AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

				Reference:	CA18/2/3/9655		
Aircraft Registration	**ZS-ELS**	**Date of Accident**	13 October 2017		**Time of Accident**	1420Z	
Type of Aircraft	Piper 28-235		**Type of Operation**		Private (Part 91)		
Pilot-in-command Licence Type	Private Pilot		**Age**	57	**Licence Valid**	Yes	
Pilot-in-command Flying Experience	Total Flying Hours		297.3		Hours on Type	50.3	
Last point of departure	Wonderboom Airport (FAWB): Gauteng Province						
Next point of intended landing	Florence Guest Farm near Chrissiesmeer: Mpumalanga Province						
Location of the accident site with reference to easily defined geographical points (GPS readings if possible)							
Tevreden Pan between Chrissiesmeer and Carolina (GPS S 26° 12' 07.o4" E 030° 10'20, 29") elevation 5749 ft.							
Meteorological Information	Wind direction:070°/11kts Broken Cloud 600feet Temperature 09°C						
Number of people on board	1+1	**No. of people injured**	0	**No. of people killed**	2		
Synopsis							

A pilot and a passenger departed from Wonderboom Airport (FAWB) for Florence Guest Farm near Chrissiesmeer. The aircraft did not arrive at Florence Guest Farm as expected. One of the guests called the passenger but her phone kept on ringing without being answered. One of the guests then traced the location of the phone using Apple's find my phone application and it indicated that the cell phone is at Tevreden Pan.

The Farm owner and the police drove to the location of the phone and found that the aircraft had crashed west of Florence on higher ground. The aircraft impacted the ground nose first and left a 4 metres (m) long trough in the ground. They could only see the wreckage and the fire when they were 100m from the wreckage due to reduced visibility and low cloud. The pilot and the passenger were fatally injured; the aircraft was destroyed by post impact fire.

Investigation revealed that during an attempt to remain below the clouds the aircraft flew into terrain at 5749ft AMSL.

Probable Cause

Control flight into terrain as the pilot was attempting to remain below clouds; the aircraft flew into terrain at 5749 feet AMSL.

SRP Date	11 September 2018	Release Date	

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Name of Owner /Operator : ZS-ELS Partnership

Manufacturer : Piper Aircraft Corporation

Model : PA-28-235

Nationality : South African

Registration Marks : ZS-ELS

Place : Tevreden Pan near Chrissiesmeer

Date : 13 October 2017

Time : 1420Z

All times given in this report are Co-ordinated Universal Time (UTC) and will be denoted by (Z). South African Standard Time is UTC plus 2 hours.

Purpose of the Investigation:

In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (2011) this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and ***not to establish blame or liability****.*

Disclaimer:

This report is produced without prejudice to the rights of the CAA, which are reserved.

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 History of Flight

1.1.1 The pilot and a passenger departed FAWB at 1320Z for Florence farm Lodge near Chrissiesmeer. The pilot had not filed a flight plan.

1.1.2 The owner of Florence Guest Farm reported that the pilot contacted him at the beginning of the week to ask geographical details about the runway located at the farm as he would be flying to the farm for the first time. The farm owner gave the pilot the runway details. The pilot advised the farm owner that they were planning to arrive on Friday in the afternoon for the wedding to be held on Saturday.

1.1.3 On the morning of the accident the pilot contacted the farm owner asking about weather. The owner told him it was broken clouds (seven octas 7/8) at 600 feet above ground level (AGL), The pilot said that the forecast indicated that it will clear up during the day. The farm owner reported that at 1240Z he sent the pilot a short message service (SMS) telling the pilot that the clouds were now three octas (3/8) and there was sunshine at Chrissiesmeer. At 1300Z the farm owner saw that the weather had changed; there were clouds coming from the east and the cloud base was now 500ft. He sent the pilot another SMS informing him of the change in weather conditions.

1.1.4 At 1410Z the farm owner started getting worried about the pilot and the passenger because the weather was deteriorating; there were more clouds at approximately 400 to 500ft. One of the guests (the passenger's son) then started calling the passenger but her phone rang without any answer. The farm owner then called FAWB ATC tower around 1415Z and the ATC on duty confirmed that the ZS-ELS got airborne at 1320Z and the estimated flying time was 53 minutes.

