtd 29 Jan 2001
(16) Designation ltr ICO LTJG Payne, dtd 01 Sep 2000
(17) Designation ltr ICO LTJG Vignery, dtd 04 Aug 2000
(18) Designation ltr ICO AD2 Smith, dtd 04 Mar 2000
(19) OPNAV 3710/7, NATOPS Evaluation Report, ICO AE3 Blocher, dtd 02 May 2000
(20) OPNAV 3710/7, NATOPS Evaluation Report, ICO CTTSN Borland, dtd 26 Feb 2001


Classified by: _____
Declassify on: X1

[REDACTED]




Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

- (21) OPNAV 3710/7, NATOPS Evaluation Report, ICO AT2 Cecka, dtd 18 Aug 2000
- (22) OPNAV 3710/7, NATOPS Evaluation Report, ICO LT Comerford, dtd 20 Feb 2001
- (23) OPNAV 3710/7, NATOPS Evaluation Report, ICO AT Guidry, dtd 22 May 2000
- (24) OPNAV 3710/7, NATOPS Evaluation Report, ICO CTT2 Hanser, dtd 03 Apr 2000
- (25) OPNAV 3710/7, NATOPS Evaluation Report, ICO LT Honeck, dtd 18 Sep 2000
- (26) OPNAV 3710/7, NATOPS Evaluation Report, ICO AT Mercado, dtd 31 Aug 2000
- (27) OPNAV 3710/7, NATOPS Evaluation Report, ICO ADCS Mellos, dtd 26 Jul 2000
- (28) OPNAV 3710/7, NATOPS Evaluation Report, ICO LT Osborn, dtd 26 Feb 2001
- (29) OPNAV 3710/7, NATOPS Evaluation Report, ICO LTJG Payne, dtd 30 Aug 2000
- (30) OPNAV 3710/7, NATOPS Evaluation Report, ICO LTJG Vignery, dtd 31 Aug 2000
- (31) OPNAV 3710/7, NATOPS Evaluation Report, ICO AD2 Smith, dtd 31 Jul 2000
- (32) VQ-1 Training Officer memo dtd 23 Feb 2001
- (33) VQ-1 Training Readiness Officer memo dtd 23 Feb 2001
- (34) [(b)(6)] memo dtd 23 Feb 2001
- (35) Crew work up evaluation dtd 13 Feb 2001
- (36) Crew work up evaluation dtd 14 Feb 2001
- (37) Crew work up evaluation dtd 21 Feb 2001
- (38) Crew work up evaluation dtd 22 Feb 2001
- (39) LCDR Pearson memo dtd 05 Mar 2001
- (40) Crew One work up schedule dtd 20 Feb 2001
- (41) VQ-1 Manifest dtd 27 Feb 2001
- (42) LCDR [] memo dtd 18 Apr 2001
- (43) LCDR [(b)(6)] memo dtd 12 Apr 2001
- (44) LCDR [] memo dtd 12 Apr 2001
- (45) LCDR [] memo dtd 11 Apr 2001



Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

- (46) VQ-1 Instruction 1500.1F dtd 02 Nov 1998
- (47) LT Honeck's responses of 12 Apr 2001 to prepared questions
- (48) ADCS Mellos' responses of 12 Apr 2001 to prepared questions
- (49) LT Osborn's responses of 12 Apr 2001 to prepared questions
- (50) LTJG Vignery's responses of 12 Apr 2001 to prepared questions
- (51) AD2 Westbrook's responses of 12 Apr 2001 to prepared questions
- (52) CDR All memo dtd 12 Apr 2001
- (53) LCDR ~~(b)(6)~~ memo dtd 23 Apr 2001
- (54) CTG 72.5 Flight Schedule dtd 31 Mar 2001
- (55) VQ-1 Flight Schedule dtd 28 Feb 2001
- (56) OPNAVINST 4790 2E, Aircraft Inspection and Acceptance Record dtd 01 2001
- (57) NAVAIR 01-75PAE-1, EP-3E NATOPS, General Description
- (58) NAVAIR 01-75PAE-1, EP-3E NATOPS, Flightcrew Coordination
- (59) NAVAIR 01-75PAE-1, EP-3E NATOPS, Emergency Procedures
- (60) LCDR ~~(b)(6)~~ memo, dtd 08 May 2001
- (61) LCDR ~~(b)(6)~~ memo, dtd 23 Apr 2001
- (62) LCDR ~~(b)(6)~~ memo, dtd 23 Apr 2001
- (63) LCDR ~~(b)(6)~~ memo, dtd 09 May 2001
- (64) FAIRECONRONONE INST 5500.1A, Emergency Action Plan, dtd 20 Mar 2000
- (65) LT Osborn's responses of 25 May 2001 to prepared questions
- (66) LT Honeck's responses of 24 May 2001 to prepared questions
- (67) LTJG Vignery's responses of 24 May 2001 to prepared questions
- (68) LTJG Comerford's responses of 29 May 2001 to prepared questions
- (69) LTJG Payne's responses of 29 May 2001 to prepared questions
- (70) LTJG Kauffman's responses of 24 May 2001 to prepared questions
- (71) ADCS Mellos' responses of 24 May 2001 to prepared questions
- (72) AD2 Westbrook's responses of 24 May 2001 to prepared questions
- (73) AT2 Mercado's responses of 24 May 2001 to prepared questions
- (74) AET2 Cecka's responses of 24 May 2001 to prepared questions
- (75) AE3 Blocher's responses of 24 May 2001 to prepared questions
- (76) CTTSN Borland's responses of 24 May 2001 to prepared questions
- (77) CINCPACFLT Pearl Harbor, HI message 160410Z APR 2001
- (78) CINCPACFLT Pearl Harbor, HI message 160411Z APR 2001
- (79) CINCPACFLT Pearl Harbor, HI message 160412Z APR 2001




Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

- (80) CINCPACFLT Pearl Harbor, HI message 160414Z APR 2001
- (81) CINCPACFLT Pearl Harbor, HI message 171930Z APR 2001
- (82) Col ~~(b)(7)~~ USAF Staff Judge Advocate, 18 Wing memo dtd 13 April 2001
- (83) LT Sonon's responses of 24 May 2001 to prepared questions
- (84) Medical clearances

Preliminary Statement

1. Pursuant to references (a) and (b) and enclosure (1), I conducted an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the aircraft collision between the VQ-1 EP-3E and the PRC F-8, which occurred over the South China Sea, and the possible loss or compromise of classified information resulting from the emergency landing of the EP-3E on the island of Hainan, China.
2. I specifically investigated the cause of the collision and any fault, neglect or responsibility thereof. I also investigated the possible loss or compromise of classified information but only to the extent of identifying the procedures used and the utility of existing emergency destruction directives governing the actions of the aircrew members. The impact of any loss or compromise of classified information is beyond the scope of this report. The scope of this investigation did not extend beyond the time the EP-3E crew disembarked their aircraft after landing in China. All reasonably available evidence was collected and each directive of the convening authority has been met.
3. The unique and unusual circumstances surrounding this particular incident presented exceptional challenges to the aircrew. Upon Chinese release of the detained crewmembers, the priority was immediately established to have the crewmembers reunited with their families for Easter Sunday, 15 April 2001. This priority resulted in a compressed (two days) Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) and intelligence debrief schedule for the repatriated aircrew. Because of the aircrew's rigorous and full day debrief schedule, access to the aircrew for the purposes of this investigation was not made available. A majority of the aircrew, upon their return home, went on 30 days of convalescent leave and was unavailable for interviews during this time period. I used the summaries from the aircrew's tape-recorded JPRA debrief and prepared questionnaires for this investigation.



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4. This investigation consists of three parts: (1) preparation for deployment, (2) the aircraft collision and (3) the possible loss or compromise of classified information.

5. Commander, Naval Security Group (NSG) is conducting a detailed investigation and damage assessment on the possible loss or compromise of classified information carried onboard the EP-3E on its flight mission on 01 April 2001.

6. All enclosures are original documents or true and correct copies of the original documents.

7. CDR (b)(6) USN, temporarily assigned duty to COMPATRECONFORPAC and LT (b)(6) JAGC, USN, Staff Judge Advocate, COMPATRECONFORPAC assisted me in this investigation. LCDR (b)(6) USN, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE (VQ-1) was the VQ-1 point of contact for this investigation per enclosure (4).

8. An extension to this investigation was requested and approved per enclosures (2) and (3) due to the limited access to the crewmembers who had taken convalescent leave.

Findings of Fact

Preparation for deployment

1. Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE (FAIRECONRON ONE (VQ-1)) is homeported in NAS Whidbey Island, WA. Unlike a typical aviation squadron, VQ-1 does not deploy as a squadron for a normal six-month deployment; instead, the command maintains eight combat reconnaissance crews (CRC-1 to CRC-8) that are rotated through the squadron's areas of responsibilities (AORs) on a continuous basis. [encls (42), (43), (44)]

2. CRCs are detached based on individual crew's operation (OP) cycle. VQ-1 has four OP cycles:

A. OP-1 = crew is detached to perform operational missions to an AOR for approximately three months.

[REDACTED]

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B. OP-2 = crew is the "ready crew" for approximately one month and responds to any contingency tasking; crew is typically at homeport but may be detached to an AOR.

C. OP-3 = crew is at homeport for approximately three months; crew can take regular leave, be assigned training schools, and conduct squadron administrative work.

D. OP-4 = crew is at homeport approximately one month and commences work ups/training for next detachment. [encls (42), (43), (44)]

3. VQ-1 flies and maintains the EP-3E. The EP-3E is detached from its homeport and rotated to a detachment site where it remains for approximately six months based on periodic maintenance or scheduled aircraft modifications. [encl (42)]

4. The EP-3E is a multi-piloted, four-engine, low-wing, electronic warfare and reconnaissance aircraft. The engines and associated propellers are sequentially numbered (#1 - #4) from left to right from the pilot's perspective. [encls (57), (58)]

5. EP-3E aircrews are manned by VQ-1 and are augmented by Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA) personnel at the detachment site. NSGA aircrew does not workup/train (OP-4) with VQ-1 aircrew prior to deployment (OP-1). [encl (43)]


6. VQ-1's aircrews (CRC-1 to CRC-8) are manned by VQ-1 personnel. A VQ-1 crewmember assigned to a crew normally stays with that crew for his or her entire tour. NSGA personnel fly with different VQ-1 CRCs. [encl (43)]

7. During the month of February 2001, CRC-1 was in their OP-4 cycle preparing for their OP-1 detachment. [encls (40), (42), (46)]

8. CRC-1 satisfactorily completed their pre-detachment training and work ups during their OP-4 cycle in accordance with FAIRECONRONONE INST 1500.1F and squadron crew rotation matrix. [encls (33), (34), (35), (36), (37), (38), (46)]

9. CRC-1 was evaluated on 22 February 2001 and received a total grade of 90 points (maximum points = 100). [encl (38)]

10. CRC-1 was certified as ready for detachment by the VQ-1 Commanding Officer on 23 February 2001. [encl (32)]



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11. LCDR [(b)(6)], USN, PATRECONWING TEN stated in a memorandum dated 05 March 2001 to COMPATRECONWING TEN CRC-1 "is deploying at Readiness Level One." She also stated that the crew is "...lean on experience at the senior officer qualified level... However, the other crew members are very experienced." [encl (39)]

12. LT Osborn was the CRC-1 Electronic Warfare Aircraft Commander (EWAC). He received this designation on 29 January 2001. [encls (15), (28), (33), (58)]

13. LT Shane J. Osborn, USN, was also the CRC-1 Electronic Warfare Mission Commander (EWMC). He received this designation on 22 February 2001. [encls (14), (44), (58)]

14. This was LT Osborn's first detachment as an EWMC and EWAC, and his fifth detachment since his arrival to VQ-1. He had 940.3 hours of total pilot time and 105.3 hours of Aircraft Commander time as of 27 March 2001. [encls (33), (53)]


15. LT Patrick C. Honeck, USN, was the CRC-1 NATOPS-qualified pilot (Electronic Warfare Pilot (EWP)). He received this designation on 19 September 2000. [encls (11), (25), (33), (58)]

16. This was LT Honeck's first detachment as an EWP and his fourth detachment since his arrival to VQ-1. He was assigned to CRC-1 the last time CRC-1 deployed. LT Honeck had 1018.3 hours of total pilot time as of 27 March 2001. [encls (33), (53)]

17. LTJG Jeffrey R. Vignery, USNR, was the CRC-1 NATOPS-qualified copilot (Electronic Warfare Copilot (EWCP)). He received this designation on 04 August 2000. [encls (17), (30), (33), (58)]


18. This was LTJG Vignery's second detachment as an EWCP since his arrival to VQ-1. He had 401.2 hours of total pilot time as of 27 March 2001. [encls (33), (53)]

19. LTJG John D. Comerford, USN, was the CRC-1 Senior Evaluator (SEVAL). He received this designation on 22 February 2001. [encls (8), (22), (33), (58)]




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30. This was AT2 Guidry's eighth detachment since his arrival to VQ-1. He had 1482.1 hours of special crew time as of 27 March 2001. [encls (33), (53)]
31. AT2 David M. Cecka, USN, the CRC-1 Biglook/Radar Operator. He received his designation on 01 February 2001. [encls (7), (21), (33), (58)]
32. This was AT2 Cecka's ninth detachment since his arrival to VQ-1. He had 1845.4 hours of special crew time as of 27 March 2001. [encls (33), (53)]
33. CTTSN Bradford J. Borland, USN, was the CRC-1 Laboratory Operator (LABOP). He was designated on 30 November 1999. [encls (6), (20), (33), (58)]
34. This was CTTSN Borland's seventh detachment since his arrival to VQ-1. He had 1605.6 hours of special crew time as of 27 March 2001. [encls (33), (53)]
35. AT2 Ramon P. Mercado, USN, was the CRC-1 In-Flight Technician (IFT). He was designated on 03 August 1999. [encls (12), (26), (33), (58)]
36. This was AT2 Mercado's sixth detachment since his arrival to VQ-1. He was assigned to CRC-1 the last time CRC-1 deployed. AT3 Mercado had 1094.6 hours of special crew time as of 27 March 2001. [encls (33), (53)]
37. AE3 Steven M. Blocher, USN, was an EWOP trainee on CRC-1. He was a qualified P-3 Observer and received his designation on 03 May 2000. [encls (5), (19), (33)]
38. This was AE3 Blocher's first detachment since his arrival to VQ-1. He had 118.7 hours of special crew time as of 27 March 2001. [encls (33), (53)]
39. CTT2 Jason D. Hanser, USN, was a LABOP Trainee on CRC-1. He was a qualified P-3 Observer and received his designation on 04 April 2000. [encls (10), (24), (33)]
40. This was CTT2 Hanser's third detachment since his arrival to VQ-1. He was assigned to CRC-1 the last time CRC-1 deployed. CTT2 Hanser had 375.1 hours of special crew time as of 27 March 2001. [encls (33), (53)]
41. CRC-1 was medically cleared for flight. [encl (84)]



Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

42. CRC-1 departed Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA on a NALO flight on 28 February 2001 and commenced their OP-1 cycle. [encl (55)]
43. CRC-1 arrived at Naval Air Facility, Misawa, Japan on 02 March 2001 and reported to VQ-1 Detachment Misawa (CTG 72.5). [encl (60)]
44. EP-3E Bureau Number (BUNO) 156511, referred to as PR-32, was already in Misawa, Japan when CRC-1 arrived. [encl (60)]
45. CRC-1 flew their first operational mission on PR-32 on 04 March 2001. On 07 March 2001, CRC-1 on PR-32, repositioned to Kadena AFB, Okinawa, Japan. [encl (60)]
46. On 27 March 2001, CRC-1 had flown their 11th operational mission since reporting to CTG 72.5. [encl (60)]
47. CRC-1's next operational mission was scheduled for 01 April 2001. [encl (54), (60)]
48. CRC-1 was scheduled to fly a 9.0-hour operational flight mission on 01 April 2001. [encl (54)]
49. CRC-1's mission on 01 April 2001 was the crew's 12th operational flight mission since their arrival in Japan. Their flight mission track included flying south of China's Hainan Island. [encls (54), (60), (82)]
50. CRC-1 was scheduled to brief their operational flight mission at 0300, take off from Kadena Air Force Base (AFB), Okinawa, Japan at 0500, and land at Kadena AFB, Okinawa, Japan at 1400 on 01 April 2001 (+9I). [encl (54)]
51. PR-32 was properly released and accepted for flight on 01 April, 2001. [encl (56)]
- PRC F-8 collision with U.S Navy EP-3E*
52. CRC-1 on PR-32 took off from Kadena AFB, Okinawa and was airborne at approximately 0500 on 01 April 2001 (+9I). [encl (54)]



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53. Mission proceeded routinely. At approximately 1000 on 01 April 2001 (+9I), approximately five hours after CRC-1 took off from Kadena, Japan, PR-32 was southeast of Hainan Island, China in international airspace. [encls (52), (77)]

54. At this time, the EWAC was seated in the right pilot seat, the EWCP was seated in the left pilot seat and the second FE was in the center FE seat. [encls (47), (48), (49), (50), (51), (52)]

55. Rotation among the pilots and FEs is normal due to crew relief, training and crew coordination considerations. [encl (58)]

56. The aircraft was established with wings level, on autopilot at 22,500 feet altitude, airspeed 180 knots, heading 190 degrees (South-Southwest). [encls (47), (49), (50), (51), (52), (77)]

