Serious incident McDonnell Douglas DC-9-83 (MD-83) D-AGWB, Sunday 26 December 1999
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Date:Sunday 26 December 1999
Time:18:17 LT
Type:Silhouette image of generic MD83 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
McDonnell Douglas DC-9-83 (MD-83)
Owner/operator:Aero Lloyd
Registration: D-AGWB
MSN: 49846/1581
Year of manufacture:1989
Total airframe hrs:26838 hours
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 174
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Serious incident
Location:München-Franz Josef Strauss Airport (MUC/EDDM) -   Germany
Phase: Take off
Nature:Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi
Departure airport:München-Franz Josef Strauss Airport (MUC/EDDM)
Destination airport:Las Palmas
Investigating agency: BFU
Confidence Rating: Information verified through data from accident investigation authorities
At 18:17, the aircraft began its take-off run on runway 26L for a charter flight to Las Palmas. Up to the moment when the take-off was to be initiated (rotation speed VR), the take-off proceeded without any abnormalities. Upon reaching VR, it was not possible to rotate the aircraft. The control column could only be pulled to just above neutral position. The take-off was aborted. Due to the length of the runway, the aborted take-off could could be carried out without any problems.

The investigation revealed that during the preparations for take-off, due to significant tailwinds or a resulting flapping movement of the HR, loads occurred which over-pressured the spring-loaded stop on the left elevator. As a result of a considerable exceeding of the normal full deflection at the left elevator, the entire altitude control system jammed. The conceivable possibility that tailwind and the simultaneous control of the elevator by the hydraulics complemented each other in their effect is linked to preconditions that were not given in the present case.
The serious malfunction is due to the fact that the blocked altitude control was not noticed during a special check at the gate and/or during the measures taken as part of the taxiing checklist. Deficiencies in the operating instructions for the type contributed overall to the fact that the parking of the aircraft and the performance of all checks up to take-off could not be carried out with the necessary awareness of the problem. The special check had to be carried out by the staff largely at their own discretion. During the usual performance of the checks, it was not mandatory to recognise the defect on the aircraft.

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: BFU
Report number: BFU 5X011-0/99
Status: Investigation completed
Download report: Final report


BFU 5X011-0/99

Revision history:

19-Oct-2020 10:45 ASN Update Bot Added
13-Aug-2021 08:34 harro Updated [Time, Phase, Departure airport, Destination airport, Narrative, Accident report, ]
13-Aug-2021 08:38 harro Updated [Aircraft type, ]
19-Jan-2024 17:54 harro Updated [Registration, Cn, Operator, Total occupants, Other fatalities, Source, ]

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