1.1.5 One of the guests then traced the location of the passenger's phone using Apple's find my phone App and showed the farm owner the location. The farm owner informed South African Police Services (SAPS) at Chrissiesmeer and requested the police officers to escort him and some guests to the phone's location. The location was at Tevreden Pan between Chrissiesmeer and Carolina. The farm owner also contacted the owners of the farm where the phone was located. At 1645Z they all drove to the location of the cell phone and found the wreckage but due to thick mist they could only see the burning wreckage, grass and fire. The wreckage was found on flat ground above a hill at approximately 11 km to the north west of the lodge.



Figure 1 Photograph showing the accident site

1.1.6 The Florence farm owner then advised Search and Rescue (SAR) officer that they have found the burnt wreckage and there were no survivors.

1.1.7 The pilot and the passenger were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and post impact fire that erupted.

1.1.8 The accident happened during dusk light conditions near Tevreden Pan at GPS (S 26° 12' 07.o4" E 030° 10'20, 29") elevation 5749 ft.

1.1.9 Google earth image below.



Figure 2: Google maps image showing the profile of the terrain and the red line in the upper part of the pictureshowing the flight path of ZS-ELS the crash site elevation is 5749 ft and the lodge elevation is 5560ft.

1.2 Injuries to Persons

Injuries	Pilot	Crew	Pass.	Other
Fatal	1	-	1	-
Serious	-	-	-	-
Minor	-	-	-	-
None	-	-	-	-

1.3 Damage to Aircraft

1.3.1 The aircraft was destroyed.

Figure 3 Photo of the damaged aircraft.

1.4 Other Damage

1.4.1 None.

1.5 Personnel Information

Nationality	South African	Gender	Male	Age	57
Licence Number	0270098569	Licence Type	Private Pilot		
Licence valid	Yes	Type Endorsed	Yes		
Ratings	None				
Medical Expiry Date	30 September 2018				
Restrictions	Corrective lenses				

Previous Accidents	None

1.5.1 Note that the pilot was not instrument rated.

Flying Experience:

Total Hours	297.3
Total Past 90 Days	29.7
Total on Type Past 90 Days	29.7
Total on Type	50.3

Note: Flying hours as at 30 August 2017

1.6 Aircraft Information

Airframe:

Type	Piper 28-235	
Serial Number	28-10694	
Manufacturer	Piper Aircraft corporation	
Date of Manufacture	1965	
Total Airframe Hours (At time of Accident)	Unknown	
Last MPI (Date & Hours)	17/11/ 2016	3457.65
Hours since Last MPI	Unknown	
C of A (First Issue Date)	5 March 1969	
C of A (Expiry Date)	4 March 2018	
C of R (Issue Date) (Present owner)	4 December 1999	
Operating Categories	Part 91	

1.6.1 Note: The flight folio could not be found to determine the total airframe hours and hours since last MPI

Engine:

Type	Lycoming O-540-A1D5
Serial Number	L 9175-40-A
Hours since New	3457.65

Hours since Overhaul	970.69

Propeller:

Type	Hartzell HC-C2YK-1BF
Serial Number	AW 2247 E
Hours since New	3457.65
Hours since Overhaul	290.65

Note: There was no evidence or records of fuel uplifted at FAWB; nor was there any record of any recent sale of fuel to the aircraft at the aerodrome.

1.7 Meteorological Information

1.7.1 Weather information as obtained from South African Weather Services (SAWS).

Wind direction	070°	Wind speed	11kts	Visibility	8000m
Temperature	9°C	Cloud cover	BKN	Cloud base	600ft
Dew point	7°C				

1.7.2 There were Altocumulus clouds and towering cumulus clouds en-route to the south east of Witbank. At 1315Z the accident site was on the western edges of a mass of low cloud which was widely spread to the east and continued encroach to the west parts of Mpumalanga. On the other hand the Alto cumulus cloud on the south east was moving to an easterly direction. The images show a Towering cumulus cloud that moved directly over head the accident site. While low cloud continued to spread westwards towards sunset, covering the accident site completely. See page 6 of 9 of the weather report below Appendices 5.2.