57. Aircrew sighted two aircraft off the starboard side of PR-32 at a distance and closing. [encls (49), (50), (51), (52), (79)]


58. Two F-8s closed to within approximately 1 nautical mile (NM) in loose trail formation. [encls (47) (49), (52), (77), (78), (79)]

59. Approximately two minutes later, at a normal turn point on PR-32's preplanned track, the crew initiated a slow left turn to the east, away from Hainan Island. [encls (49), (51), (52)]

60. This turn was the crew's last turn on track prior to returning to Kadena AFB. The PRC aircraft were observed at various points during the turn. [encls (47), (49), (51), (52)]

61. Weather was clear with visual meteorological conditions. [encls (47), (48), (49), (50), (51), (52), (82, pages 49-54)]

62. Upon completion of the turn, PR-32 was on a 070 heading (East-Northeast), wings level, with autopilot engaged. The lead F-8 commenced the first of three passes to join in formation on the port side of PR-32. [encls (47), (48), (49), (50), (51), (52), (77), (78)]



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63. During the first approach, the F-8 pilot came within approximately ten feet of PR-32 and was observed saluting the EP-3E flight station. [encls (47), (48), (49), (50), (51), (52), (77), (78)]

64. The F-8 drifted out of formation but returned to within approximately five feet of PR-32's port wing at the same altitude. [encls (49), (50), (51), (52), (78), (79)]

65. On this second approach, the F-8 pilot was observed to have his oxygen mask removed and was seen gesturing to the crew with hand signals in a pushing motion. [encls (49), (50), (51), (52), (77)]

66. The F-8 once again drifted out of formation. [encls (49), (50), (51), (52), (79)]

67. On the F-8's third and final pass the F-8 pilot overshot (due to excessive closure rate) his attempt to join up with PR-32. This placed the F-8 below and slightly forward of PR-32's port wing. [encls (49), (50), (51), (52), (77)]


68. The F-8 pilot slightly raised the nose of his aircraft (increasing the F-8's angle of attack) in what appeared to be an effort to slow his aircraft. [encls (49), (50), (51), (52), (77), (78), (79)]

69. At approximately 1005 (+9I), the F-8 pilot was unable to control his closure rate. The F-8 pitched up into PR-32's #1 propeller striking the propeller at the point where the F-8's vertical stabilizer assembly and fuselage meet. [encls (47), (49), (50), (51), (52)]

70. The F-8 was immediately ripped in half. Numerous smaller pieces of the F-8 were also observed. [encls (49), (51), (52)]

71. The tail section of the F-8 impacted the left aileron of PR-32. [encls (47), (49), (52)]

72. Upon the F-8's impact with PR-32, PR-32 immediately pitched up and began shaking violently due to damage on the #1 propeller. [encls (49), (50), (52)]



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73. The nose section of the F-8 continued forward and impacted the nose radome of PR-32 causing the radome to disintegrate. Pieces of the radome flew over the top of PR-32. [encls (47), (49), (51), (52)]

74. Other pieces of the radome impacted both port and starboard pitot tubes (a portion of the airspeed indicating system) resulting in loss of airspeed indications and degradation of altitude indicating systems. [encls (49), (50), (51), (52)]

75. After PR-32 pitched up, PR-32 snap rolled to the left to approximately 130 to 140 degrees angle of bank (AOB), approximately 30 degrees nose low. [encls (49), (50), (52)]

76. The EWAC assumed control from where he was seated in the right pilot seat. With the assistance of the EWCP (who was occupying the left pilot seat of PR-32) the EWAC immediately applied full right aileron and full right rudder, pulling the power levers to flight idle to initiate recovery. [encls (47), (48), (49), (50), (51), (52)]


77. PR-32 remained out of control until descending to approximately 15,000 feet altitude (a loss of 7,500 feet of altitude) with a rate of descent in excess of 4,000 feet per minute. [encls (49), (50), (52)]

78. At approximately 15,000 feet altitude, the EWAC and EWCP accomplished a wings level attitude on PR-32. The aircraft continued to vibrate violently. [encls (49), (50), (52)]

79. In an attempt to regain control, the EWAC directed emergency shutdown procedures on the #1 engine. [encls (49), (50), (51), (52)]

80. As the descent continued, the EWAC was unable to regain control and ordered the EWCP to direct the crew to prepare to bail out. [encls (49), (52)]

81. Approaching 10,000 feet altitude, #1 propeller rotation slowed (from approximately 60 percent RPM to 30 percent RPM, possibly coupled with a near flat blade angle), allowing the crew to regain partial control of PR-32. [encls (49), (52)]



Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

82. The damaged F-8 was last seen trailing smoke in an uncontrolled dive toward the ocean surface. [encls (48), (49), (51)]
83. The aircraft became more controllable after the shut down of the #1 engine, although nearly full right aileron was required to maintain PR-32's wings level. [encls (49), (52)]
84. The EWCP, still in the left pilot seat, concluded bailout and Mayday calls, and at the direction of the EWAC, redirected the crew to prepare to ditch. [encls (47), (48), (49), (50), (51), (52)]
85. Ditching an aircraft is landing the aircraft in the water. [encl (59)]
86. The crew quickly discussed options, decided to land and identified Lingshui airfield on the island of Hainan, China as the closest available airfield on a heading of 290 degrees. [encls (49), (52)]
87. While proceeding to the airfield, the EWAC began making calls on UHF 243.0 (Guard - an international emergency frequency) declaring an emergency, and switched to emergency transponder (IFF) codes. The navigator was making similar Mayday calls on HF guard. [encls (49) (52)]
88. As PR-32 was en route to Lingshui airfield, the EWP replaced the EWAC in the right pilot seat. The EWAC, after donning his parachute, then replaced the EWCP in the left pilot seat. The FE replaced the second FE in the center FE seat. Manning in the flight station thus became EWAC in the left pilot seat, EWP in the right pilot seat and the FE in the center FE seat. [encls (47), (48), (49), (50), (51), (52)]
89. As the crew proceeded to Lingshui, several more calls were made on Guard with no response. [encls ((49), (52)]
90. The EWAC conducted a controlled descent to 1000 feet altitude, using the radar altimeter, at 10 nautical miles from Lingshui airfield, orbiting to better locate the field and further evaluate aircraft controllability. [encls (49), (52)]
91. PR-32 approached the field at a 90-degree offset from the approach end of the favored runway (favored for wind direction) and executed a left 270-degree turn for

[REDACTED]

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

landing (near full right aileron and rudder required to maintain level flight). [encls (49), (52)]

92. Concerned that unnecessary movement of flight control surfaces or a change in configuration might cause PR-32 to depart controlled flight (level of damage to the port aileron and flaps unknown), the EWAC elected to conduct a no-flap, three engine landing. [encls (49), (52)]

93. The crew configured PR-32 for landing, conducted applicable checklists and entered an overhead downwind for landing. Landing and rollout were completed with no additional difficulties. [encls (48), (49), (52)]

Destruction of classified materiel


94. VQ-1 crews carry classified materiel as a matter of normal routine. Classified materiel is necessary in executing the flight mission. [encl (63)]

95. [REDACTED]

96. [REDACTED] (b)(2)

97. [REDACTED]

98. [REDACTED]



Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

99. Classified materiel onboard PR-32 flown on 01 April 2001 included [

[

](b)(1)

100. Classified materiel onboard PR-32 was contained in various media including paper, magnetic media (tapes and computer disks) and computer hard drives. [encls (45), (82), pages 40-48)

101. After the collision and when the order "prepare to bailout" was called, crewmembers commenced donning their parachutes. [encls (47), (49), (52)]

102. After the #1 engine was shutdown and PR-32 became more controllable, the order to "prepare to ditch" was subsequently called. [encls (49), (52), (80)]

103. Once the crew was directed to "prepare to ditch," destruction of classified materiel was directed and destruction commenced. [encls (65), (68), (69), (70), (71), (73), (74), (75), (80)]

104. VQ-1 has an emergency destruction instruction. [encl (64)]

105. Emergency destruction of classified materiel is neither practiced nor drilled by the aircrews as a matter of routine. [encls (66), (67), (68), (69), (70), (71), (72), (73), (74), (75), (76)]

106. Destruction of classified materiel in-flight included jettisoning classified materiel out the starboard overwing hatch, smashing equipment with the onboard axe and other hard objects such as metal containers and, upon landing of the aircraft, hand-shredding classified papers. [encls (69), (81)]

107. Destruction of all classified materiel onboard PR-32 did not occur. [encls (66), (67), (68), (69), (70), (75)]

Opinion
(Preparation for Deployment)

[REDACTED]

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

1. Crewmembers on CRC-1 were fully qualified and ready for deployment in accordance with existing VQ-1 instructions. [FF (8), (9), (10), (11)]
2. The designation of EWMC shortly after an EWAC designation, although not routine, is not unusual. [FF (13)]

Recommendations
(Preparation for Deployment)

1. Aircrew integration regarding NSG crew integrity with VQ CRCs should be given emphasis.
2. See other recommendations below under possible loss or compromise of classified information.

Opinion
(Aircraft Collision)

1. The lead PRC F-8 was unable to maintain formation on PR-32 probably due to the dissimilarity between the two aircraft. [FF (62), (63), (64), (65), (66), (67), (68)]
2. The lead F-8 pilot was unable to safely control his aircraft during his third and final attempt to join with PR-32 and subsequently collided into PR-32. [FF (67), (68), (69)]
3. The second F-8 was not a factor in the collision. [FF (57), (62)]
4. CRC-1 did not commit any dangerous or hazardous maneuvers. [FF (56), (58), (59), (62), (63), (64), (65), (66), (67), (68)]
5. CRC-1 did not provoke the lead F-8 pilot. [FF (56), (57), (58), (59), (60), (62), (63), (64), (65), (66), (67), (68)]
6. CRC-1 did not cause the collision between PR-32 and the F-8. [FF (66), (67), (68), (69)]

[REDACTED]

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

7. CRC-1 was not negligent, not responsible and not at fault for the collision between the F-8 and PR-32. [FF (66), (67), (68), (69)]

Recommendations
(Aircraft Collision)

1. Pursue collision avoidance measures for future safety enhancement in the event of airborne intercepts. These mutually agreeable safety measures should include minimum standoff intercept distances and safety of flight communication channels.

Opinion
(Possible Loss or Compromise of Classified Information)

1. Emergency destruction of classified materiel was commenced after PR-32 recovered from its uncontrolled and rapid descent following the mid-air collision with the F-8. The destruction of classified materiel was accomplished while the aircrew was probably still in shock from the aircraft collision and the subsequent rapid descent of the aircraft and with very little time prior to landing. [FF (103), (106)]

2. Compromise by the People's Republic of China of undestroyed classified materiel on PR-32 is highly probable and cannot be ruled out. [FF (107)]

Recommendations
(Possible Loss or Compromise of Classified Information)

1. FAIRECONRONONEINST 5500.1A (VQ-1 Command Emergency Action Plan) for emergency destruction should be a mandatory part of aircrew predeployment workups. This should include standardized training, documentation and practice drills.

2. Emergency destruction drills should be conducted with aircrew and aircrew augmentees as a matter of routine upon arrival in AOR and should be practiced as needed throughout the crew's detachment.

3. Aircrew harnesses should be carried onboard all aircraft to ensure aircrew safety when jettisoning classified materiel from the aircraft becomes necessary.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 COMMANDER, PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE FORCE
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 KANEHOE BAY, HI 96863-4000



5800
 Ser NO1J/470
 20 Jun 01

[REDACTED] - Unclassified upon removal of enclosures
 (77), (78), (79), (80), (81) and (82)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Captain [(b)(6)] ltr of 4 Jun 01

From: Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, Pacific
 To: Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (Code NO1J)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN
 FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND
 THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED
 OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR
 COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE
 EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURED ON THE
 ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME
 ZONE MINUS SEVEN

1. Forwarded.
2. The proceedings, findings of fact, opinions and recommendations of the investigating officer are approved.

M. L. Holmes
 M. L. HOLMES

X.N # S-067-01
 DATE RCVD 01 JUN 01
 ASC # N/A
 CODE NO1J
 COPY # 1 OF # 1
 THIS MATERIAL IS ACCOUNTABLE
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER NAVAL AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
BOX 357051
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92135-7051

5830
Ser N01J/S003
29 November 2001

████████████████████
SECOND ENDORSEMENT on Captain [

(b)(6)

], USN, ltr
of 4 Jun 01

From: Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Code N09N2)
Via: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION
BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E
BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)
F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND
THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF
THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF
HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE
MINUS SEVEN

1. Readdressed and forwarded. Note that the scope of this particular investigation was limited to "the cause of the collision, any resulting injuries and damages, and any fault, neglect, or responsibility therefore...with attention directed to the events leading up to and during the time of the collision followed by the possible loss and compromise of classified information resulting from the emergency landing of the aircraft." The investigation was limited by CINCPACFLT to the time period prior to the incident to 10 minutes after the collision. As noted by the investigating officer, the investigation was further limited because direct access to the crewmembers was not available and the investigation had to rely on summaries of the repatriation debriefs and investigating officer generated questionnaires. The proceedings, findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations, as endorsed, are hereby further endorsed with the following modifications:

- a. Modify Finding of Fact 1: Delete enclosure (44).
- b. Modify Finding of Fact 2: Delete enclosures (43) and (44).

[REDACTED]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

- c. Modify Finding of Fact 3: Replace enclosure (42) with enclosure (43).
- d. Modify Finding of Fact 6 to read: "VQ-1's aircrews (CRC-1 to CRC-8) are manned by VQ-1 personnel. A VQ-1 crewmember assigned to a crew may stay with that crew for his or her entire tour. [encl (43)]."
- e. Modify Finding of Fact 7: Delete enclosure (46).
- f. Modify Findings of Fact 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, and 35: At the end of the first sentence in each of these enclosures, add the words "as described in the NATOPS Flight Manual for the EP-3E Aircraft."
- g. Modify Findings of Facts 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39: Add enclosure (41).
- h. Modify Finding of Fact 13: Delete enclosure (44).
- i. Modify Finding of Fact 27: Delete enclosure (55).
- j. Modify Finding of Fact 57: Delete enclosure (79).
- k. Modify Finding of Fact 58: Add the words "People's Republic of China (PRC)" before "F-8s." Add enclosures (77), (78), (79), (80), (81), and (82).
- l. Modify Finding of Fact 59: Delete enclosure (51).
- m. Modify Finding of Fact 63: Delete enclosure (48).
- n. Modify Finding of Fact 64: Delete enclosure (50).
- o. Modify Finding of Fact 65: Delete enclosure (51).
- p. Modify Finding of Fact 68: Delete enclosure (51).

[REDACTED]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

- q. Modify Finding of Fact 78: Delete enclosure (50).
- r. Modify Finding of Fact 93: After the word "difficulties," add "or significant injuries." Add enclosures (47-51).
- s. Modify Finding of Fact 103: Add enclosures (64) and (83).
- t. Modify Finding of Fact 107: After the word "occur," add "as there was material and equipment that was not jettisoned from PR-32 that was either left in leather bags, hand-shredded by the crew, or simply hidden on the plane." Add enclosure (80).
- u. Modify Recommendation 7 under the Recommendation Section entitled "Possible Loss or Compromise of Classified Information": Add the words "The destruction device or apparatus should have an independent power source" to the end of the recommendation.
- v. Add "Recommendation 8" under the Recommendation Section entitled "Possible Loss or Compromise of Classified Information": "Additional equipment for destruction of classified equipment, such as axes, should be acquired and placed on all EP-3E aircraft to use during the destruction process. Said equipment should be stowed in different areas on the aircraft to facilitate use throughout the aircraft."
- w. Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, Pacific, confirmed that the classification on Page 42 of enclosure (82) was mismarked. The word "CODEWORD" has been deleted from the top and bottom of that page.

[REDACTED]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

2. This aircraft collision and subsequent loss/compromise of classified information was the direct result of a People's Republic of China (PRC) F-8 pilot's inability to safely control his aircraft near a U.S. Navy EP-3E while flying in international airspace. After the collision and once the EP-3E pilot regained control of the aircraft, emergency destruction of a large amount of classified material was commenced. However, after successfully completing an emergency landing on Hainan Island, China, there was still classified material and equipment on board the aircraft. These items were not jettisoned or destroyed, but either hidden on the plane or hand-shredded. Therefore, compromise of undestroyed classified material is highly probable.

