Runway excursion Accident de Havilland Canada DHC-8-102 Dash 8 C-GTCO, Wednesday 23 January 2019
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Date:Wednesday 23 January 2019
Type:Silhouette image of generic DH8A model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
de Havilland Canada DHC-8-102 Dash 8
Owner/operator:Air Creebec
Registration: C-GTCO
MSN: 119
Year of manufacture:1988
Total airframe hrs:43522 hours
Engine model:Pratt & Whitney Canada PW120A
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 9
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Substantial, repaired
Location:Rouyn Airport, QC (YUY) -   Canada
Phase: Take off
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Rouyn Airport, QC (YUY/CYUY)
Destination airport:Montreal-Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport, QC (YUL/CYUL)
Investigating agency: TSB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
A DHC-8-102 aircraft operated by Air Creebec, was on an instrument flight rules flight 926 from Rouyn-Noranda (CYUY) to Montréal/Pierre Elliott Trudeau Intl (CYUL) with 3 crew members and 6 passengers on board. During the take-off run from runway 26 at CYUY, the aircraft began to veer to the left. It continued to do so until the left main landing gear rolled off the surface of the runway and hit a snow windrow 5 feet beyond the edge of the runway. The aircraft continued to veer to the left and came to rest in a compacted snowbank 40 feet from the runway. One of the passengers received minor injuries. The aircraft sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, landing gear, and propellers. The accident occurred during the hours of darkness, when visibility was reduced to approximately 2 statute miles in snow showers.

Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. The pilot flying did not look far enough ahead for long enough to notice that the aircraft was deviating to the left before veering off the runway.
2. Given that the pilot monitoring was not looking out the window to monitor the aircraft’s path, he did not notice the deviation and was therefore unable to help the pilot flying correct the deviation in the path during the take-off roll.
3. The strong authority gradient between the pilots reduced the effectiveness of monitoring, which resulted in a failure to detect and correct the deviation from the departure path.
4. During the takeoff-rejection procedure, the pilot flying accidentally caught the right engine power lever with his finger, pushing the lever completely forward, and placed only the left lever in the idle position, which produced a significant dissymmetry in the torque and accentuated the deviation from the path, resulting in the runway excursion.
5. Since the pilot flying was able to place only 1 power lever in the idle position, it is highly likely that he did not have his right hand on the levers, contrary to what is stated in the standard operating procedures. Consequently, he was not ready to quickly and safely reject the takeoff.

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: TSB
Report number: A19Q0010
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year 1 month
Download report: Final report


TSB A19Q0010


Revision history:


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