Figure 4 Image showing a Towering cumulus cloud that moved directly over head the accident site

1.7.3 The accident site covered by low clouds (whitish shade) while TCU (reddish brown cell) moved eastwards directly overhead the accident site see figure 5 below.



Figure 5 The image showing the accident site covered by low clouds

1.7.4 The METAR report for Ermelo station recorded wind at 12 knots from the east, visibility beyond 10km, scattered clouds with bases at 1800 feet AGL, temperature of 14 degrees and dew point of 9 degrees, and the required altimeter subscale setting was 1024. The satellite image for the time confirms the following observations.

FAEO 131300Z 07012G23KT 9999 FEW018 17/09 Q1024=

FAEO 131400Z 07012KT 9999 SCT0181 14/09 Q1024=

FAEO 131500Z 06012KT 9999 FEW015 12/08 Q1025=

FAEO 131600Z 06014KT 9999 SCT008 10/08 Q1025=

FAEO 131700Z 08010KT 9999 BKN008 09/08 Q1025=

FAEO 131800Z 07011KT 8000 BKN006 09/08 Q1027=

According to the writer of the weather report, it was inconclusive to suggest visibility reduction below VFR threshold due to fog during the given period but a possibility of the occurrence of mist cannot be ruled out.

1.7.5 According to the weather report the visibility was 8000m and cloud base 600ft in order for VMC conditions the visibility must be above 5000m and cloud base above 1500ft so the aircraft was flown in IMC conditions. The aircraft must have been flown at approximately 5749 feet AMSL to try and remain below the low clouds and maintain visual reference with the ground. The aircraft impacted rising ground at 5749 ft AMSL.

1.8 Aids to Navigation

1.8.1 The aircraft was equipped with standard navigational equipment as approved by the regulator for the aircraft type.

1.9 Communications.

1.9.1 The aircraft was equipped with standard communication equipment as approved by the regulator for the aircraft type and there were no recorded defects prior to or during the flight. The aircraft was able to communicate with ATC at FAWB aerodrome during departure on frequency 118.35 MHz.

1.10 Aerodrome Information

1.10.1 The aircraft crashed in an open field in Tevreden Pan near Chrissiesmeer at GPS (S 26° 12' 07.o4" E 030° 10'20, 29") elevation 5749 ft.

1.11 Flight Recorders

1.11.1 The aircraft was not equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR) or cockpit voice recorder (CVR), nor were these required to be fitted by the regulation.

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

1.12.1 The aircraft crashed 11km north-west of Florence guest farm on a flat ground "above the hill. According to the weather report there were broken clouds at 600ft above ground level which is approximately 6300 ft AMSL, the aircraft must have been flown at approximately 5750 feet AMSL to try and remain below the low clouds and maintain visual reference with the ground. The aircraft impacted rising ground at 5749 ft AMSL.

1.12.2 The aircraft crashed nose first and left a 4m long trough in the ground see figure 6. The wreckage trail was approximately 72 m. Parts of all the aircraft's primary structures were accounted for at the accident site. The completeness and proximity of the main wreckage and the depth of the impact mark, suggested that the aircraft had struck the ground with a shallow trajectory at high speed.

Figure 6 Image of the crater in the ground

1.12.3 The flap operating lever was found in its lowest detent indicating that the flaps were retracted on impact. The control cables were damaged by the accident. The single cabin entry door which was located on the right hand side of the aircraft was crushed. Part of the door frame was recovered and it still had a door latch engagement slot. This damage suggested that the door had burst open during

impact.

1.12.3 The engine was pushed back to the firewall causing deformation of the cockpit/cabin sidewalls and had been affected by the fire damage to the extent that the magnetos had been damaged and the ignition harness was destroyed. The carburettor air box had been distorted on impact but it was possible to establish that the heat control lever was in the cold position. Pieces of engine cowl and miscellaneous debris from the cabin, including seat headrests and mounts for GPS units were scattered beyond the nose impact point. The furthest items in the debris zone, comprising a single seat headrest and the left wing, lay separately about 25 m beyond the fuselage remains.