3. The following is a summary of the facts concerning the collision:

a. At approximately 0500 (local time, +9I) on 1 April 2001, Combat Reconnaissance Crew ONE (CRC-1) of Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron VQ-1 departed Kadena AFB, Okinawa, Japan, in a U.S. Navy EP-3E (BUNO 156511) designated as PR-32. The flight was scheduled to terminate nine hours later (1400 local) at the point of origin after completing its mission off the coast of the PRC. The crew was approximately 30 days into their 90-day deployment and flying their 12th operational mission. All members of the crew were fully qualified.

b. At approximately 1000 (+9I), PR-32 was flying in international airspace southwest of Hainan Island when the aircrew of PR-32 sighted a pair of PRC F-8 aircraft in loose trail off their starboard side. They were flying in VMC at 22,500 ft, 180 kts, and heading 190 degrees. Approximately 2 minutes later, PR-32 initiated a slow left turn to a heading of 070 (away from Hainan Island), in accordance with their pre-planned flight track. Upon completion of the turn, with wings

[REDACTED]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

straight and level and auto-pilot engaged, the lead F-8 commenced the first of three passes to join up in formation with PR-32 on its port side.

c. During the first pass, the pilot of the F-8 closed to a distance of approximately 10 feet, saluted the PR-32 flight station, and then departed. On the second pass, the lead F-8 closed within 5 feet of the PR-32's port wing at the same altitude, gestured to the PR-32 crew with hand signals interpreted as a pushing motion, and again departed. The third and final pass occurred at approximately 1005 local. The pilot of the F-8 overshot his approach, and in an apparent attempt to arrest his rate of closure, raised the nose of his aircraft, striking the #1 propeller of PR-32 on the port outboard side. The F-8 was ripped in half at the point where its vertical stabilizer and fuselage meet. The tail section of the F-8 impacted the left aileron of PR-32 which caused PR-32 to immediately pitch up and begin to shake violently. The nose section of the F-8 subsequently impacted and disintegrated the nose radome of PR-32.

d. The debris from the radome impacted both port and starboard pitot tubes of PR-32 resulting in loss of airspeed indications and degradation of altitude indication systems. After pitching up, PR-32 snap rolled left into 130-140 degrees angle of bank, 30 degrees nose down, at a rate of descent which exceeded 4,000 FPM. The Electronic Warfare Aircraft Commander (EWAC), who was also the Mission Commander, was in the right seat. He assumed control of the aircraft with the assistance of the Electronic Warfare Copilot (EWCP), who was in the left seat. They applied full right aileron, full right rudder, and pulled the power control levers to flight idle to initiate recovery. PR-32 remained out of control until descending to approximately 15,000 feet where the aircraft began to roll wings level. PR-32 continued to vibrate violently.

[REDACTED]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

e. At this point, the EWAC directed the emergency shutdown of the #1 engine and ordered the crew to "prepare for bailout." Approaching 10,000 feet, the slowing rotation of the #1 propeller (possibly coupled with the flat blade angle pitch) permitted the crew to regain partial control of the aircraft. When the #1 engine was completely shut down, the pilot was able to maintain straight and level flight with nearly full right aileron and rudder applied. The EWCP completed the bailout checklist and made several "Mayday" calls. The EWAC then redirected the crew to "prepare to ditch." However, after a brief discussion, the decision was made to land at Lingshui Airfield on Hainan Island, as it was the nearest available airfield. A switch was then made to the emergency transponder (IFF) codes. The Navigator began making "Mayday" calls on the HF guard. In addition, numerous emergency calls were made on the UHF frequency declaring an emergency.

f. Concerned that unnecessary movement of the flight control or a change to the aircraft configuration might cause PR-32 to depart controlled flight, the EWAC elected to make a controlled descent to 1,000 feet and conduct a no-flap, three-engine landing, which was executed without further difficulty.

g. As a matter of normal routine, PR-32 was carrying Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret classified material on that flight, as is required to execute its mission. Media included paper, magnetic (tapes and computer disks), and computer hard drives. In addition, compartmentalized material and CMS were onboard. After the collision and the order to "prepare to bailout" was called, crewmembers donned their parachutes. Destruction of classified material did not commence as it is not required in a bailout situation. However, after the #1 engine was shut down and PR-32 became more controllable, the crew was directed to "prepare to ditch." Although not required at this point, destruction of classified material was directed and destruction commenced. Destruction of onboard classified

[REDACTED]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

material included jettisoning material out of the starboard over-wing hatch, smashing equipment with the onboard axe and other hard objects such as metal containers, and upon landing of the aircraft, hand-shredding the remaining classified papers. Destruction of all classified material was not completed in accordance with enclosures (4) and (5) of FAIRECONRONONEINST 5500.1A. Destruction of all classified material onboard PR-32 did not occur.

(b)(6)

4. According to conversations between [REDACTED], USN, COMNAVAIRPAC EP-3E Class Desk, and COMPATRECONFORPAC, several corrective actions have been directed and are taking place. Commander, Naval Security Group (COMNAVSECGRU) was directed by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to act as Executive Agent in conducting a security assessment of the incident. The results were briefed to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) and CNO. After it is briefed to Congress, it will be presented to other pertinent commands, such as Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC). CINCPACFLT has directed an assessment team, with members from CINCPACFLT and CTF-72, to assure compliance with recently implemented Emergency Action Plan (EAP) procedures. These new procedures include:

- a. Formalizing pre-deployment EAP training;
- b. EAP training conducted at the forward detachment site with the entire crew (including Naval Security Group Activity) prior to the first operational mission;
- c. Mission Commanders conducting unannounced emergency destruction drills on missions (on a not to interfere basis with collection);
- d. Reviewing, modifying, and simplifying the EAP to increase efficiency;

[REDACTED]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

e. VQ-1 transitioning more of its CMS to electronic comsec keying material and only carrying that CMS required for the scheduled mission(s) for a given day;

f. Study notes are kept to a minimum, and are kept in electronic format where possible;

g. Requiring hard copy mission support/reference materials to be kept to a minimum, and restricting them to the current AOR;

h. Reviewing CMS processes and formalizing training for the applicable personnel in each crew to receive training during the pre-deployment work-up;

i. Providing new laptop computers for VQ-1 in order to further promote the reduction in paper media; and

j. Coordinating training between VQ-1 and Naval Security Group Activity to ensure that NSGA has crew training materials prior to reporting to VQ-1 for operational missions.


5. Work is ongoing between VQ-1 and COMNAVSECGRU to improve the crew and command-level coordination. At least two conferences have been held with an increasing level of COMNAVSECGRU interest. At the conference held in June 2001 at COMNAVSECGRU headquarters, a working group unanimously agreed to the requirement of co-locating WPAC Cryptologic Direct Support flyers to Whidbey Island. This will greatly increase capability of the commands and aircrew to train together.

6. All corrective actions to be taken should be sufficient to prevent recurrence. Recommend that no disciplinary action be taken.

[REDACTED]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION
BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E
BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)
F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND
THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF
THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF
HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE
MINUS SEVEN

7. The proceedings, findings of fact, opinions, and
recommendations, as endorsed and modified herewith, are
forwarded recommending approval.


J. B. NATHMAN

Copy to:
COMPATRECONFORPAC
[] (b)(6)



[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
250 MAHALAPA DRIVE
PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII 96860-3131

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830
Ser N00J/SX01
22 May 02

[REDACTED] - Unclassified upon removal of enclosures
(77), (78), (79), (80), and (82).

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on Captain [REDACTED]
ltr of 4 Jun 01

(b)(1)
2, USN, [REDACTED]

J/1320

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (N09N2)
Via: Chief of Naval Operations (N09B)

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

1. Forwarded. An executive summary of the facts concerning the collision is found in paragraph 3 of the second endorsement.
2. The following substantive changes are made:

a. Add "Recommendation 9" under the Recommendation Section entitled "Possible Loss or Compromise of Classified Information": An Alternate Mission Commander position should be designated in NATOPS for instances where the Mission Commander is unable to fulfill those responsibilities. This recommendation reflects the inability of an Aircraft Commander who is focused on saving an aircraft in extremis to simultaneously act as Mission Commander and coordinate emergency destruction.

b. Add "Recommendation 10" under the Recommendation Section entitled "Possible Loss or Compromise of Classified Information": Responsibilities for emergency destruction of classified material should be standardized and promulgated via formal joint instructions between VQ-1 and NSGA Misawa.

4

[REDACTED]

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

Electronic Warfare Aircraft Commander, Senior Evaluator and Special Evaluator for emergency destruction of classified material should be incorporated into the NATOPS manual.

c. Add "Recommendation 11" under the Recommendation Section entitled "Possible Loss or Compromise of Classified Information": Roles and responsibilities of Mission Commander,

d. Add "Recommendation 12" under the Recommendation Section entitled "Possible Loss or Compromise of Classified Information": Continue to improve deployment preparations and crew readiness certification to include greater crew and command level coordination as discussed in the second endorsement (paragraph 5, page 28). Special Evaluator should be included in pre-deployment training in order to improve crew coordination.

3. Concur that no disciplinary action is necessary. The findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations are hereby approved and forwarded.

R. F. Willard
R. F. WILLARD
Deputy and Chief of Staff

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMPATRECONFORPAC

LE J (b)(6)



[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO
5830
Ser N09BL/2U506696
10 October 2002

[REDACTED] - Unclassified upon removal of enclosures
(77), (78), (79), (80), (81), and (82)

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on Captain [(b)(6)], USN, []
[] 1/1320 ltr of 4 Jun 01

From: Director, Navy Staff (DNS)
To: Chief of Naval Operations (N09N2)
Via: (1) Commander, Naval Security Group Command
(2) Director, Navy Staff (DNS)

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

1. Readdressed and forwarded.
2. The subject investigation was appointed to examine "the cause of the collision, any resulting injuries and damages, and any fault, neglect, or responsibility therefore." Attention was directed to the events leading up to and during the time of the collision followed by the possible loss and compromise of classified information resulting from the emergency landing of the aircraft. The issue of the possible loss and compromise of classified information was investigated, however, only to the extent of identifying the procedures used and the utility of existing emergency destruction directives governing the actions of the crew members. Commander, Naval Security Group Command (COMNAVSECGRU) was designated as the Executive Agent for conducting the security assessment of the incident, apart from the subject investigation.
3. Various opinions and recommendations in the subject investigation and subsequent endorsements deal with COMNAVSECGRU functions and mission and how they relate with the Combat

[REDACTED]

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

Reconnaissance Crew. Because this investigation bears on COMNAVSECGRU's area of responsibility, and the security assessment conducted by COMNAVSECGRU and this investigation are inextricably linked, I request you review the subject investigation and provide comments per reference (a).

4. Upon completion of your review, please forward your endorsement to me. Should you have any questions, my point of contact on this matter is Captain [REDACTED], JAGC, USN, who may be reached at [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] (b)(6)

P. A. Tracey
P. A. TRACEY
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Copy to:
CINCPACFLT
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMPATRECONFORPAC

[REDACTED] (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL SECURITY GROUP COMMAND
9900 SAVAGE ROAD, SUITE 8585
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE MD 20755-8585

5830
Ser N00/S1192
11 Dec 02

[REDACTED] - Unclassified upon removal of enclosures (77), (78), (79), (80), and (82).

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on Captain [REDACTED] (b)(6), USN, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] /1320 ltr of 4 Jun 01

From: Commander, Naval Security Group Command
To: Chief of Naval Operations (N09N2)
Via: Director, Navy Staff (DNS)

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

Ref: (c) EP-3E Collision: Cryptologic Damage Assessment and Incident Review Final Report (July 2001) (NOTAL)
(d) PHONCON CNSG (N00J) [REDACTED] /OPNAV (N09N2) Mr. [REDACTED] (b)(6) [REDACTED] of 9 Dec 02.

1. Forwarded. Concur with the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations as endorsed, with the following substantive additions:

a. Add "Recommendation 2" under the Recommendation Section entitled "Preparation for Deployment": All Core Crew/Tactical Nucleus (TAC NUC) personnel should be positionally qualified and designated in writing prior to starting work-ups.

b. Add "Recommendation 3" under the Recommendation Section entitled "Preparation for Deployment": Serving independently for at least one detachment as a Senior Evaluator/Electronic Warfare Aircraft Commander (SEVAL/EWAC) should be a prerequisite for designation as Mission Commander.

[REDACTED]

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

c. Add "Recommendation 4" under the Recommendation Section entitled "Preparation for Deployment": Ample consideration should be given to pairing VQ Squadron Mission Commanders/SEVALS and NSGA Special Evaluators (SPECEVALs) well in advance of crew workups, with the aim of complimenting strengths and weaknesses, creating more balanced, broadly experienced crews.

2. As stated in paragraph 2 of the original correspondence, the impact of any loss or compromise of classified information is beyond the scope of the subject investigation, which does not extend beyond the time the EP3E crew disembarked in China. The assessment of loss or compromise (hereinafter, the "Cryptologic Damage Assessment") was conducted as a separate investigation and documented in reference (c). The Cryptologic Damage Assessment complies with all reference (b) requirements. The copy of that document transmitted to OPNAV (N09N2) for its review will be retained there, per reference (d), along with the subject investigation.

3. CNSG's points of contact are CDR [] at [] 3613 or LCDR Paul Kapfer, JAGC, at (202) 373-3632. [] (b)(3)


J. D. BURNS

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Copy to:
COMPACFLT
COMNAVAIRPAC
COMPATRECONFORPAC
CAPT [] (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE FORCE
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
BOX 64000
MARINE CORPS BASE HAWAII
KANELOE BAY, HI 96863-4000

5830
Ser NO1J/283
6 Apr 01

From: Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, Pacific
To: [] U.S. Navy
(b)(6) [] U.S. Navy

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

Ref: (a) JAG Manual, Chapter 2
(b) SECNAVINST 5510.36, Chapter 12 (b)(6)
(c) PHONECON CPRFP (NO1J) [] /CNO (NO9N2) Mr.
(b)(6) [] of 6 Apr 01

1. Pursuant to references (a) and (b), you are appointed to inquire, as soon as practical, into the circumstances surrounding the aircraft collision between the VQ-1 EP-3E BUNO 156511 and the PRC F-8, and the possible loss or compromise of classified information as a result of the emergency landing of the EP-3E.
2. Per section 0242 of reference (a), you are to investigate all facts and circumstances surrounding the events which led to and followed the collision of the VQ-1 EP-3E and the PRC F-8 and the emergency landing of the EP-3E. You must investigate the cause of the collision, any resulting injuries and damages, and any fault, neglect, or responsibility therefore. Report your findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations within 45 days from the date of this letter, unless an extension is granted. In particular, your attention is directed to the events leading up to and during the time of the aircraft collision followed by the possible loss or compromise of classified information resulting from the emergency landing of the aircraft.
3. Per reference (c), upon the discovery of the loss or compromise of classified information, you are directed to file interim reports that completely and accurately identify the information lost or compromised. Contents and classification of interim reports should be made in accordance with paragraphs 12-5 and 12-6 of reference (b) and submitted to COMNAVAIRFAC, CNO (NO9N2), the originator and the OCA of the lost or compromised

ENCLOSURE(1)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

information, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Field Office Hawaii, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and all others required by paragraph 12-8 of reference (b).

4. By copy of this appointing order, questions regarding the JAGMAN investigation will be directed to [], Staff Judge Advocate, COMPATRECONFORPAC. COMPATRECONWING ONE and FAIRECON ONE are directed to provide a point of contact that can assist the investigating officers with gathering information from their respective commands. Please provide in writing the name, telephone number, and e-mail address of the point of contact to [] by 10 April 2001.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)


M. L. HOLMES

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRPAC (N01J)
CINCPACFLT (N00J)
FAIRECON ONE
COMPATRECONWING ONE
COMPATRECONWING TEN
CNO (N09N2)
NCIS Pearl Harbor

[] (b)(6)

From: [] (b)(6)
nt: Tuesday, May 08, 2001 7:47 AM
: [] (b)(6)
Cc: [] (b)(6)
Subject: Request for extension on JAGMAN

[] (b)(6) (b)(6)

In regards to my conversation with [] and his conversation with RADM Holmes regarding the JAGMAN investigation on the EP-3E incident in China, request a 30 day extension on the current JAGMAN deadline.

V/R
[] (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER, PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE FORCE
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
BOX 64000
MARINE CORPS BASE HAWAII
KANELOE BAY, HI 96863-4000

5830
Ser N01J/364
8 May 01

From: Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, Pacific

To: (b)(6) [U.S. Navy
(b)(4) [, U.S. Navy

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 1 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

Ref: (a) Your extension request of 8 May 01
(b) JAGMAN Section 209(f)

1. Per reference (a), you request a 30-day extension to the original JAGMAN investigation deadline.
2. Per reference (b), your request for a 30-day extension is granted.


K. D. PHILLIPS
By direction

ENCLOSURE(3)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
 UNIT 25450
 FPO AP 96601-6550

5811
 N1
 09 Apr 2001

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE
 To: [(b)(6)], USN, [(b)(6)]

Subj: APPOINTMENT LETTER TO ASSIST AND ACT AS A POINT OF CONTACT FOR THE JAGMAN INVESTIGATORS CONDUCTING A COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 01 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

Ref: (a) JAGMAN, Chapter 2
 (b) SECNAVINST 5510.36, Chapter 12
 (c) COMPATRECONFORPAC ltr 5830 Ser N01J/283 of 6 Apr 01

1. Pursuant to references (a) through (c), you are appointed to assist and act as a point of contact for the JAGMAN investigators conducting a command investigation surrounding the aircraft collision between the VQ-1 EP-3E BUNO 156511 and the PRC F-8, and the possible loss or compromise of classified information as a result of the emergency landing of the EP-3E on Hainan Island, PRC.
2. You should become familiar with references (a) through (c) and begin collecting information that is pertinent to the investigation.
3. As soon as practical, you should inform the Staff Judge Advocate for COMPATRECONFORPAC, [], USN, JAGC, of your appointment. [] may be reached at [] or via e-mail at [] (b)(6)

CERTIFIED TO PD A TRUE COPY
 [] }
 [] }
 LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE(4)

Subj: APPOINTMENT LETTER TO ASSIST AND ACT AS A POINT OF CONTACT FOR THE JAGMAN INVESTIGATORS CONDUCTING A COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE AIRCRAFT COLLISION BETWEEN FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE ONE (VQ-1) EP-3E BUNO 156511 AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) F-8, WHICH OCCURRED OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION RESULTING FROM THE EMERGENCY LANDING OF THE VQ-1 EP-3E, WHICH OCCURRED ON THE ISLAND OF HAINAN, CHINA, ON 01 APRIL 2001, STANDARD TIME ZONE MINUS SEVEN

4. By copy of this appointing order, Department Heads, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE, are directed to furnish any assistance in obtaining information and processing information. Social Security Numbers of military personnel should be obtained through PSD or other official channels.

