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Date: | Sunday 27 May 2018 |
Time: | |
Type: | Bombardier CRJ-1000 |
Owner/operator: | Air Nostrum |
Registration: | EC-LJS |
MSN: | 19003 |
Year of manufacture: | 2010 |
Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 84 |
Other fatalities: | 0 |
Aircraft damage: | None |
Category: | Serious incident |
Location: | Madrid-Barajas Adolfo Suárez Airport (MAD/LEMD) -
Spain
|
Phase: | Approach |
Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
Departure airport: | Alicante Airport (ALC/LEAL) |
Destination airport: | Madrid-Barajas Adolfo Suárez Airport (MAD/LEMD) |
Investigating agency: | CIAIAC |
Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:On Sunday, 27 May 2018, from 21:30 to 22:00, there were several losses of separation between aircraft in the Madrid CTR (control zone) as they were approaching the airport.
Before that, between 20:47 and 20:57, seven consecutive go-arounds occurred due to weather conditions; specifically, a sudden convective current that caused tailwind and wind shear. Due to the sudden change in wind speed and direction, the airport’s configuration was changed. The airport, which had been in a North Configuration before the event, changed to a South Configuration at 20:54.
The seven go-arounds, the adverse weather conditions and the change in the airport’s configuration complicated the air traffic management and gave rise to these losses of separation.
The first loss of separation involved TAP flight TP1018, an Airbus A320 (CS-TNQ), and a Air Nostrum flight ANE99DJ, a CRJ-1000 (EC-LJS).
As the radar tracks showed, the aircraft intercepted the localizers with a diagonal separation below 2 NM, which is the minimum radar separation between aircraft established on adjacent localizers.
The ground speed of both aircraft when they intercepted the localizer was in excess of 200 knots. The aircraft’s IAS is not known, but considering the wind speed at the time of the incident, it is likely that the aircraft were not complying with the speed restriction published in the AIP. The controller instructed both aircraft, when they were 16 NM away from the airport, to lower their speed to 180 knots.
Subsequently, the aircraft with callsign TAP1018, which had a higher speed and was flying behind the aircraft with callsign ANE99DJ, was instructed to reduce its speed to 160 knots.
However, this speed restriction did not keep the aircraft from closing even more, since TAP1018 needed some time to adjust its speed to that instructed by the controller.
The controller provided information to the two aircraft, such that both crews were aware that the other aircraft was intercepting the localizer on the parallel runway.
The investigation has determined that these losses of separation were caused by the complex operational situation in the airspace of the Madrid TMA.
The following contributed to the incident:
- The unavailability of weather information tools that cover the entire airspace of the Madrid TMA.
- The sudden change in weather conditions, and specifically, in the wind speed and direction.
- The time needed to make the decision to change the runway configuration.
Accident investigation:
|
| |
Investigating agency: | CIAIAC |
Report number: | IN-031/2018 |
Status: | Investigation completed |
Duration: | 1 year and 10 months |
Download report: | Final report |
|
Sources:
CIAIAC
Revision history:
Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
04-Apr-2020 11:40 |
harro |
Updated [Registration, Cn, Operator, Total occupants, Nature, Departure airport, Source] |
04-Apr-2020 11:40 |
harro |
Updated [Narrative] |
04-Apr-2020 11:41 |
harro |
Updated [Narrative, Accident report, ] |
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