1.12.4 The propeller hub separated from the crank shaft. The separation features on the crankshaft were conical; in appearance with a 45° shear lip around the entire radius of the break, see figure 7 and 8. There was extensive fire damage in the cockpit area with little useful information remaining on the instruments. The throttle control was found pushed fully forward at full power position. The aircraft flight folio couldn't be found during the on-site investigation.

Figure 7/8: Pictures showing a broken engine crankshaft (L) and the propeller (R)

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

1.13.1 The pathologist reported that both the pilot and the passenger died of multiple injuries, which were consistent with having been sustained in the impact.

1.14 **Fire**

1.14.3 A post impact fuel-fed fire erupted and further damaged was caused to the aircraft.

1.15 Survival Aspects

1.15.1 The accident was considered not survivable; the single cabin entry door which was located on the right hand side of the aircraft was crushed. There was extensive fire damage in the cockpit area.

1.16 Tests and Research

1.16.1 None.

1.17 Organizational and Management Information

1.17.1 This was a private flight conducted under the provisions as contained in Part 91 of the Civil Aviation Regulations of 2011.

1.17.2 The last annual inspection that was carried out on the aircraft prior to the accident flight was certified on 17 November 2016 at 3457.65 airframe hours by an Aircraft Maintenance Organisation. The AMO that performed the MPI on the aircraft was in possession of a valid AMO certificate.

1.18 Additional Information

1.18.1 VFR minima in uncontrolled airspace Part 91.07.9

Airspace class	Altitude band	Flight visibility	Distance from cloud
C F G	At and above 10,000 feet above MSL	8 km	1 500 m horizontally 1 000 ft vertically
C F G	Below 10,000 ft AMSL and above 3,000 feet above MSL, or above 1,000 feet above terrain, whichever is the higher	5 km	1 500 m horizontally 1 000 ft vertically
C	At and below 3,000 feet above MSL, or 1,000 feet	2500m	1 500 m horizontally 1 000 ft vertically
F G	above terrain, whichever is the higher	1500m unless in accordance with (iii) below.	Clear of cloud and with the surface in sight

VFR flight determination and weather deterioration

91.06.23 *(1) The PIC of an aircraft operating outside a control zone or an aerodrome traffic zone is responsible to ascertain whether or not weather conditions permit flight in accordance with VFR.*

(2) Whenever weather conditions do not permit a pilot to maintain the minimum distance from cloud and the minimum visibility required by VFR, the pilot shall –

(a) if in controlled airspace, request an amended clearance enabling the aircraft to continue in VMC to the nearest suitable aerodrome, or to leave the airspace within which an ATC clearance is required;

(b) if no clearance in accordance with paragraph (a) can be obtained, continue to operate in VMC and land at the nearest suitable aerodrome, notifying the appropriate ATC unit of the action taken;

(c) if operating within a control zone, request authorization to operate as a special VFR flight; or

(d) request clearance to operate in accordance with the IFR.

Special VFR weather minima

91.06.22 *(1) A PIC of an aeroplane <u>may only</u> conduct Special VFR operations in weather conditions below the conditions prescribed in regulation 91.06.21 <u>within a control zone (CTR) –</u>*

(a) under the terms of an air traffic control clearance;

(b) by day only;

(c) with a cloud ceiling of at least 600 feet and visibility of at least 1 500m, measured from the aerodrome reference point;

(d) when the Special VFR flight will not unduly delay an IFR flight;

(e) if the aeroplane is equipped with two way radio equipment capable of communicating with an ATSU on the appropriate frequency; and

(f) if leaving the control zone, in accordance with instructions issued by an ATSU prior to departure.

1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques

1.19.1 None

2. ANALYSIS

2.1 At the time of the accident, the pilot was in possession of a valid private pilot licence and aviation medical certificate. The aircraft type was endorsed in the pilot's licence and the pilot had a total of 297.3 flying hours, with 50.3 flying hours on this aircraft type.

2.2 Available aircraft technical documentation showed that the aircraft was properly maintained in accordance with the manufacture's approved procedures and was believed to be airworthy prior to the accident.