[] (b)(6)
[Acting]

Copy to:
N1, VQ-1
N2, VQ-1
N3, VQ-1
N4, VQ-1
N5, VQ-1
N6, VQ-1
N7, VQ-1
N8, VQ-1
N9, VQ-1

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[]
LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

(b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
UNIT 28488
FPO AP 96601-6550

1220
N8
03 May 00

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE
To: AEAN Steven M. Blocher, USN, [] (b)(6)

Subj: DESIGNATION AS P-3 OBSERVER

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3710.7R
(b) FAIRECONRONONEINST 1510.6N

1. Having successfully completed the requirements of references (a) and (b), you are hereby designated as an Observer in the P-3 series type aircraft, effective 28 April 2000.
2. This designation remains effective subject to the limitations imposed by references (a) and (b), and shall remain in effect until revoked or terminated by reassignment or transfer from this command. I take great pleasure in congratulating you on this significant achievement!

[] (b)(6)

Copy to:
Service Record
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Operations (Logs and Records)
Training Dept

(b)(6)



ENCLOSURE(5)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
UNIT 25458
FPO AP 96601-8850

1220
N8

30 NOV 1999

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE
To: CTTSN Bradford J. Borland, USN, [] (b)(6)
Subj: DESIGNATION AS LABORATORY OPERATOR
Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3710.7R
(b) NAVAIR 01-75PAE-1
(c) FAIRECONRONONEINST 1510.6N

1. Having demonstrated your abilities to perform the duties as an Airborne ELINT Analyst and having completed the requirements of reference (a) through (c), you are hereby designated as a Laboratory Operator in the EP-3E type aircraft.

2. I take great pleasure in congratulating you on this achievement. This designation is granted for demonstrated ability and professional knowledge. It reflects the results of your personal and professional endeavors. Notation of this designation will be made in your Service Record and in your NATOPS Training Jacket.

[] (b)(6)

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Service Record
Manpower
NATOPS Jacket
Operations (Logs and Records)
Training Dept

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
[] (b)(6)
LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

ENCLOSURE(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
UNIT 25458
FPO AP 96601-6550

1220
NB
1 Feb 01

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE
To: AT2(NAC) David M. Cecka , USN

Subj: DESIGNATION AS AN EP-3E BIGLOOK/RADAR OPERATOR

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3710.7R
(b) NAVAIR 01-75PAE-1
(c) FAIRECONRONONEINST 1510.6N

1. Per references (a) through (c), you are designated as a Biglook/Radar Operator in the EP-3E aircraft for Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE. This designation is based on your successful qualification dated 11 August 2000.
2. I take great pleasure in congratulating you on this achievement! This designation is granted for demonstrated ability and professional knowledge. It reflects the results of your personal and professional endeavors. Notation of this designation will be made in your NATOPS Training Jacket.
3. This designation remains effective subject to the limitations imposed by references (a) through (c), and shall remain in effect until revoked or terminated by reassignment or transfer from this command.

7 / (b)(6)
L

Copy to:
NATOPS Jacket
Operations (Logs and Records)
Training Dept

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[]
LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE(7)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE

UNIT 25458

FPO AP 96601-6880

1210
N8
22 Feb 01

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE
To: LTJG John D. Comerford, USNR

Subj: DESIGNATION AS AN EP-3E NATOPS SENIOR EVALUATOR

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3710.7R
(b) NAVAIR 01-75PAE-1
(c) FAIRECONRONONEINST 1520.5C

1. Per references (a) through (c), you are designated as a SENIOR EVALUATOR (SEVAL) in the EP-3E aircraft for Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE. This designation is based on your successful qualification dated 18 January 2001.

2. I take great pleasure in congratulating you on this achievement! This designation is granted for demonstrated ability and professional knowledge. It reflects the results of your personal and professional endeavors. Notation of this designation will be made in your NATOPS Training Jacket.


3. This designation remains effective subject to the limitations imposed by references (a) through (c), and shall remain in effect until revoked or terminated by reassignment or transfer from this command.

(b)(6)

Copy to:
→ NATOPS Jacket
Operations (Logs and Records)
Training Dept

ENCLOSURE(8)

(b)(6)





DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
UNIT 25458
FPO AP 96601-6550

1220
N8
21 May 99

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE
To: AT3 Scott L. Guidry, USN, [(b)(6)]

Subj: DESIGNATION AS ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATOR

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3710.7R
(b) NAVAIR 01-75PAE-1
(c) FAIRECONRONONEINST 1510.6M


1. Having successfully completed the requirements of references (a) through (c), you are hereby designated as an Electronic Warfare Operator (EWOP) in the EP-3E type aircraft.

2. I take great pleasure in congratulating you on this achievement! This designation is granted for demonstrated ability and professional knowledge. It reflects the results of your personal and professional endeavors. Notation of this designation will be made in your Service Record and in your NATOPS Training Jacket.

[(b)(6)]

Copy to:
BUPERS (PERS-404E)
Service Record
Manpower
NATOPS Jacket
Operations (Logs and Records)
Training Dept

(b)(6)



ENCLOSURE(9)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
 FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
 UNIT 25458
 FPO AP 96601-6550

1220
 N8
 04 APR 2000

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE
 To: CTTSN Jason D. Hanser, USN, [(b)(6)]

Subj: DESIGNATION AS P-3 OBSERVER

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3710.7R
 (b) FAIRECONRONONEINST 1510.6N

1. Having successfully completed the requirements of references (a) and (b), you are hereby designated as an Observer in the P-3 series type aircraft, effective 21 March 2000.

2. This designation remains effective subject to the limitations imposed by references (a) and (b), and shall remain in effect until revoked or terminated by reassignment or transfer from this command. I take great pleasure in congratulating you on this significant achievement!

[(b)(6)]
 L]

Copy to:
 Service Record
 NATOPS Jacket
 Operations (Logs and Records)
 Training Dept

(b)(6)

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 []
 LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

ENCLOSURE (10)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
UNIT 25458
FPO AP 96601-6550

1210
N8
19 Sep 00

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE
To: LT Patrick C. Honeck, USN, [(b)(6)]/1310

Subj: DESIGNATION AS A NATOPS-QUALIFIED PILOT

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3710.7R
(b) FAIRECONRONONEINST 3510.1F

1. Having completed the pilot training requirements and written examinations under the provisions of references (a) and (b), and having demonstrated your ability to perform the duties of a P-3 Pilot in Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE, you are hereby designated as a NATOPS-Qualified Pilot in the P-3 series type aircraft.

2. I take great pleasure in congratulating you on this accomplishment. Notation of this designation will be made in your official service record.

[(b)(6)]

Copy to:
Service Record
NATOPS Jacket
Operations (Logs and Records)
Training Dept

(b)(6)

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
[]
LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

ENCLOSURE(11)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
UNIT 25458
FPO AP 96601-6580

1220
N8
03 AUG 1999

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE
To: AT3 Ramon P. Mercado, USN, [(b)(6)] (b)(6)
Subj: DESIGNATION AS IN-FLIGHT TECHNICIAN
Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3710.7R
(b) NAVAIR 01-75PAE-1
(c) FAIRECONRONONEINST 1510.6M

1. Having successfully completed the requirements of references (a) through (c), you are hereby designated as an In-Flight Technician in the EP-3E type aircraft.

2. I take great pleasure in congratulating you on this achievement! This designation is granted for demonstrated ability and professional knowledge. It reflects the results of your personal and professional endeavors. Notation of this designation will be made in your Service Record and in your NATOPS Training Jacket.

[] (b)(6)

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Training Dept



ENCLOSURE(12)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
UNIT 25458
FPO AP 96601-6550

1220
N8
8 Nov 99

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE
To: ADCS(AW/NAC) Nicholas A. Mellos, USN, [] (b)(6)

Subj: DESIGNATION AS FLIGHT ENGINEER/PLANE CAPTAIN, INSTRUCTOR
FLIGHT ENGINEER, T56 ENGINE GROUND TURN OPERATOR AND
OBSERVER

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3710.7R
(b) OPNAVINST 4790.2L
(c) NAVAIR 01-75PAC-1
(d) COMNAVAIRPACINST 3510.4L
(e) FAIRECONRONONEINST 3510.1F


1. Per references (a) through (e), you are designated a Flight Engineer/Plane Captain, Instructor Flight Engineer, T56 Engine Ground Turn Operator and Observer in the P-3 series type aircraft for Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE effective 2 November 1999.

2. This designation carries the PQS signature authority for P-3 (series) P-3C Flight Engineer (NAVEDTRA 43433-13B), Fleet P-3 Observer (NAVEDTRA 43433-11A, and P-3 Ground Engine Turn Operator (NAVEDTRA 43433-26).

3. This designation remains effective subject to the limitations imposed by references (a) through (e), and shall remain in effect until revoked or terminated by reassignment or transfer from this command.

[] (b)(6)

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Training Dept



ENCLOSURE(13)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
UNIT 25498
FPO AP 96601-6880

1210
NB
22 FEB 01

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE
To: LT Shane J. Osborn, USN

Subj: DESIGNATION AS ELECTRONIC WARFARE MISSION COMMANDER

Ref: (a) FAIRECONRONONEINST 3710.6K


1. Having completed the requirements for Electronic Warfare Mission Commander required by reference (a), and having demonstrated your sustained excellence in crew leadership, personnel and material management, systems knowledge, and electronic reconnaissance proficiency, you are hereby designated an Electronic Warfare Mission Commander for operations in the specially configured EP-3E type aircraft.

2. Independent operation of a complex aircraft, such as the EP-3E on reconnaissance missions, requires a high degree of maturity, experience, knowledge, and ability. Having demonstrated such qualities, you are considered fully capable of proceeding independently with a qualified crew to any part of the world and carrying out assigned operational missions. You are responsible for all aspects of the ESM missions including safety of flight and actual control of the aircraft.

3. I take great pleasure in congratulating you on this achievement! This designation is granted for demonstrated ability and professional knowledge. It reflects the results of your personal and professional endeavors. Notation of this designation will be made in your next Report of Fitness.

[] (b)(6)

Copy to:
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Training Dept



ENCLOSURE (14)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
UNIT 25458
FPO AP 96601-6880

1210
N8
29 Jan 01

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE
To: LT Shane J. Osborn, USN

Subj: DESIGNATION AS ELECTRONIC WARFARE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER

Ref: (a) FAIRECONRONONEINST 1520.4E

1. Having completed the pilot training requirements contained in reference (a), and having demonstrated a high level of competency to the Electronic Reconnaissance Specialty Designation Oral Board, you are hereby designated an Electronic Warfare Aircraft Commander (EWAC) in the EP-3E type aircraft.

2. This accomplishment clearly indicates you possess the required level of flight proficiency as well as the required level of knowledge in electronic warfare operational and technical procedures. Moreover, this command recognizes the initiative and extra effort on your part that is demanded in order to attain this designation.

3. I take great pleasure in congratulating you on this outstanding achievement! Notation of this accomplishment will be noted on your next report of fitness.

[(b)(6)]

Copy to:
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Operations (Logs and Records)
Training Dept

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LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (15)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
UNIT 25450
FPO AP 96601-6250

1210
N8
1 Sep 00

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE
To: LTJG Richard D. Payne, USNR, []/1325

Subj: DESIGNATION AS NAVIGATOR/COMMUNICATOR (b)(6)

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3710.7R
(b) NAVAIR 01-75PAE-1
(c) FAIRECONRONONEINST 1520.5C


1. Having successfully completed the requirements of references (a) through (c), you are hereby designated as a Navigator/Communicator in the P-3 series aircraft, effective 22 August 2000.

2. I take great pleasure in congratulating you on this achievement! This designation is granted for demonstrated ability and professional knowledge. It reflects the results of your personal and professional endeavors. Notation of this designation will be made in your Service Record and in your NATOPS Training Jacket.

[]

(b)(6)

Copy to:
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NATOPS Jacket
Operations (Logs and Records)
Training Dept.



(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE (16)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
UNIT 28458
FPO AP 86601-6550

1210
N8

AUG 4 2000

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE

To: LTJG Jeffrey Vignery, USNR, []/1315
(b)(6)

Subj: DESIGNATION AS A NATOPS-QUALIFIED COPILOT

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3710.7R
(b) FAIRECONRONONEINST 3510.1F

1. Having successfully completed the requirements of references (a) and (b), you are hereby designated as a NATOPS-Qualified Copilot in the P-3 series type aircraft and qualified for operational and/or training flights as assigned.

2. This designation is delivered with my personal congratulations for a job well done!

[] (b)(6)

Copy to:
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NATOPS Jacket
Operations (Logs and Records)
Training Dept

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[]
LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

(b)(6)

ENCLOSURE 17



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
UNIT 25458
FPO AP 96601-6550

1220
N8
4 Mar 00

From: Commanding Officer, Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE
To: AD2 Wendy S. Smith, USN, [] (b)(6)

Subj: DESIGNATION AS FLIGHT ENGINEER

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3710.7R
(b) OPNAVINST 4790.2G
(c) FAIRECONRONONEINST 3510.1F

1. Having demonstrated your abilities to perform the duties of a Flight Engineer, and having completed the requirements of references (a) through (c), you are hereby designated a Flight Engineer in the P-3 series type aircraft.

2. I take great pleasure in congratulating you on this achievement! This designation is granted for demonstrated ability and professional knowledge. It reflects the results of your personal and professional endeavors. Notation of this designation will be made in your Service Record and in your NATOPS Training Jacket.

[(b)(6)]

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(b)(6)

18

ANTI-TERRORISM TRAINING: [(b)(6)] provided the crew with an up-to-date anti-terrorism presentation.

INTEL BRIEF [(b)(6)] provided the crew with an in-depth AOR specific intel brief.

CONFIGS BRIEF: CRC-1 reviewed aircraft configurations with AT1 Thompson.

EW SIGNALS TRAINING: The crew ESM inline spent more than 10 hours doing formal signals training.


LAST DEPLOYMENT: SWA, 15 Oct - 10 Dec 00. LT Honeck, ADCS Mellos, AD2 Smith, AT2 Smith, AT2 Mercado, and CTT2 Hanser are the remaining crewmembers from CRC-1's last deployment.

3. The following is an acknowledgment of the work-up cycle report by the crew EWAC and SEVAL.

I acknowledge that the crew work-up progress report adequately reflects CRC-1's work-up cycle and the statements regarding crew readiness have been explained to me by the Training Readiness Officer.



LT Osborn
EWAC



LTJG Comerford
SEVAL



(b)(6)

NAME (LAST, FIRST, INITIAL) BLOCHER, STEVEN M.		GRADE AEAN	SSN [REDACTED]
AIRCRAFT MODEL VQ-1	AIRCRAFT MODEL P-3(series)	CREW POSITION OBSERVER	
TOTAL PILOT/FLIGHT HOURS 33	TOTAL HOURS IN MODEL 33	DATE OF LAST EVAL INITIAL	

NATOPS EVALUATION

REQUIREMENTS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE
OPEN BOOK EXAM	25 APR 00	(b)(6)
CLOSED BOOK EXAM	25 APR 00	
ORAL EXAMINATION	27 APR 00	
*EVALUATION FLIGHT	27 APR 00	
FLIGHT DURATION 3:0	AIRCRAFT ID# 161126	OVERALL FINAL GRADE QUALIFIED

REMARKS OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR

1. AEAN BLOCHER flew a satisfactory NATOPS evaluation flight. noted and thoroughly discussed during debrief:

(b)(6)

2. Conducted annual emergency egress per OPNAVINST 3710.7R.

3. Conducted annual Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) flight evaluation per OPNAVINST 1542.7B.

CHECK IF CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR (b)(6)	SIGNATURE (b)(6)	DATE 28 APR 00
GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATEE AEAN BLOCHER STEVEN M.	SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>	DATE 28 APR 00

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
[REDACTED]
LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

(b)(6)

EXPIRES: 30 APR 01

SR. NAME OF UNIT COMMANDER (b)(6)	SIGNATURE [REDACTED]	DATE 02 MAY 00
---	--------------------------------	--------------------------

* WST, OFT, or cockpit check in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.9

ENCLOSURE(19)

NATOPS EVALUATION REPORT
 OPNAV 3710/7 (4-90) S/N 0107-LF-009-8000 (Formerly OPNAV 3510/8)

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3710-21

NAME (LAST, FIRST INITIAL) BORLAND, BRADFORD J.		GRADE CTTSN (NAC)	SSN [] []
*QUADRON/UNIT VQ-1	AIRCRAFT MODEL EP-3E	CREW POSITION LABOP	
TOTAL PILOT/LIGHT HOURS 1508.0	TOTAL HOURS IN MODEL 1508.0	DATE OF LAST EVALUATION 30 MAY 00	

NATOPS EVALUATION

REQUIREMENT	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE		
		O	CO	U
OPEN BOOK EXAMINATION	20 FEB 01			
CLOSED BOOK EXAMINATION	20 FEB 01			
ORAL EXAMINATION	21 FEB 01			
*EVALUATION FLIGHT	21 FEB 01			
FLIGHT DURATION 1.0/3.1	AIRCRAFT BUND OFT#1/161126	OVERALL FINAL GRADE QUALIFIED		

REMARKS OF EVALUATOR/INSTRUCTOR

1. CTTSN Borland flew a NATOPS flight evaluation. [

(b)(6)

2. CTTSN BORLAND is recommended to serve as an EP-3E LABOP NATOPS Instructor.

3. Conducted annual EGRESS training per OPNAVINST 3710.7R.

4. Conducted annual Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) flight evaluation per OPNAVINST 1542.7B.

(b)(6)

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
 LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

(b)(6)

CHECK IF CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATOR/INSTRUCTOR [] []	SIGNATURE <i>Bradford Borland</i>	DATE 21 FEB 01
GRADE, NAME OF EVALUÉE CTTSN BRADFORD J. BORLAND	DATE 21 FEB 01	

REMARKS OF UNIT COMMANDER

EXPIRES: 28 FEB 02

RANK, NAME OF UNIT COMMANDER [] []	DATE 26 FEB 01
---	-------------------

*WST, OFT, COY, OR COCKPIT CHECK IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3510.9

ENCLOSURE (20)

NAME (LAST, FIRST, INITIAL) CECKA, DAVID M.		GRADE AT2	SSN E J
SHIP / UNIT VQ-1	AIRCRAFT MODEL EP-3E	CREW POSITION BIGLOOK	
TOTAL PILOT/FLIGHT HOURS 1636.2	TOTAL HOURS IN MODEL 1636.2	DATE OF LAST EVAL INITIAL	

NATOPS EVALUATION

REQUIREMENTS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE
OPEN BOOK EXAM	08 AUG 00	(b)(6)
CLOSED BOOK EXAM	08 AUG 00	
ORAL EXAMINATION	11 AUG 00	
EVALUATION FLIGHT	11 AUG 00	
FLIGHT DURATION 1.2	AIRCRAFT BHM 156511	OVERALL FINAL GRADE QUALIFIED

REMARKS OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR

1. AT2 CECKA flew a good NATOPS evaluation flight. [

(b)(6)

2. Conducted annual emergency egress per OPNAVINST 3710.7R.
3. Conducted annual Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) flight evaluation per OPNAVINST 1542.7B.

