Accident ICP Savannah VG 2AEQ, Sunday 16 July 2017
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Date:Sunday 16 July 2017
Time:15:55 LT
Type:Silhouette image of generic SVNH model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
ICP Savannah VG
Owner/operator:Corsica Sky Services
Registration: 2AEQ
MSN: 07-06-51-610
Fatalities:Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 1
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Destroyed
Location:Capo-di-Feno, Ajaccio, Corse du Sud 2A -   France
Phase: Approach
Nature:Banner and glider towing
Departure airport:
Destination airport:Capo di Feno airstrip
Investigating agency: BEA
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
The ultralight was towing a banner and crashed for unknow reasons.
The pilot (61), manager of Corsica Sky Services, died few hours at the hospital.

Bea report conclusions:


During his flight to Propriano, the pilot felt a break in the chain of orders in roll. It is likely that this corresponded to the break
one of the two attachments of the optional dual-control system. The upkeep of the system by the second fixation allowed normal operation in
pitch but introduced an important game in roll.

The positioning of this binding under the seats did not allow the pilot to seewhat part had yielded. Still succeeding in controlling the ULM, and not thinking probably not a second break can take place, the pilot made the choice to return to his base to drop his banner. The flight of ten minutes to join Capo di Feno probably helped him in his decision.

After the dropping, the pilot conducted an aerodrome circuit to return to land.The rupture of the second attachment took place during the last turn, making the ULM uncontrollable on roll and pitch axes. The withdrawal of the reserve parachute for reasons of maintenance did not allow the pilot to limit the consequences loss of control.

The accident is due to the fatigue failure of the two attachments of the optional system of double command. Following this accident, the manufacturer published a bulletin mandatory service requiring the replacement of inter-sleeve tubes by with different tie geometry, and by limiting the use of
service of this new room at 600 hours.

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: BEA
Report number: 
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year
Download report: Final report



Revision history:

16-Jul-2017 22:29 Iceman 29 Added
16-Jul-2017 22:42 Iceman 29 Updated [Operator, Source, Embed code, Narrative]
16-Jul-2017 22:55 Iceman 29 Updated [Embed code]
17-Jul-2017 08:48 TB Updated [Time, Aircraft type, Location, Nature, Embed code]
10-Aug-2018 09:17 Iceman 29 Updated [Time, Aircraft type, Registration, Phase, Destination airport, Source, Embed code, Narrative]
10-Aug-2018 10:16 harro Updated [Aircraft type, Cn, Embed code]

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