2.3 The examination of the wreckage indicated that the aircraft was serviceable prior to impact and that the aircraft hit the ground in a nose low attitude at high speed. The available information indicated that the accident area was covered by low clouds. The accident site was higher in elevation compared to surrounding ground and the destination landing strip. The accident site elevation is 5749ft AMSL the highest peak in the area is 5941ft AMSL and the destination is 5560ft AMSL see figure 2. The pilot was not instrument rated and was flying in IMC conditions. The investigation determined that the accident was weather related which resulted in the pilot not realising that the ground ahead was rising. During an attempt to remain below the clouds the aircraft flew into terrain at 5749ft AMSL. The highest peak is at 5941ft AMSL which shows that the terrain is rising, the destination guest farm elevation is 5560ft AMSL so the terrain rises and drops again. The aircraft impacted high rising terrain at 5749 feet AMSL.

2.4 The satellite image from the South African weather services (SAWS) showed that the flight departed in clear conditions and that the flight path had very good visual flight conditions up until approximately 20 km from the destination. The satellite image also showed the aircraft had passed under a band of high clouds between Witbank and Carolina. This appeared to have caused the pilot to assume that the cloud encountered was similarly a band of cloud with clear conditions beyond.

2.5 Given the accident site which was approximately 11 km north of the track, this suggested that the pilot was either attempting to find a way around the weather or remain clear of clouds. It is also probable that as the weather deteriorated, the pilot ran out of escape routes and encountered rising ground which reduced terrain clearance.

2.6 Investigation revealed that during an attempt to remain below the clouds the aircraft flew into terrain at 5749ft AMSL.

3. CONCLUSION

3.1 Findings

3.1.1 The pilot held a valid private pilot's licence and had the aircraft type endorsed in his logbook. The aviation medical certificate was valid with the expiry date of 30 September 2018.

3.1.2 The pathologist reported that both the pilot and passenger died of multiple injuries, which were consistent with having sustained at impact.

3.1.3 The pilot was not instrument rated nor was he authorised to fly without any ground reference.

3.1.4 The pilot did not file a flight plan which could have included selecting SAR/FAJS +1h since the weather was bad.

3.1.4 Weather contributed to this accident. There were broken clouds and their base was between 500 and 600 feet AGL.

3.1.5 The weather was below VFR operating minima.

3.1.6 The aircraft had a valid certificate of airworthiness at the time of the accident.

3.1.7 The last Mandatory Periodic Inspection (MPI) prior to the accident flight was certified on 17 November 2016 at 3457.65 total airframe hours. The AMO that performed the last mandatory inspection was accredited by the SACAA.

3.1.9 The flight was conducted under the provisions of Part 91 of the Civil Aviation Regulations of 2011, as amended.

3.1.10 The aircraft technical documentation showed nothing out of ordinary with the aircraft before the flight took place.

3.1.11 The propeller hub had separated from the crankshaft during the accident sequence. The separation features on the crankshaft were conical in appearance with a 45° shear lip around the entire radius of the break.

3.1.12 Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of failure of the power plant and the flight controls.

3.1.13 The investigation revealed that the aircraft had a control flight into terrain (CFIT) as the pilot was attempting to stay below clouds, the aircraft was flown at 5749 feet AMSL in an area where the highest peak at 5941 feet AMSL.

3.2 Probable Cause/s

3.2.1 Control flight into terrain (CFIT) as the pilot was attempting to stay below clouds, the aircraft was flown at 5749 feet AMSL in an area where the highest peak at 5941 feet AMSL.

4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 None.

5. APPENDICES

5.1 Appendix 1: SAWS Weather report

Appendix 1: SAWS Weather report.

South African Weather Service

ISO 9001 Certified Organisation

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Record Reference: ZS-ELS-2017-10-13
Document Type: Report
Version: 1

Document Control

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Version and Amendment Schedule

Version	Version Date	Author	Description of Amendments
1	17 October 2017	Luthando Masimini	Document Created

Report: Aircraft accident

Scope

The meteorological information provided in this report includes the following:

Observational weather data at/or in the vicinity of the aircraft accident/incident, closer to the time of its occurrence.

These include, but are not limited to:

(i) Remote sensing data such as Satellite and RADAR imagery; etc., depending on availability.
(ii) Surface observational data in the form of METARs, SYNOPs, etc. – and these relay observed weather elements such as:

- Dry-bulb and Dew-point temperature readings;
- Surface Wind Speed and Direction;
- Clouds (coverage and bases/heights);
- Visibility;
- Weather phenomenon; and
- the QNH.