CHECK IF CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR [(b)(6)]	SIGNATURE	DATE 11 AUG 00
GRADE, NAME OF EVALUEE AT2 DAVID M. CECKA	SIGNATURE	DATE 11 AUG 00

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
 [(b)(6)]
 LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

EXPIRES: 31 AUG 01

GRADE, NAME OF UNIT COMMANDER [(b)(6)]	[(b)(6)]	DATE 18 Aug 00
---	------------	-------------------

ENCLOSURE(21)

NAME (LAST, FIRST, INITIAL) COMERFORD, JOHN D.		GRADE LTJG	SSN (b)(6)
WING / UNIT VQ-1	AIRCRAFT MODEL EP-3E	CREW POSITION SEVAL	
TOTAL PILOT/FLIGHT HOURS 936.5	TOTAL HOURS IN MODEL 839.8	DATE OF LAST EVAL INITIAL	

NATOPS EVALUATION

REQUIREMENTS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE
OPEN BOOK EXAM	18 JAN 01	(b)(6)
CLOSED BOOK EXAM	18 JAN 01	
ORAL EXAMINATION	18 JAN 01	
*EVALUATION FLIGHT	18 JAN 01	
FLIGHT DURATION 1.0	AIRCRAFT BUNO 156507	OVERALL FINAL GRADE QUALIFIED

REMARKS OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR

1. LTJG COMERFORD flew a NATOPS evaluation flight. (b)(6)
2. Conducted annual emergency egress per OPNAVINST 3710.7R.
3. Conducted annual Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) flight evaluation per OPNAVINST 1542.7B.

(b)(6)

CHECK IF CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR (b)(6)	SIGNATURE (b)(6)	DATE 14 FEB 01
GRADE, NAME OF EVALUEE LTJG JOHN D. COMERFORD	SIGNATURE John D. Comerford	DATE 14 FEB 01

REMARKS OF COMMANDER

RANK, NAME OF UNIT COMMANDER

(b)(6)

EXPIRES: 31 JAN 02

DATE 20 FEB 01

* WST, OPT. or cockpit check in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.9

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
 LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

ENCLOSURE (22)

NAME (LAST, FIRST, INITIAL) GUIDRY, SCOTT L.		GRADE AT3 (NAC)	SSN [(b)(6)]
WAGON / UNIT VQ-1	AIRCRAFT MODEL EP-3E	CREW POSITION EWOP	
TOTAL PILOT/FLIGHT HOURS 1074.3	TOTAL HOURS IN MODEL 1074.3	DATE OF LAST EVAL INITIAL	

NATOPS EVALUATION

REQUIREMENTS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE
OPEN BOOK EXAM	28 APR 00	[(b)(6)]
CLOSED BOOK EXAM	01 MAY 00	
ORAL EXAMINATION	15 MAY 00	
*EVALUATION FLIGHT	15 MAY 00	[(b)(6)]
FLIGHT DURATION 2.0	AIRCRAFT DUNS 156514	
		OVERALL FINAL GRADE QUALIFIED

REMARKS OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR

1. AT3 GUIDRY flew a good NATOPS evaluation flight.

[(b)(6)]

Conducted annual emergency egress per OPNAVINST 3710.7R.

3. Conducted annual Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) flight evaluation per OPNAVINST 1542.7B.

CHECK IF CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATOR, INSTRUCTOR [(b)(6)]	DATE 16 MAY 00
GRADE, NAME OF EVALUEE AT3 (NAC) SCOTT L. GUIDRY	DATE 16 MAY 00
SIGNATURE [(b)(6)] AT3	

REPORT OF COMMANDER

EXPIRES: 31 MAY 01

NAME, NAME OF UNIT COMMANDER [(b)(6)]	DATE 22 MAY 00
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* WPT, OFT, or cockpit check in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.9

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
 [(b)(6)]
 LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

ENCLOSURE (23)

NAME (LAST, FIRST, INITIAL) HANSER, JASON D.		GRADE CTTSN	SSN [(b)(6)]
SQUADRON / UNIT VQ-1	AIRCRAFT MODEL P-3(series)		CREW POSITION OBSERVER
TOTAL PILOT/FLIGHT HOURS 26.1	TOTAL HOURS IN MODEL 26.1		DATE OF LAST EVAL INITIAL

NATOPS EVALUATION

REQUIREMENTS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE
OPEN BOOK EXAM	14 FEB 00	(b)(6)
CLOSED BOOK EXAM	14 FEB 00	
ORAL EXAMINATION	21 MAR 00	
*EVALUATION FLIGHT	21 MAR 00	
FLIGHT DURATION 4.7	AIRCRAFT BUONO 160768	

REMARKS OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR

- CTTSN HANSER flew a good NATOPS evaluation flight. [(b)(6)]
- Conducted annual emergency egress per OPNAVINST 3710.7R.
- Conducted annual Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) flight evaluation per OPNAVINST 1542.7B.

CHECK IF CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR [(b)(6)]	SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>	DATE 31 Mar 00
GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATEE CTTSN JASON D. HANSER		DATE 31 MAR 00

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
 (b)(6)
 LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

RANK, NAME OF UNIT COMMANDER [(b)(6)]	SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>	EXPIRES: 31 MAR 01
		DATE 03 APR 00

* WST, OPT, or multipt check in accordance with OPNAVINST

ENCLOSURE (24)

NAME (LAST, FIRST, INITIAL) HONECK, PATRICK C.		GRADE LT	SSN (b)(6)
BRN / UNIT VQ-1	AIRCRAFT MODEL P-3	CREW POSITION PILOT	
TOTAL PILOT/FLIGHT HOURS 865	TOTAL HOURS IN MODEL 292	DATE OF LAST EVAL INITIAL	

NATOPS EVALUATION

REQUIREMENTS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE
OPEN BOOK EXAM	17 JULY 00	(b)(6)
CLOSED BOOK EXAM	17 JUL 00	
ORAL EXAMINATION	6 SEP 00	
EVALUATION FLIGHT	6 SEP 00/8 SEP 00	L
FLIGHT DURATION 2.1/2.7	AIRCRAFT BONO 160768	
		OVERALL FINAL GRADE QUALIFIED

REMARKS OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR

1. LT HONECK flew an outstanding NATOPS evaluation flight.

2. Conducted annual emergency egress per OPNAVINST 3710.7R.

3. Conducted annual Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) flight evaluation per OPNAVINST 1542.7B.

CHECK IF CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR (b)(6)	SIGNATURE (b)(6)	DATE 8 SEP 00
GRADE, NAME OF EVALUEE LT PATRICK C. HONECK	SIGNATURE Patrick C. Honeck	DATE 8 SEP 00

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
(b)(6)
LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

EXPIRES: 30 SEP 01

NAME, NAME OF UNIT COMMANDER (b)(6)	SIGNATURE (b)(6)	DATE 18 SEP 00
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WST, OFT, or cockpit check in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.9

ENCLOSURE(25)

NAME (LAST, FIRST, INITIAL) MERCADO, RAMON P.		GRADE AT2	SSN (b)(6)
SQUADRON / UNIT VQ-1	AIRCRAFT MODEL EP-3E	CREW POSITION IFT	
TOTAL PILOT/FLIGHT HOURS 906.5	TOTAL HOURS IN HOSE 906.5	DATE OF LAST EVAL INITIAL	

NATOPS EVALUATION

REQUIREMENTS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE
OPEN BOOK EXAM	31 JUL 00	(b)(6)
CLOSED BOOK EXAM	31 JUL 00	
ORAL EXAMINATION	16 AUG 00	
*EVALUATION FLIGHT	16 AUG 00	
FLIGHT DURATION 1.5	AIRCRAFT BINO 156528	OVERALL FINAL GRADE QUALIFIED

REMARKS OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR

1. AT2 MERCADO flew an outstanding NATOPS evaluation flight.

(b)(6)

2. Conducted annual emergency egress per OPNAVINST 3710.7R.

3. Conducted annual Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) flight evaluation per OPNAVIST 1542.7B.

CHECK IF CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATOR, INSTRUCTOR (b)(6)	SIGNATURE Ramon P. Mercado	DATE 16 AUG 00
GRADE, NAME OF EVALUEE AT2 RAMON P. MERCADO		DATE 16 AUG 00

NOTICED TO BE A TRUE COPY
 (b)(6)
 LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

NAME, NAME OF UNIT COMMANDER (b)(6)	EXPIRES: 31 AUG 01
	DATE 22 AUG 00

NOT. OFF. or cockpit check in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.9

ENCLOSURE (26)

NAME (LAST, FIRST INITIAL) MELLOS, NICHOLAS A.		GRADE ADCS (AW/NAC)	ESN (b)(6)
SQUADRON / UNIT VQ-1	AIRCRAFT MODEL P-3 (SERIES)		CREW POSITION FLIGHT ENGINEER
TOTAL PILOT/FLIGHT HOURS 7724.6	TOTAL HOURS IN MODEL 7612.8	DATE OF LAST EVAL 11AUG99	

NATOPS EVALUATION

REQUIREMENTS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE
OPEN DOOR EXAM	17JUL00	(b)(6)
CLOSED DOOR EXAM	17JUL00	
ORAL EXAMINATION	21JUL00	
EVALUATION FLIGHT	21JUL00	
*EVALUATION FLIGHT	21JUL00	
FLIGHT DURATION 3.8	AIRCRAFT BORO 161126	OVERALL FINAL GRADE QUALIFIED

REMARKS OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR

1. ADCS Mellos successfully completed a NATOPS evaluation flight.

(b)(6)

2. ADCS Mellos is recommended to serve as a squadron NATOPS instructor.

3. Qualified as a VQ-1 Plane Captain.

4. Conducted Annual Egress training per OPNAVINST 3710.7R.

5. Conducted annual Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) flight evaluation per OPNAVINST 1542.7B

CHECK IF CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE



GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR (b)(6)	SIGNATURE (b)(6)	DATE 21 JULY 00
GRADE, NAME OF EVALUEE ADCS NICHOLAS A. MELLOS	SIGNATURE (b)(6)	DATE 21 JULY 00

REQUIRED TO BE A TRUE COPY
 (b)(6)
 LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

EXPIRES: 31AUG01

NAME, GRADE OF UNIT COMMANDER (b)(6)	DATE 26 Jul 00
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WDT, OPT, or cockpit check in accordance with OPNAVINST

ENCLOSURE (27)

NAME (LAST, FIRST, INITIAL) OSBORN, SHANE J.		GRADE LT	SSN
WDRGN / UNIT VQ-1	AIRCRAFT MODEL P-3	CREW POSITION PILOT	
TOTAL PILOT/FLIGHT HOURS 869.2	TOTAL HOURS IN MODEL 515.8	DATE OF LAST EVAL 31 MAY 00	

NATOPS EVALUATION

REQUIREMENTS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE
OPEN BOOK EXAM	28 DEC 00	(b)(6)
CLOSED BOOK EXAM	28 DEC 00	
ORAL EXAMINATION	21 FEB 01	
*EVALUATION FLIGHT	21 FEB 01	
FLIGHT DURATION 3.1	AIRCRAFT BUNO 161126	OVERALL FINAL GRADE QUALIFIED

REMARKS OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR

1. LT Osborn flew a NATOPS evaluation flight.

(b)(6)

2. Conducted annual emergency egress per OPNAVINST 3710.7R.

3. Conducted annual Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) flight evaluation per OPNAVINST 1542.7B.

CHECK IF CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR (b)(6)	(b)(6)	DATE 2-26-01
GRADE, NAME OF EVALUEE LT SHANE J. OSBORN		DATE 2-25-01

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
 (b)(6)
 LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE
 EXPIRES: 28 FEB 02

GRADE, NAME OF UNIT COMMANDER (b)(6)	(b)(6)	DATE 26 FEB 01
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* WST, OFT, or cockpit check in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.6

ENCLOSURE (28)

NAME (LAST, FIRST, INITIAL) PAYNE, RICHARD D.		GRADE LTJG	SSN (b)(6)
ACRON / UNIT VQ-1		AIRCRAFT MODEL P-3	CREW POSITION NAV/COMM
TOTAL PILOT/FLIGHT HOURS 197.7		TOTAL HOURS IN MODEL 122.0	DATE OF LAST EVAL INITIAL

NATOPS EVALUATION

REQUIREMENTS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE
OPEN BOOK EXAM	19 AUG 00	(b)(6)
CLOSED BOOK EXAM	19 AUG 00	
ORAL EXAMINATION	22 AUG 00	
EVALUATION FLIGHT	22 AUG 00	OVERALL FINAL GRADE QUALIFIED
FLIGHT DURATION 6.9	AIRCRAFT BUNO 156517	

REMARKS OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR

1. LTJG Payne flew a good NATOPS evaluation flight.

(b)(6)

2. Conducted annual emergency egress per OPNAVINST 3710.7R.
3. Conducted annual Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) flight evaluation per OPNAVINST 1542.7B.

CHECK IF CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR (b)(6)	SIGNATURE (b)(6)	DATE 23 Aug 00
GRADE, NAME OF EVALUEE LTJG RICHARD D. PAYNE	SIGNATURE Richard D. Payne	DATE 23 AUG 00

REMARKS OF COMMANDER

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
(b)(6)
LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

EXPIRES: 31 AUG 01

RANK, NAME OF UNIT COMMANDER (b)(6)	SIGNATURE (b)(6)	DATE 30 Aug 00
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* WET, OPT, or cockpit check in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.9

ENCLOSURE (29)

NAME (LAST, FIRST, INITIAL) VIGNERY, JEFFREY.		GRADE LTJG	SSN (b)(6)
ADRON / UNIT VQ-1	AIRCRAFT MODEL P-3	CREW POSITION COPILOT	
TOTAL PILOT/FLIGHT HOURS 277.0	TOTAL HOURS IN MODEL 44.7	DATE OF LAST EVAL 10 MAY 00	

NATOPS EVALUATION

REQUIREMENTS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE
OPEN BOOK EXAM	17 JUL 00	(b)(6)
CLOSED BOOK EXAM	17 JUL 00	
ORAL EXAMINATION	26 JUL 00	
*EVALUATION FLIGHT	26 JUL 00	
FLIGHT DURATION 5.8	AIRCRAFT NO. / 160768	
		OVERALL FINAL GRADE QUALIFIED

REMARKS OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR

1. LTJG VIGNERY flew an outstanding NATOPS evaluation flight.

(b)(6)

3. Conducted annual Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) flight evaluation per OPNAVINST 1542.7B.

CHECK IF CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATOR LTJG JEFFREY VIGNERY	SIGNATURE <i>Jeffrey A. Vignery</i>	DATE 31 JUL 00
REMARKS OF COMMANDER		DATE 31 JUL 00

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
 (b)(6)
 LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

EXPIRES: 31 JUL 01

DATE 31 JUL 00	DATE 31 AUG 00
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WST, OPT, or cockpit check in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.9

ENCLOSURE (30)

NATOPS EVALUATION REPORT

OPNAV 3710/7 (4-90) S/N 0107-LF-009-8000 (Formerly OPNAV 3510/8)

REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3710-21

NAME (LAST, FIRST INITIAL) SMITH, W.		GRADE AD2	SSN (b)(6)
QUADRON / UNIT VQ-1	AIRCRAFT MODEL P-3		CREW POSITION FLIGHT ENGINEER
TOTAL PILOT / FLIGHT HOURS 818.2	TOTAL HOURS IN MODEL 818.2	DATE OF LAST EVAL 1Mar00	

NATOPS EVALUATION

REQUIREMENTS	DATE COMPLETED	GRADE
OPEN BOOK EXAM	17Jul00	(b)(6)
CLOSED BOOK EXAM	17Jul00	
ORAL EXAMINATION	18Jul00	
* EVALUATION FLIGHT	18Jul00	
FLIGHT DURATION 2.9	AIRCRAFT BUND 160768	

REMARKS OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR

- AD2 SMITH flew an outstanding NATOPS Evaluation flight.
- Conducted annual EGRESS training IAW OPNAVINST 3710.7R.
- Conducted annual ACT Flight evaluation IAW OPNAVINST 1542.7B.
- Requalified as P3 plane captain IAW OPNAVINST 4790.2G.

CHECK IF CONTINUED ON REVERSE

GRADE, NAME OF EVALUATOR / INSTRUCTOR (b)(6)	SIGNATURE (b)(6)	DATE 20 Jul 00
GRADE, NAME OF EVALUEE AD2 W. SMITH	SIGNATURE Wendy Sue Smith AD2 (Appraiser)	DATE 27 July 00
REMARKS OF UNIT COMMANDER		

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY
 (b)(6)
 LEGAL OFFICER, FAIRECONRON ONE

EXPIRES: 31Jul01

GRADE, NAME OF UNIT COMMANDER (b)(6)	DATE 31 Jul 00
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* WST, OPT, COT, OR cockpit check in accordance with OPNAVINST 3510.9

ENCLOSURE 31

23 FEBRUARY 2001

MEMORANDUM

From: Training Officer
To: Commanding Officer
Via: Operations Officer
Executive Officer

Subj: CREW ONE READINESS CERTIFICATION

Ref: (a) FAIRECONRONONEINST 3711.2A

1. Combat Reconnaissance Crew One is scheduled to deploy to Misawa, Japan on or about 28 February 2001. Per reference (a), Crew One is recommended for Readiness Certification.

(b)(6) 26 FEB 01
Training Officer

Date: 26 Feb 01


FIRST ENDORSEMENT

From: Commanding Officer
To: Training Officer

Subj: CREW READINESS CERTIFICATION

1. Having reviewed the attached package, I certify Crew One is ready for detachment.

(b)(6)
Commanding Officer



ENCLOSURE(32)

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL
 (b)(6)
 BY AUTHORITY: 10 USC 1044i COMMISSION INDEFINITE

23 Feb 01

MEMORANDUM

From: Training Readiness Officer
 To: Commanding Officer
 Via: Training Officer
 Executive Officer

Subj: COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE CREW ONE; WEST-PAC WORK-UP PROGRESS REPORT

Ref: (a) Preliminary VQ-1 TRM (revised 28 Oct 96)

1. Per reference (a), the following aircrew have successfully completed work-ups for the period 12 FEB - 28 FEB 01.

Position	Name	Experience	Readiness Progress Summary			
			R1	R2	R3	R4
EWAC	LT OSBORN	1 ST EWAC 5 TH det				
ENP	*LT HONECK	1 ST ENP 4 TH det	✓			✓
EWCP	LTJG VIGNERY	2 ND EWCP				
SEVAL	LTJG COMERFORD	1 ST SEVAL 5 TH det				
EVAL	LTJG PAYNE	1 ST EVAL 2 ND det				
NAV/COM	LTJG KAUFFMAN	2 ND det				
FE	*ADCS MELLOS	4 TH det				
FE	*AD2 SMITH	5 TH det				
EWOP (8)	*AT2 SMITH	9 TH det				
EWOP (9)	AT2 GUIDRY	8 TH det				
BIGLOOK	AT2 CECKA	9 TH det				
LABOP	CTTSN BORLAND	7 TH det				
IFT	*AT2 MERCADO	6 TH det				

(b)(6)

Trainee scores not included in Total Crew Rating

EWOP(T)	AE3 BLOCHER	1 ST det				
LABOP (T)	CTTSN WENZEL	2 ND det				
LABOP (T)	*CTT2 HANSER	3 RD det				
Total Crew Rating			L			✓

* Indicates crewmembers assigned to CRC-1 the last time crew deployed.

READINESS COORDINATOR COMMENTS:

2. The following is a summary of completed training:

CREW PREDEPLOYMENT ADMIN BRIEF: All members of CRC-1 attended an in-depth pre-deployment admin brief by (b)(6)

FLIGHT STATION OFT: Flight station members completed one OFT, evaluated by (b)(6)

FLIGHT STATION DFWs: The flight station crew completed one day and one night DFW.

CREW ACT TRAINING: The crew members received an in-depth ACT refresher facilitated by LTJG Comerford.

CMS BRIEF: All officers and IFT's reviewed CMS procedures and conduct quarterly training with (b)(6)

MAS TRAINERS: A total of four MAST events were scheduled and completed with the final being satisfactorily evaluated by (b)(6) VQ-1.

ENCLOSURE(33)

23 February 2001

MEMORANDUM

From: [(b)(6)]
 To: Commanding Officer VQ-1
 Via: N7 [Signature]
 Executive Officer

Subj: CREW ONE PRE-DETACHMENT OFT

1. This crew was briefed prior to the start of the event to utilize all Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT) skills and Operational Risk Management (ORM) skills as they deemed necessary. I also briefed them to handle all scenarios and malfunctions as they would while on an operational mission. This was crew ONE's last flight event.

2. The following scenario was performed:

- a. LT Osborn (EWAC right seat)
 LTJG Vignery (ENP left seat)
 LT Honeck (ENP - Radar console)
 AD2 Westbrook (FE Seat)
 ADCS Mellos (C/B Panel)

Scenario - 10.5 hour OLK flown out of Misawa

Environment - Scattered snow showers, 350 foot ceiling, 3 miles visibility

- 30.01, 3C, Winds 260/005, RCR 12

GW - 142,000

- Engine starts:

1. #2 prop coupler failed at 50%. Crew secured start as RPM shot up to 57% and then started to decrease as prop started to slow after start button popped out. Good crew trouble shooting techniques and discussions.

2. Number one INS failed. Crew elected to immediately cancel event even though the number two INS and standby gyro were both checked good. Use ORM to help determine what you can and cannot safely operate with when making these types of decisions.

- Taxi: Number two engine anti-ice c/b popped during taxi, crew elected to have maintenance trouble shoot before takeoff to ensure that both the full system was working.

- Takeoff: Jeff had two great abort runs due to low powers. On the second abort the low pitch stop on the number three engine failed and the aircraft did not deviate from centerline.

- Crew elected to takeoff without the autofeather system armed and on the third takeoff the number two engine decoupled at refusal and LT Vignery continued the takeoff without problem. After the gear was up and locked LT Osborn took the controls and continued the climb out. The initial portion of the climb out was rough as the aircraft transitioned into IMC and the crew began to troubleshoot the malfunction. The three engine rate of climb was calculated to be +500 feet per minute at 1010, but the crew elected to leave 1077 tit set during the climb out and risk an induced fire warning. Climbing through 1,500' the number two engine prop pump number two light illuminated with a corresponding prop leak. Climbing through 2,000 feet the

ENCLOSURE (34)

crew got into icing and TIT was still at 1049, at this time the crew received a momentary fire warning on the number three engine. After a brief discussion about not shutting down the engine they continued their climb out and left TIT at 1040. Passing through 6000 feet the crew began fuel dump and performed seat swaps to get LT Honeck in the right seat and LT Osborn in the left seat. After a few minutes the number three fire warning briefly sounded again and the crew posted a fire watch and reduced power to 1010 TIT and continued their climb. A few minutes later after breaking out VMC at 8000 feet the number three fire warning briefly sounded again with no secondary indications and the crew reduced TIT to approximately 980 and the warning never sounded again. At this point LT Osborn wanted to get the aircraft on the deck immediately and requested emergency vectors to final for the GCA to RWY 28. The aircraft was positioned on final at 12nm and 8500 feet and the controller gave the crew a descent to 3000 feet and a vector away from final to properly give the crew spacing and distance to descend to approach altitude. The remainder of the approach seemed to be rushed and although the crew successfully accomplished everything that the emergency required the rush affected their airwork on the approach and several times the aircraft was not turned to the directed heading causing deviations from the final approach course. The landing and rollout were successful.

3. Summary: Overall, this crew's performance was good. This is a talented and experienced crew and they will perform well together while on detachment.

(b)(2) + (b)(5)

4. Recommendation: This crew is already a cohesive unit and is ready to deploy now.

Very Respectfully,

[(b)(6)]

CC:
Training jackets



CREW WORKUP EVALUATION

MAST #1 (WARM UP)

CRC: ONE

Date: 13 FEB 01

SEVAL: LTJG COMERFORD

EVAL: LTJG PAYNE

BIGLOOK: AT2 CECKA

LABOP:

EWOP: [AT2 SMITH]

LABOP(T): CTT2 HANSER

EWOP: AT2 GUIDRY

LABOP(T): [(b)(3)]

EWOP(T): [(b)(3)]

Note: Required crewmembers, per the Training Matrix, must score a "QUAL" in all areas. A "U" in any area will result in a grade of unsatisfactory for the entire evolution.

1. Conduct of Mission.

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----|
| a. Mission fully briefed | N/A |
| b. Signal Recognition | N/A |
| c. Crew Coordination | N/A |
| d. Crew Mission Knowledge | N/A |

Note: All graded areas are commented on below.

Evaluator Comments:

Outstanding first MAST trainer for CRC-1. Good signal recognition, mission briefing and mission knowledge. Minor problems with ICS discipline were thoroughly debriefed.


A satisfactory grade is recommended.

Evaluating Officer/Date: LTJG J.D. Comerford 13 Feb 01

Training Officer comments:

A satisfactory grade is recommended.

Training Officer/Date: Patent C. Howell 26 FEB 01



ENCLOSURE (35)

CREW WORKUP EVALUATION

MAST #2

CRC: ONE

SEVAL: LTJG COMERFORD

BIGLOOK: AT2 CECKA

EWOP: AT2 GUIDRY

EWOP: [AT2 SMITH]

EWOP:

Date: 14 Feb 01

EVAL: LTJG PAYNE

LABOP:

LABOP(T): CTT2 HANSER

LABOP(T): CTTSN WENZEL

Note: Required crewmembers, per the Training Matrix, must score a "QUAL" in all areas. A 'U' in any area will result in a grade of unsatisfactory for the entire evolution.

1. Conduct of Mission.

- | | | |
|---------------------------|-----|---|
| a. Mission fully briefed | (Q) | U |
| b. Signal Recognition | (Q) | U |
| c. Crew Coordination | (Q) | U |
| d. Crew Mission Knowledge | (Q) | U |

Note: All graded areas are commented on below.

Evaluator Comments:

The crew had some minor difficulties with emitter identification but extra communication cleared up most difficulties. Nearly all emitters were identified very quickly and passed through to the SEVAL. The MAST trainer experienced its usual defects, but the crew adapted quickly to a tougher situation.

A satisfactory grade is recommended.

Evaluator/Date [(b)(3)] 14 Feb 01


Training Officer comments:

A satisfactory grade is recommended.

Training Officer/Date:

Patrick C. Howard

26 FEB 01



ENCLOSURE (36)

CREW WORKUP EVALUATION

MAST 1

CRC: 1

SEVAL: LTj; Comerford

BIGLOOK: AT² Cecka

EWOP: [(b)(3)]

EWOP: AT² Guidry

EWOP: [(b)(3)]

Date: ¹³ ~~14~~ FEB 01

EVAL: LTj; Payne

LABOP: CTT² Hanser (+)

LABOP (T): [(b)(3)]

EWOP: _____

Note: Required crewmembers, per the Training Matrix, must score a "QUAL" in all areas. A 'U' in any area will result in a grade of unsatisfactory for the entire evolution.

1. Conduct of Mission.

- | | | |
|---------------------------|------|-----|
| a. Mission fully briefed | Qual | N/A |
| b. Signal Recognition | Qual | N/A |
| c. Crew Coordination | Qual | N/A |
| d. Crew Mission Knowledge | Qual | N/A |

Note: All graded areas are commented on below.


Evaluator Comments:

Outstanding first MAST trainer for CRC-1. Good signal recognition, mission briefing, and mission knowledge. Minor problems with ICS discipline were thoroughly debriefed.

A satisfactory grade is recommended.

Evaluating Officer/Date: J.D. Comerford LTj, J.D. COMERFORD

13 FEB 01



CREW WORKUP EVALUATION

MAST 2

CRC: 1

SEVAL: LTJG Comerford

BIGLOOK: AT2 Ceeka

EWOP: [(b)(3)]

EWOP: AT2 Guidry

EWOP: [(b)(3)]

Date: 14 FEB 01

EVAL: LTJG Payne

LABOP: CTT2 Hanser (T)

LABOP (T): CTTSN Wentzel (T)

EWOP: _____

Note: Required crewmembers, per the Training Matrix, must score a "QUAL" in all areas. A "U" in any area will result in a grade of unsatisfactory for the entire evolution.

1. Conduct of Mission.

- a. Mission fully briefed N/A
- b. Signal Recognition N/A
- c. Crew Coordination N/A
- d. Crew Mission Knowledge N/A

te: All graded areas are commented on below.

Evaluator Comments: Crew had some minor difficulties ^{with} in emitter identification but extra communication cleared up most difficulties. Nearly all emitters were identified very quickly and passed through to the SEVAL. The MAST trainer experienced its usual defects, but the crew adapted quickly and well to a tougher situation.

A satisfactory grade is recommended.

Evaluating Officer/Date: [(b)(3)] 14 FEB 01



CREW WORKUP EVALUATION

MAST #3

CRC: ONE

Date: 21 FEB 01

SEVAL: LTJG COMERFORD

EVAL: LTJG PAYNE

BIGLOOK: AT2 CECKA

LABOP:

EWOP: AT2 GUIDRY

LABOP(T): CTTSN WENZEL

EWOP [(b)(3)]

EWOP(T): AE3 BLOCHER

Note: Required crewmembers, per the Training Matrix, must score a "QUAL" in all areas. A "U" in any area will result in a grade of unsatisfactory for the entire evolution.

I. Conduct of Mission.

- | | | |
|---------------------------|-----|---|
| a. Mission fully briefed | (Q) | U |
| b. Signal Recognition | (Q) | U |
| c. Crew Coordination | (Q) | U |
| d. Crew Mission Knowledge | (Q) | U |

Note: All graded areas are commented on below.

Evaluator Comments:

Outstanding third MAST for Crew 1. Inline coordination between Eval and Labop is improving. Minor deviations in signal recognition and ICS communications discipline were noted and debriefed. Crew 1 is ready for their Wing 10 evaluation.

A satisfactory grade is recommended.

Evaluator/Date: LTJG Comerford 21 Feb 01

Training Officer comments:

A satisfactory grade is recommended.

Training Officer/Date:

Patrick C. Hunt 26 Feb 01



ENCLOSURE (37)

CREW WING EVALUATION

MAST #4 EVALUATION

CRC: ONE

Date: 22 Feb 01

SEVAL: LTJG COMERFORD

EVAL: LTJG PAYNE

BIGLOOK: AT2 CECKA

LABOP: CTTSN BORLAND

EWOP: AT2 SMITH

LABOP(T):

EWOP: AT2 GUIDRY

Note: Required crewmembers, per the Training Matrix, must score a "QUAL" in all areas. A 'U' in any area will result in a grade of unsatisfactory for the entire evolution.

1. Conduct of Mission.

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----|
| a. Mission fully briefed | N/A |
| b. Signal Recognition | N/A |
| c. Crew Coordination | N/A |
| d. Crew Mission Knowledge | N/A |

Note: All graded areas are commented on below.

Evaluator Comments:


See attached wing evaluation.

A satisfactory grade is recommended.

Training Officer comments:

A satisfactory grade is recommended.

Training Officer/Date: *Patrick C. Horned 26 FEB 01*



CREW WORKUP EVALUATION

MAST 3

CRC: 1

SEVAL: LTJG Comerford

BIGLOOK: AT² Cecka

EWOP: AT² Guidry

EWOP: (b)(3)

EWOP: AE³ Bloucher (T)

Date: 21 FEB 01

EVAL: LTJG PAYNE

LABOP: CTTSN WENTSEL

LABOP (T): _____

EWOP: _____

Note: Required crewmembers, per the Training Matrix, must score a "QUAL" in all areas. A 'U' in any area will result in a grade of unsatisfactory for the entire evolution.

1. Conduct of Mission.

- | | | |
|---------------------------|------|-----|
| a. Mission fully briefed | QUAL | N/A |
| b. Signal Recognition | QUAL | N/A |
| c. Crew Coordination | QUAL | N/A |
| d. Crew Mission Knowledge | QUAL | N/A |


Note: All graded areas are commented on below.

Evaluator Comments:

Outstanding third mast for Crew 1. In line coordination between EVAL and Labop is improving markedly. Minor deviations in signal recognition and ICS comms discipline were noted and thoroughly debriefed. Crew 1 is ready for their Wing 10 evaluation.

A satisfactory grade is recommended.