The availability of the information on clouds (cover and bases), visibility, and the weather depends on the type of the reporting weather station - i.e. whether it's a manned or automated weather station.

Purpose

To provide the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) with meteorological information for their inquest into an aircraft accident/incident closer to the time of its occurrence.

Table of Contents

Background

An aircraft was crashed near Tevreden Pan between Crissiesmeer and Carolina, Mpumalanga, on the 13 October 2017. The involved aircraft was reported to have departed from Wonderboom airport (FAWB) at about 1321Z to a lodge near Chrissiersmeer. Weather information for the period 1321-1807Z is requested for an inquest to the incident. The location of the accident site is given by the following GPS coordinates: S31^{0} 03' 39.3" E29^{0} 22' 33.4".

SUMMARY OF OBSERVED WEATHER CONDITIONS CLOSER TO THE ESTIMATED TIME OF OCCURRENCE OF THE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

(i) Satellite image:

Satellite images showing observed clouds within the period of the flight under investigation, 1315 – 1800Z, are included as Attachments A1-2. The images recorded no clouds over the Wonderboom (FAWB) at the specified time of departure, but scattered clouds in the form of Alto cumulus (Ac) and high based Towering cumulus clouds (TCu) enroute to the south and east of Witbank. At this time, 1315Z, the accident site was located at the western edges of a mass of low cloud, which was widely spread to the east, and continued to encroach the western parts of Mpumalanga. On the other hand, the Ac cloud that was reported lying over the southwestern parts earlier in the text, was moving into an easterly direction. The mages also show a TCu that moved directly overhead the coordinates of the accident site at 1545Z. While the low cloud continued to spread westwards towards sunset, covering the accident site completely (overcast conditions), the mid-level cloud together with the TCu dissipated were dissipating (see 1800Z night microphysics satellite composite in Attachment A2).

(ii) Surface observations:

The METARs from Ermelo Weather Office (FAEO), which lies within 37km southwest of the accident site, are included in Attachment B. Closer to the indicated time of commencement of the flight (1300Z) the corresponding METAR at FAEO reported moderate, but initially gusty winds, east-north-easterly winds with the base of the low cloud, the bulk of which was still lying to the east at the time, observed at 1800 feet. The METAR shows that as the low cloud was pushed westwards by the easterly winds the cloud base dropped to the lowest bases of 600 feet by 1800Z.

Given the close proximity of the accident site to the reporting weather station (i.e., $\pm$ 37km) and the fact that the area was affected by the same cloud, it is justifiable to approximate the surface conditions at the accident site using the observations from Ermelo. As for the estimation of the time of occurrence/arrival of the low cloud at the accident site, we can deduct from the satellite images that the IMC conditions (due to the low cloud under scrutiny) occurred/arrived much earlier at the accident site than at FAEO. This is due to the fact that the accident site is located east of Ermelo. Also, when comparing the vicinity of the two areas relative to the cloud at the time provided for the commencement of the flight (i.e., 1300Z satellite), the cloud was already encroaching the accident site in comparison with FAEO location relative to the cloud, which (FAEO) was still reasonably clear of the cloud.

Due to the observed strength of the wind at FAEO, which was initially gusty and stayed above 10 knots throughout the period, and taking into consideration the justified use of the station's data to approximate conditions at the accident site in the preceding paragraph, it is inconclusive to suggest visibility reduction below VFR thresholds due to fog during the given period, but a possibility for the occurrence of mist cannot be overruled.

Attachment A1





Attachment A2





Attachment B

Meteorological Aerodrome Report(s)

Station: FAEO

Date: 2017-10-13

FAEO 131300Z 07012G23KT 9999 FEW018 17/09 Q1024=
FAEO 131400Z 07012KT 9999 SCT018 14/09 Q1024=
FAEO 131500Z 06012KT 9999 FEW015 12/08 Q1025=
FAEO 131600Z 06014KT 9999 SCT008 10/08 Q1025=
FAEO 131700Z 08010KT 9999 BKN008 09/08 Q1026=
FAEO 131800Z 07011KT 8000 BKN006 09/08 Q1027=

....End of report