Evaluating Officer/Date: LTJG Comerford 21 FEB 01



UNCLASSIFIED

MISSION AVIONICS SYSTEMS TRAINER EVALUATION FORM

Crew 1 Date 22 FEB 01

EWMC: LT OSBORN

SEVAL: LTJG COMERFORD

EVAL: LTJG PAYNE

BIGLOOK: AT² CECKA

LABOP: CTTSN BERLAND

STA 9: [(b)(3)]

STA 8: AT² GUIDRY

1. MISSION BRIEF

a. SEVAL "planeside" brief

- 1) Mission Objectives
- 2) Target Orientation
- 3) Pre-Mission Intel
- 4) Aircraft Placement

b. TACEVAL "in-line" brief

- 1) Condition Three Check
- 2) Band Assignments
- 3) Collection Prioritization
- 4) Target Area OOB

3. CREW COORDINATION

- 1) SEVAL ↔ outside agency
- 2) SEVAL ↔ TACEVAL
- 3) TACEVAL ↔ Operators
- 4) Operator ↔ Operator

4. CREW MISSION KNOWLEDGE

- 1) Demonstrated by Crew
- 2) Signal Tests avg. ≥ 75%
- 3) Application of Knowledge

2. SIGNAL RECCE

- 1) Coverage of Spectrum
- 2) Timely Detection/Ident
- 3) Signal Prioritization
- 4) Case Management
- 5) Case Documentation
- 6) Emitter PSIT Accuracy
- 7) Use of EPL/TACAIDS

MISSION BRIEF.....

SIGNAL RECCE.....

CREW COORDINATION.....

CREW MISSION KNOWLEDGE.....

TOTAL GRADE.....

(b)(2)+
(b)(5)

(b)(2)+
(b)(5)

Comments: CRC-1 SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED THEIR EVALUATED MUST.

OVERALL: EXCELLENT JOB PERFORMANCE. SEVAL/EVAL MISSION BRIEFS WERE OUTSTANDING. ENSURE THAT ALL CREW MEMBERS BRING REQUIRED MISSION MATERIAL FOR EVERY SCHEDULED EVENT. FOR THE MOST PART, THE CREW EXCEEDED AT TIMELY AND ACCURATE DATA COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION. THE EVAL MUST RELAY ALL POTENTIAL CRITICAL SIGNALS OF INTEREST TO THE SEVAL AS NEAR TO REAL TIME AS POSSIBLE. SEVAL SITUATION REPORTING TO FRIENDLY SURFACE UNITS WAS OUTSTANDING. ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH FRIENDLY UNITS IN OPAREA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. CRC-1 IS READY FOR DEPLOYMENT TO WESTP

[(b)(6) FOR COMPATWING TEN EVALUATOR]

5 Mar 01

MEMORANDUM

TO: COMMODORE MARRIOTT

FM:

VIA:

[(b)(6)]

SUBJ: CREW ONE READINESS CERTIFICATION


1. Crew One is deploying at **Readiness Level One**. The SEVAL, LTjg Comerford, is on his first SEVAL det. LT Osborn is on his first EWAC det. Of note: the LABOP did not partake in the first three MASTs due to ARP at Fallon. He did join the crew for the final evaluation. Throughout the trainers, communication was discussed and improved with each successive MAST. I watched the second MAST and was impressed with how frank each crew members were in the debrief.
2. Crew One last deployment was 15 Oct - 10 Dec to SWA. [LT Honeck (EWP), ADCS Mellos (FE), AD2 Smith (FE), AT2 Mercado (IFT)] [(b)(6)] and CTT2 Hanser (LABOP trainee) are the returning CRC-1 members.
3. This crew is [(b)(3)] at the senior officer qualified level (first fully qualified det, but multiple det). However, the other crew members are [] [] During the MASTs, the junior personnel (both officers and enlisted) were open to suggestions from everyone.
4. Crew One is ready to go on deployment.

Very Respectfully,

[(b)(6)]

I PERSONALLY SPOKE w/[(b)(3)] ABOUT THE FINAL MAST EVALUATION. HE REPORTED GOOD PERFORMANCE w/ MINOR DISCREPANCIES THAT WERE DEBRIEFED WITH THE CREW.

[(b)(3)]



ENCLOSURE(39)

CREW 1 WORK UP SCHEDULE

EWMC: LT OSBORN/ SEVAL: LTJG COMERFORD
12 FEB - 28 FEB

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
			8	9
12 PREDEPLOYMENT BRIEF 0700-1200 SGNL TRNG 1400-1600 SCIF	13 MAST #1 0700-0900 FASO DFW SGNL TRNG 1400-1600 SCIF	14 MAST #2 0700-0900 FASO SGNL TRNG 1400-1600 SCIF	15 SGNL TRNG 1400-1600 SCIF	16 SGNL TRNG 1400-1600 SCIF
19 HOLIDAY	20 OFT SGNL TRNG 1400-1600 SCIF	21 MAST #3 0700-0900 FASO SGNL TRNG 1400-1600 SCIF	22 MAST #4 0700-0900 FASO CMS DRAW CMS PACK OUT → 0945 DFW SGNL TRNG 1400-1600 SCIF	23 FLT GEAR/MAINT PACKOUT SGNL TRNG 1400-1600 SCIF
26	27 CREW 1 LIBERTY	28 DEPLOY 0700 SHOW 0900 T/O	01	


LAST UPDATE 20 February, 2001

DETERMINED TO BE A TRUE COPY

(b)(6)

BY AUTHORITY OF USIC, ISRAELI, URMISQUIN, INQUIRERS

ENCLOSURE (40)



DRAFTED: 12-Feb-01
 REVISED: 27-Feb-01

**FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
 MANIFEST**

CREW: ONE
 MSN/ROUTE: WI-HI-MA
 BRIEF: 0700
 DEPART: 0900

DATE: 28-Feb-01
 A/C: NALO
 CALL SIGN: RS 240
 MANIFEST ID: 165

DESIG	RANK	NAME	SEX	SSN	DEST	DURATION
1. EWMC	LT	OSBORN, SHANE	M	7 7	MISAWA	99 DAYS
2. EWP	LT	HONECK, PATRICK	M		"	"
3. EWCP	LTJG	VIGNERY, JEFFREY	M		"	"
4. SEVAL	LTJG	COMERFORD, JOHN	M		"	"
5. EVAL	LTJG	PAYNE, RICHARD	M		"	"
6. NAV	LTJG	KAUFFMAN, REGINA	F		"	"
7. FE	AD2	WESTBROOK, WENDY	F		"	"
8. FE	ADCS	MELLOS, NICHOLAS	M		"	"
9. IFT	AT2	MERCADO, RAMON	M		"	"
10. B/L	AT2	CECKA, DAVID	M		"	"
11. []	(b)(3)	[]	M		"	"
12. EWOP	AT2	GUIDRY, SCOTT	M	(b)(6)	"	"
13. EWOP(T)	AE3	BLOCHER, STEVEN	M		"	"
LAB	CTTSN	BORLAND, BRADFORD	M		"	"
14. LAB(T)	CTT2	HANSER, JASON	M		"	"
15. []	(b)(3)	[]	M		NOTE 1	20 DAYS
16. LAB(T)	CTTSN	WENZEL, VINCENT	M		MISAWA	99 DAYS
17. []			F		"	"
18. []			M		"	"
19. []			F		"	"
20. []			M		"	"
21. []	(b)(3)		F		"	"
22. []			M		"	"
23. []			M		"	"
24. []			M		"	"
25. []			M	7 7	MISAWA	60 DAYS

NOTE 1: WILL RETURN ON PR-50 ON OR ABOUT 15 MAR 01.

SUBMITTED BY

(b)(6)
 LCDR, USN
 OPERATIONS OFFICER

APPROVED BY:

(b)(6)
 CDR, USN
 COMMANDING OFFICER

ENCLOSURE(41)

ENCLOSURE (42) IS BEING WITHHELD
UNDER EXEMPTIONS (b)(2) AND (b)(6).

7 PAGES

CONSISTING OF MEMORANDUM, SUBJ: EXPLANATION/SUMMARY OF HOW
VQ-1 DEPLOYS CREWS AND AIRCRAFT, DATED 18 APR 2001, WITH TWO
ENCLOSURES: CREW ROTATION MATRIX AND MISSION CALENDAR

ENCLOSURE (43) IS BEING WITHHELD
UNDER EXEMPTIONS (b)(2) AND (b)(6).

2 PAGES

CONSISTING OF MEMORANDUM, SUBJ: HOW VQ-1 FORMS CREWS, DATED
19 APR 2001

ENCLOSURE (44) IS BEING WITHHELD
UNDER EXEMPTIONS (b)(2) AND (b)(6).

2 PAGES

CONSISTING OF MEMORANDUM, SUBJ: VQ-1 QUALIFICATION PROCESS FOR
EWAC, SEVAL, AND EWMC, DATED 12 APR 2001

11 Apr 2001

From: []
To: [(b)(6)]
Via: []

Encl: (1) CRC-1 Inventory Sheet
(2) Memo on CRC-1 Classified Material Content

SUBJ: CRC-1 CLASSIFIED MATERIAL INVENTORY

1. Enclosure (1) is a transcription of a fax transmittal from Det Misawa of what CRC-1 had checked out of Whidbey prior to detachment. The fax was very hard to read, so the N2 transcribed it to an excel spreadsheet.
2. Enclosure (2) is an internal memo sent to the N2 that explains more of the content of what was provided on laptop computers and classified disks, as well as crew study notes.

Very Respectfully,

[(b)(6)]
[]

ENCLOSURE(45)

ENCLOSURES (1) AND (2) OF ENCLOSURE (45) ARE BEING WITHHELD
UNDER EXEMPTIONS (b)(1), (b)(2) AND (b)(6).

3 PAGES

CONSISTING OF CURRENTLY AND PROPERLY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
REGARDING A TRANSCRIBED FACSIMILE ON AN EXCEL SPREADSHEET
AND A MEMORANDUM, SUBJ: CRC-1'S CLASSIFIED MATERIAL CONTENT,
DATED 3 APR 2001



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE
UNIT 25488
FPO AP 98601-6890

FAIRECONRONONEINST 1500.1F
N7
02 Nov 98

FAIRECONRON ONE INSTRUCTION 1500.1F

Subj: COMMAND TRAINING INSTRUCTION

Ref: (a) FAIRECONRONONEINST 1500.3C
(b) FAIRECONRONONEINST 1510.6M
(c) FAIRECONRONONEINST 1520.4D
(d) FAIRECONRONONEINST 1520.5B
(e) FAIRECONRONONEINST 3711.2A
(f) COMPATWINGSPACINST 1500.2A
(g) FAIRECONRONONEINST 3500.1G

1. Purpose. To establish the VQ-1 Master Training Plan.
2. Cancellation. FAIRECONRONONEINST 1500.1E
3. Scope. The provisions of this instruction are applicable to all members of the command.
4. Policy. Successful training and combat readiness depends on sound leadership that encourages involvement at all levels. Comprehensive, detailed guidance for all aspects of VQ-1 training programs and administration will be contained in the CPWF VQ-1 Training Readiness Manual (TRM), once published. Thorough familiarity and use of the TRM and references (a) through (g) are critical to successful program implementation.

b. Responsibilities

a. Commanding Officer:

- (1) Review and certify Combat Reconnaissance Crew (CRC) pre-deployment training prior to detachment.
- (2) Review and approve all instructions developed to provide training program guidance.

b. Executive Officer:

- (1) Review and sign the Monthly Training Plan (MTP). The MTP will serve as the training calendar and schedule.
- (2) Review and approve the Weekly Training Schedule (WTS).

c. Training Officer:

ENCLOSURE (16)

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY

(b)(6)

BY AUTHORITY: 50 USC 1044, COMMISSION INDEFINITE

FAIRECONRONONEINST 1500.1F
02 Nov 98

(1) Ensure squadron training programs and reporting are conducted in compliance with the TRM and all other applicable guidance. Submit changes to these publications as requirements or constraints change.

(2) Schedule the Planning Board for Training (PBFT). Ensure coordination of all squadron training.

(3) Compile and publish the Monthly Training Plan. The plan should include at a minimum:

- Squadron indoctrination schedule per reference (a).
- EYE Security/Safety Standdowns per reference (b).
- Projected workcenter training schedules.
- Aircraft training priorities per references (c), (d), and (e).
- 4 month projected training calendar with special events or conference annotated.
- Other items from the PBFT.

(4) Compile and publish the Weekly Training Plan. Include at a minimum:

- Maintenance training.
- Aircraft training per reference (c).
- Flight training priorities per reference (d) and (e).
- Occupational health training.
- General training.

(5) Ensure TDE pre-deployment training is scheduled and executed per reference (f) and the TRM. Ensure this training is germane to the crew's anticipated operations and that a training summary is drafted and forwarded to the Commanding Officer for certification prior to the crew's detachment.

(6) Ensure squadron training and documentation requirements are met as established by references (g) and (h).

(7) Coordinate school quotas or correspondence courses and scheduling for squadron personnel.

d. Department Heads:

(1) Ensure timely submission of monthly departmental training requirements to the Training Officer for input into the



Monthly Training Schedule. Submissions are required no later than the second Friday of the month prior to the month for which the training is scheduled. Inputs should be broken down by workcenter.

(2) Attend the PBFT. Monitor the progress of their department's members through training syllabi.

e. Division Officer/CPO's/LPO's

(1) Ensure submission of monthly proposed training to the Department Reads for review at the PBFT.

(2) Ensure all workcenter training is documented in the individual's training jacket or personnel records as appropriate. Review documentation quarterly.

(3) Nominate personnel for required training courses and facilitate attendance.

(4) Assist all personnel to qualify for advancement. Maintain proper documentation of completed advancement requirements.

(5) Recommend personnel for advancement exams.

f. Workcenter Training Petty Officer

(1) A primary and Alternate Training Petty Officer will be assigned to each Division/Department. The Training Petty Officers will be responsible for the maintenance of the training jackets.

(2) Plan and schedule weekly and monthly workcenter training.

6. Pre-Deployment Training

a. Per reference (f) and the TRM, the deploying crew's SEVAL and EWAC will schedule a pre-deployment work-up program. The Training Department Aircrew Readiness Coordinator will assist as required. This program may be developed to accommodate crew requests and operational requirements, but will include the following at a minimum:

- Pre-Det Readiness Screening
- Anti-Terrorism Training



FAIRECONRONONEINST 1500.1F

02 Nov 98

- Intelligence Brief
- Administration Brief
- Three evaluated MAS Trainer evolutions
- CMS Review for CMS users
- Flight Station DFW's
- Configs Brief
- MOPF Training (For SWA DETS)

b. The Training Department will coordinate with other departments and external organizations as necessary to execute the work-up program.

c. The Electronic Warfare Aircraft Commander (EWAC)/Senior Evaluator (SEVAL) of the crew will prepare a weekly progress report for submission to the Commanding Officer each Friday of the workup period.

d. The Training Department will prepare a summary of these work-up programs in a timely fashion for crew readiness certification by the Commanding Officer.

7. Deployment Training

a. The Training Department will establish specific training goals for all deploying aircrew trainees and provide the goals to the Mission Commander.

b. Mission Commanders will appoint a "Crew Training Officer" to supervise and track all ground and aircrew training during the deployment.

c. The Crew Training Officer will be responsible for providing the crew training summary for the Post Det Report. Weekly training progress reports are required via det sitrep, fax or e-mail.

T. A. Boyers
T. A. BOYERS
Acting

Distribution:
FAIRECONRONONEINST 5216.2W
Lists I and II (Less F)

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY


(b)(6)

BY AUTHORITY: 10 USC 1044; COMMISSION: INDEFINITE

ENCLOSURE (47) IS BEING WITHHELD
UNDER EXEMPTIONS (b)(5) AND (b)(6).

45 PAGES

CONSISTING OF FIVE CREW MEMBER RESPONSES TO PREPARED
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THEIR OBSERVATIONS DURING THE EVENT



COMPATRECONFORPAC

ACOS for SAFETY/NATOPS

[(b) (6)]

BOX 64000

MCBH Kaneohe Bay HI 9683-4000

Phone: [(b) (6)] Ext: [(b) (6)]

MEMORANDUM

12 Apr 01

From: CPRFP ACOS for Safety/NATOPS (N45)

To: Commander Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CPRFP)

Via: CPRFP Chief of Staff

SUBJ: SYNOPSIS OF EVENTS ICO 01 APRIL 01 VQ-1 AIRCRAFT COLLISION WITH PRC F-8 AIRCRAFT (BASED ON CREW TESTIMONY)

1. **General:** The VQ-1 event was scheduled as a routine reconnaissance flight in the South China Sea. The aircrew briefed before dawn and launched. The flight proceeded normally for the first five hours. At the five hour point, the aircraft was southeast of Hainan Island in international airspace. The aircraft was established wings level, on autopilot at 22,500', airspeed 180 knots (linger airspeed) and on heading 190 degrees. At that point, the aircrew sighted two F-8 aircraft off the right side of the E-P3 at a distance and closing. The F-8s closed to within approximately 1 nautical mile (NM) in loose trail formation. Two minutes later, at a normal turn point on the EP-3's preplanned track, the crew initiated a slow left turn utilizing 15 degrees Angle of Bank (AOB) to the east, rolling out on a 070 degree heading. This turn was the crew's last turn on track prior to heading back to base. The PRC aircraft were observed in loose trail position at various points during the slow turn.

2. **Collision:** Following completion of the turn, with the EP-3 straight and level on a 070 heading, the lead PRC F-8 joined tightly in formation on the port side of the EP-3. The F-8 twice drifted out of formation but each time returned to within five feet of the EP-3 at the same altitude. During the initial approach, the F-8 pilot was observed saluting the crew. On the second approach, the F-8 pilot was observed to have his oxygen mask removed and seen gesturing to the crew with hand signals in a pushing motion. On the third pass, his closure rate became excessive. He appeared to make some effort toward corrective action to slow the closure rate (by initiating a turn away). Apparently unable to control his closure rate, he allowed the F-8 to pitch up into the EP-3's #1 propeller. The EP-3's propeller struck the F-8 at the point where the vertical stabilizer assembly met the fuselage. The jet was immediately "ripped" in half. Numerous smaller pieces of the F-8 were also observed. The tail section of the F-8 impacted the left aileron of the EP-3, tearing an approximate eight inch by three inch hole in the underside of the aileron. The EP-3 immediately pitched up and began shaking violently due to damage to the # 1 propeller. The nose section of the F-8 continued forward and impacted the

radome of the EP-3, causing it to disintegrate and pass in pieces over the top of the EP-3. Portions of the radome impacted both port and starboard pitot tubes (a portion of the airspeed indicating system) resulting in loss of airspeed indications and degradation of altitude indication systems. Unknown debris may have damaged the #3 propeller. At least one HF antenna wire was ripped from its mounting on the EP-3, lodging in the trim tab on the port elevator.

3. Collision – Immediate Aftermath: Immediately following the collision and pitch up, the EP-3 snapped rolled to the left to between 130 and 140 degrees AOB, 30 degrees nose low. The Electronic Warfare Aircraft Commander (EWAC), assumed control from the right seat (as senior pilot) and with the assistance of the Third Pilot (who then occupied the left seat of the EP-3) immediately applied full right aileron and full right rudder, pulling the power levers to flight idle to initiate recovery. The EP-3 remained out of control through 15,000' (a loss of 7,500' of altitude) with a rate of descent in excess of 4000 feet per minute. At 15,000', the EWAC managed to level the wings with the EP-3 still vibrating violently. In an attempt to regain control the EWAC, with the concurrence of the senior Flight Engineer (FE), directed the accomplishment of the Emergency Shutdown Procedure on the #1 engine. As the descent continued, the EWAC was unable to regain control and ordered the copilot to direct the crew to prepare to bail out. Approaching 10,000' #1 propeller rotation slowed (from approximately 60 percent RPM to 30 percent, possibly coupled with a near flat blade angle), allowing the crew to regain partial control of the EP-3 on a heading of 300 degrees. The damaged F-8 was last seen trailing smoke in an uncontrolled dive toward the ocean surface.

4. Recovery of Control: As the crew recovered partial control of the aircraft, the EWAC selected Ground Speed on his inertial repeater, allowing him to monitor airspeed through secondary means. The aircraft became more controllable after the shut down of the #1 engine, although nearly full right aileron was required to maintain wings level. The Third Pilot (in the left seat), concluded bailout and Mayday calls, and at the direction of the EWAC, redirected the crew to prepare to ditch. Noise level in the cockpit was extremely high due to aircraft nose damage. The crew quickly discussed options and identified Lingshui airfield as the closest available airport on a heading of 290 degrees. While proceeding to the airfield, the EWAC began making calls on UHF 243.0 (Guard – an international emergency frequency) declaring an emergency, and switched to emergency transponder (IFF) codes. The Navigator was making similar Mayday calls on HF guard. The crew then switched seats and donned parachutes, placing the EWAC in the left seat (to provide greater control during landing due to the availability of nosewheel steering), the senior FE in the center seat and the Copilot in the right seat. As the crew proceeded inbound to Lingshui, several more calls were made on Guard with no response. The EWAC conducted a controlled descent to 1000' (using radar altimeter) at 10 nautical miles from Lingshui, at one point orbiting to better locate the field and further evaluate aircraft controllability.

5. Landing: The EP-3 approached the field at a 90 degree offset from the approach end of the favored runway (favored for wind direction) and executed a left 270 degree turn for landing (near full right aileron and rudder required to maintain level flight). Concerned that unnecessary movement of flight control surfaces or a change in configuration might cause the EP-3 to depart

controlled flight (level of damage to the port aileron and flaps unknown), the EWAC elected to conduct a no-flap, three engine landing. The crew configured the EP-3 for landing, conducted applicable checklists and entered an overhead downwind for landing. Landing and rollout were completed with no additional difficulties.

6. The above information was taken from the written statements of Flight Station crew members involved in the incident. I am standing by to provide additional information as needed.

[(b) (6)]
CDR USN

23 Apr 2001

From: [(b)(6)]
To: [(b)(6)]
Via: [(b)(6)]

Ref: (a) VQ-1 CRC-1 Flight Log Books

SUBJ: CRC-1 TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS

1. The following is the flight hour totals logged in ref (a) as of 27 Mar 01 (last flight before 01 Apr 01):

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Total Pilot Time</u>	<u>Total A/C Cmdr Time</u>
LT Osborn	EWAC/EWMC	940.3	105.3
LT Honeck	EWP	1018.3	0.0
LTJG Vignery	EWCP	401.2	0.0

<u>Name</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Total Special Crew Time</u>
LTJG Comerford	SEVAL	1035.3
LTJG Payne	EVAL	507.5
LTJG Kauffman	NAV	364.2
ADCS Mellos	FE	8018.0
AD2 Westbrook	FE	1062.6
AT2 Mercado	IFT	1094.6
AT2 Cecka	BIG LOOK	1845.4
AT2 Guidry	EWOP	1482.1
AE3 Blocher	EWOP(T)	118.7
CTTSN Borland	LAB	1605.6
CTT2 Hanser	LAB(T)	375.1

Very Respectfully,

[(b)(6)]

LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE() 53

ORIGINAL

**GROUND SCHEDULE
WEDNESDAY, 28 FEBRUARY**

EVENT	TIME	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR	ATTENDEES
PREVENT	0715-1600	BLDG 121, 2 ND FL	STAFF	[]
NAVOSHA	0730-1600	NAVAIRES	STAFF	[(b)(6)]
NI ADMIN PCS TRANSFERS	1300-1330	ADMIN	[(b)(6)]	NI PERSONNEL

OVERSEAS FLIGHTS

* ALL TIMES ZULU *

1. PR-32 272330-280630 7+00 RJSM-RJSM SV2/PRR CRC-6 [(b)(6)]

T/O _____ Z LAND _____ Z

NOTES: CNX - O2 System

2. PR-31 280500-281100 6+00 OBBI-OBBI SV2/NIW CRC-7 [(b)(6)]

T/O 0500 Z LAND 1100 Z

NOTES: _____

DRAFTED BY: [(b)(6)]
FLIGHT OFFICER

REVIEWED BY: [(b)(6)]
TRAINING OFFICER

SUBMITTED BY: [(b)(6)]
OPERATIONS OFFICER

APPROVED BY: [(b)(6)]
CDR, USN
COMMANDING OFFICER

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL
(b)(6)
BY AUTHORITY: 10 USC 1044H. COMMISSION: INDEFINITE

FLEET AIR RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON ONE

COMMANDING OFFICER

[(b)(6) + (2)]

EXECUTIVE OFFICER

[(b)(6) + (2)]

FLIGHT SCHEDULE

WEDNESDAY, 28 FEB 01

SUNRISE: 0654

SUNSET: 1751

JULIAN: 1059

HRS: SCHED 10+30

SDO: []

ODO: []

ORIGINAL

URNS: [(b)(6) + (2)]

1. DEEPSEA-51 TBD 1+30 LOCAL FCF
2K2/FCF TBD
P-3C/PR-51 TBD

[(b)(6) + (2)]

T/O: ~~1000~~ LAND: 1135

NOTES: A/C ↑ i.6

2. ~~VP-46/221~~ DEEPSEA-50 0830 4+00 LOCAL EWP-7 COMP/EWAC-3
1A1/001 1100
P-3C/VP-46 1500

[(b)(6) + (2)]

T/O: 1335 LAND: 1415

NOTES: A/C ↓ #4 TIT GAUGE, NO EVENTS COMP. (VP-46 A/C ↓ @ PREFLIGHT)

3. DEEPSEA-50 1130 5+00 LOCAL EWAC-3/EWCP-1
1A1/001 1330
P-3C/PR- 1830

[(b)(6) + (2)]

T/O: 1500 LAND: 1805

NOTES: T/O DELAYED DUE TO MAINT., LTJG SRP NO EVENT DUE TO DAYLIGHT

OPERATIONS NOTES

- CRC-1 AND MAINTAINERS 0700 FOR 0900 AT THE AIR TERMINAL: LT OSBORNE, LT CEMERFORD, [(b)(6) + (2)], LT HONECK, LTJG KAUFFMAN, LTJG PAYNE, LTJG VIGNERY, ADCS MELLOSI [(b)(6) + (3)], AT2 CEKCA, AT2 GUIDRY, AT2 HANSER, AT2 MERCADO, [(b)(6) + (4)], AD2 WESTBROOK, AB3 BLOCHER, AT3 BROWN, [(b)(6) + (2)], [(b)(6) + (2)], CTTSN BORLAND, AKAN PRICE, [(b)(6) + (2)]
- ALL AIRCREW SPECIAL LIB CHITS AND LEAVE REQUESTS SHALL BE ROUTED THROUGH OPERATIONS.
- # DENOTES AIRCREW SCHEDULED FOR MULTIPLE EVENTS ON THE SAME DAY.
- ALL AIRCRAFT USE GROUND POWER ONLY UNTIL AFTER FOD WALKDOWN.
- THE DAILY FLIGHT SCHEDULE IS AVAILABLE ON SDO ANSWERING MACHINE [(b)(6) + (2)]

*** BINNACLE LIST ***

MEDICAL -- [(b)(6) + (b)(3)]

NATOPS -- [(b)(6) + (b)(3)]

*** NATOPS QUESTION ***

THE MINIMUM RECOMMENDED ALTITUDE FOR AN EMERGENCY BAILOUT IS _____ FEET

- 1000
- 2000
- 3000
- 4000

ANSWER TO YESTERDAY'S NATOPS QUESTION ***

THERE ARE _____ DITCHING STATIONS ON AN EP-3E AIRCRAFT.

- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL

[(b)(6)]

BY AUTHORITY: 10 USC 10441, COMMISSION: INDEFINITE

AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE RECORD

OPNAVINST 4790.2E

1. AC BU/SER NO 156511	2. T/M/S EPSE	3. RPT. CUST. A-1	4. OXY 1600	5. FUEL GRADE: 08 QTY: 56K	6. OIL GRADE: 23677	7. DA 1090 APR 01, 01
8. ORDNANCE/SPECIAL/EQUIPMENT/LIMITATIONS/REMARKS: NONE/NONE/ALTOPS/CONF 5 "D" NPO TEAM INSPECTED ALL CREW [(b)(3)]				9. I have personally inspected this aircraft IAW the applicable MRCs/checklists. Any discrepancies noted have been entered on OPNAV 4790/3B. SIGNATURE OF PLANE CAPTAIN: [(b)(3)] RANK/RATE		
				10. Certification of safe for flight condition by the MO, MMCO, or MCO. Other persons may sign this form if authorized. SIGNATURE: [(b)(3)] RANK/RATE: A-1		
				11. I have reviewed the discrepancy reports of the 10 previous flights, insured proper filing of weight and balance data, and accept this aircraft for flight. SIGNATURE OF PILOT IN COMMAND: [(b)(3)] RANK/RATE: 1SN		

OPNAV 4790/1d: (12-89)

SN 0107 (F-008-1600)

PLANE CAPTAIN: ADCS NICHOLAS WELLOS

SFE: [(b)(3)]

PILOT: LT. SHANE OSBORN

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY

[(b)(3)] 23 APR 01
MMCO

ENCLOSURE (5)

ENCLOSURES (57), (58), AND (59) HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO THE NAVAL AIR
SYSTEMS COMMAND FOR RELEASE DETERMINATION AND DIRECT
RESPONSE TO THE FOIA REQUEST APPLICANT

08 May 2001

From: [(b)(6)]
To: [(b)(6)]

Via: [(b)(6) + (2)]

Ref: (a) VQ-1 Flight Schedules
(b) VQ-1 Det Misawa Flight Schedules
(c) Daily Status Report Messages

SUBJ: CRC-1 DETACHMENT SCHEDULE 28 FEB 01 TO 01 APR 01

1. Per refs (a) through (c), the following summarizes the movements of CRC-1 and PR-32 from the beginning of their detachment to the Pacific Command AOR to the incident on 01 Apr 01. PR-32 was already in place at VQ-1 Detachment Misawa when CRC-1 arrived, as were the NSGA CRC-1 crewmembers.

28 Feb	VQ-1 CRC-1 crewmembers depart NAS Whidbey Island, WA via NALO. arrive Hickam AFB, HI and remain overnight
01 Mar	VQ-1 CRC-1 crewmembers depart Hickam AFB, HI via NALO
02 Mar	VQ-1 CRC-1 crewmembers arrive NAF Misawa, JA
04 Mar	CRC-1 flies PR-32 on mission Misawa to Misawa
05 Mar	CRC-1 flies PR-32 on mission Misawa to Misawa
07 Mar	CRC-1 flies PR-32 on reposition flight Misawa to Kadena
11 Mar	CRC-1 flies PR-32 on mission Kadena to Kadena
12 Mar	CRC-1 flies PR-32 on mission Kadena to Kadena
15 Mar	CRC-1 flies PR-32 on mission Kadena to Kadena
16 Mar	CRC-1 flies PR-32 on mission Kadena to Kadena
18 Mar	CRC-1 flies PR-32 on mission Kadena to Kadena
19 Mar	CRC-1 flies PR-32 on mission Kadena to Kadena
22 Mar	CRC-1 flies PR-32 on mission Kadena to Kadena
24 Mar	CRC-1 flies PR-32 on mission Kadena to Kadena
27 Mar	CRC-1 flies PR-32 on mission Kadena to Kadena
28 Mar	CRC-1 scheduled to fly PR-32 on mission Kadena to Kadena, didn't fly because of fuel dollars
01 Apr	CRC-1 flies PR-32 on mission from Kadena. in flight collision with Chinese fighter, landed Lingshui, CH

Very Respectfully,

[(b)(6) + (2)]

ENCLOSURE

23 Apr 2001

From: [(b)(6)]
To: [(b)(6)]
Via: [(b)(6)]

Ref: (a) CRC-1 Work-Up Progress Report 23 Feb 01

SUBJ: CORRECTION TO REPORT ICO LTJG RICHARD PAYNE, [(b)(6)]
DETACHMENT EXPERIENCE

i. Ref (a) states that LTJG Payne was on his second detachment overall and his first as an EVAL. In fact, he was on his third detachment overall and his first as an EVAL. This was a typographical error in ref (a).

Very Respectfully,

[(b)(6)]

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE (62) IS BEING WITHHELD
UNDER EXEMPTIONS (b)(3) AND (b)(6).

4 PAGES

CONSISTING OF MEMORANDUM, SUBJ: NAME CHANGES, DATED 23 APR
2001, AND THREE DD FORMS 1343, NOTIFICATION OF CHANGE IN SERVICE
MEMBERS OFFICIAL RECORD, REGARDING NAME CHANGES

ENCLOSURE (63) IS BEING WITHHELD
UNDER EXEMPTIONS (b)(2) AND (b)(6).

1 PAGE

CONSISTING OF MEMORANDUM, SUBJ: NORMAL PROCEDURES FOR THE
HANDLING OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL FOR VQ-1 EP-3 MISSIONS, DATED 9
MAY 2001

ENCLOSURE (64) IS BEING WITHHELD
UNDER EXEMPTIONS (b)(2) AND (b)(6).

52 PAGES

CONSISTING OF FAIRECONRONONEINST 5500.1A, SUBJ: VQ-1 COMMAND
EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN (EAP), DATED 20 MAR 2000

ENCLOSURES (65) THROUGH (76) ARE BEING WITHHELD
UNDER EXEMPTIONS (b)(2) AND (b)(5).

36 PAGES

CONSISTING OF 12 CREW MEMBER RESPONSES TO PREPARED QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THEIR OBSERVATIONS DURING THE DESTRUCTION OF
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

ENCLOSURES (77) THROUGH (81) ARE BEING WITHHELD
UNDER EXEMPTION (b)(1) AND (b)(5).

15 PAGES

CONSISTING OF CURRENTLY AND PROPERLY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
REGARDING DEBRIEFS AND OBSERVATIONS OF THE EP-3 CREW.

13 April, 2001

FROM: 18 WG/JA

TO: COMMANDER COMPATRECONFOPAC

Attn: [(b)(6)]

I have reviewed the source materials for the attached copies (55 total pages) and have verified that they are true and accurate copies. The Flight Weather Briefing (6 pages) and the VQ-1 Flight Plan (1 page) were recovered from 18 Wing Base Operations where they are maintained in the normal course of business.

[(b)(6)]

[REDACTED] Unclassified

ENCLOSURE (2)

THE ELEVEN ATTACHMENTS TO ENCLOSURE (82) ARE BEING WITHHELD
UNDER EXEMPTION (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5) AND (b)(6).
55 PAGES
CONSISTING OF CURRENTLY AND PROPERLY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
REGARDING THE CONTENTS OF THE MISSION FOLDER AND CREW AND
AIRCRAFT INVENTORIES.

ENCLOSURES (83) IS BEING WITHHELD
UNDER EXEMPTIONS (b)(2) AND (b)(5).

3 PAGES

CONSISTING OF CREW MEMBER RESPONSES TO PREPARED QUESTIONS
CONCERNING HER OBSERVATIONS DURING THE DESTRUCTION OF
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

ENCLOSURE (84) IS BEING WITHHELD
UNDER EXEMPTION (b)(3) AND (b)(6).
14 PAGES
CONSISTING OF FIFTEEN NAVMED FORMS 6410/2, CLEARANCE NOTICE
(AEROMEDICAL).