Accident Cessna 500 Citation I C-GTNG, Thursday 13 October 2016
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Date:Thursday 13 October 2016
Type:Silhouette image of generic C500 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Cessna 500 Citation I
Registration: C-GTNG
MSN: 500-0169
Year of manufacture:1974
Engine model:Pratt & Whitney Canada JT15D-1A
Fatalities:Fatalities: 4 / Occupants: 4
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Destroyed, written off
Location:8,3 km NE of Kelowna Airport, BC (YLW) -   Canada
Phase: Initial climb
Departure airport:Kelowna Airport, BC (YLW/CYLW)
Destination airport:Calgary/Springbank Airport, AB (CYBW)
Investigating agency: TSB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
A Cessna 500 Citation I jet, registration C-GTNG, impacted terrain shortly after takeoff from Kelowna Airport, Canada. All four occupants died in the crash.
The aircraft arrived at Kelowna Airport at about 08:30 in the morning from Calgary/Springbank Airport. That evening the flight was to fly back to Springbank with the pilot and 3 passengers.
The pilot filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan via the MENBO and IGVEP waypoints to Calgary/Springbank, and the flight was expected to take 46 minutes at a cruise altitude of FL250.
At 21:26, the pilot obtained an IFR clearance from the ground controller for the KELOWNA SEVEN DEP standard instrument departure (SID) procedure for runway 34.
The instructions for the Runway 34 KELOWNA SEVEN DEP SID were to climb to 9000 feet ASL, or to an altitude assigned by air traffic control (ATC), and to contact the Vancouver Area Control Centre (ACC) after passing through 4000 feet ASL. The aircraft was then to climb and track 330° magnetic (M) inbound to the Kelowna non-directional beacon (LW). From LW, the aircraft was to climb and track 330°M outbound for vectors to the filed or assigned route.
At 21:31, the Kelowna tower controller cleared the aircraft to take off from the intersection of runway 34 and taxiway D. The pilot acknowledged the clearance and began the take-off roll on runway 34 about 1 minute later. Radar data showed that, at 21:33:41, the aircraft was 0.5 nautical miles (nm) beyond the departure end of the runway and was climbing at more than 4000 feet per minute (fpm) through 2800 feet ASL, at a climb angle of approximately 16°. In that time, it had deviated laterally by about 3° to the right of the 330°M track associated with the SID.
At 21:34:01, when the aircraft was 1.2 nm beyond the runway, it had climbed through 3800 feet ASL and deviated further to the right of the intended routing. The aircraft's rate of climb decreased to about 1600 fpm, and its ground speed was 150 knots. A short time later, the aircraft's rate of climb decreased to 600 fpm, its climb angle decreased to 2°, and its ground speed had increased to 160 knots.
At 21:34:22, the aircraft was 2.1 nm beyond the departure end of the runway, and it was climbing through approximately 4800 feet ASL. The aircraft had deviated about 13° to the right of the intended track, and its rate of climb reached its maximum value of approximately 6000 fpm, with a climb angle of about 22°. The ground speed was roughly 145 knots.
At 21:34:39, the aircraft was 2.7 nm beyond the departure end of the runway, passing through 5800 feet ASL, and had deviated about 20° to the right of the intended routing. The rate of climb was approximately 2000 fpm, with a climb angle of about 7°.
According to the SID, the pilot was to make initial contact with the ACC after the aircraft had passed through 4000 feet ASL. Initial contact was made when the aircraft was passing through 6000 feet ASL, at 21:34:42.
ACC acknowledged the communication and indicated that the aircraft had been identified on radar. The aircraft was then cleared for a right turn direct to the MENBO waypoint once it was at a safe altitude, or once it was climbing through 8000 feet ASL. The aircraft was also cleared to follow the flight-planned route and climb to 10 000 feet ASL.
At 21:34:55, the pilot read back the clearance as the aircraft climbed through 6400 feet ASL, with a rate of climb of approximately 2400 fpm. The aircraft was tracking about 348°M at a groundspeed of about 170 knots.
At 21:35:34, the aircraft began a turn to the right, which was consistent with the instruction from the ACC. Flying directly to the MENBO waypoint required the aircraft to be on a heading of 066°M, requiring a right turn of about 50°. At this point, the aircraft was still climbing and was passing through 8300 feet ASL. The rate of climb was about 3000 fpm.
The aircraft continued the right turn and was tracking through 085°M. After reaching a peak altitude of approximately 8600 feet ASL, the aircraft entered a steep descending turn to the right, consistent with the characteristics of a spiral dive.
At 21:35:47, the ACC controller cleared C-GTNG to climb to FL 250. The lack of radar returns and radio communications from the aircraft prompted the controller to initiate search activities.
At 21:51, NAV CANADA notified first responders, who located the accident site in forested terrain at about midnight. The aircraft had been destroyed, and all of the occupants had been fatally injured.

Because there were no flight recording systems on board the aircraft, the TSB could not determine the cause of the accident. The most plausible scenario is that the pilot, who was likely dealing with a high workload associated with flying the aircraft alone, experienced spatial disorientation and departed from controlled flight shortly after takeoff. The investigation also determined that the pilot did not have the recent night flying experience required by Transport Canada for carrying passengers at night.

Findings as to causes and contributing factors
1. The aircraft departed controlled flight, for reasons that could not be determined, and collided with terrain.

Findings as to risk
1. If flight data, voice, and video recordings are not available to an investigation, the identification and communication of safety deficiencies to advance transportation safety may be precluded.
2. If night and instrument proficiency are not adequately maintained, a pilot may not be able to recognize an aircraft upset and respond appropriately, especially during high-workload situations, increasing the risk of loss-of-control accidents.
3. If weight-and-balance documents are inaccurate, there is a risk that aircraft will be operated outside of the allowable centre-of-gravity specifications, which could affect flight stability and controllability.
4. If Transport Canada does not effectively oversee private operators, this sector of aviation may be exposed to higher risks that could lead to an accident.


04:16 UTC / 21:16 local time:
CYLW 140416Z AUTO 35006KT 9SM -RA SCT006 07/06 A2947 RMK SLP992

04:33 UTC / 21:33 local time:
CYLW 140433Z AUTO 01006KT 9SM -RA SCT006 BKN020 07/06 A2946 RMK PRESFR SLP985

04:35 UTC / 21:35 local time:
CYLW 140435Z AUTO 01005KT 9SM -RA BKN006 BKN020 07/06 A2945 RMK PRESFR SLP983
Wind 010 at 5 knots; visibility 9 miles in rain; broken clouds at 600 feet, broken clouds at 2000 feet, temperature +7°C; dew point +6°C;

04:37 UTC / 21:37 local time:
CYLW 140437Z AUTO 01006KT 9SM -RA BKN008 BKN020 07/06 A2945 RMK PRESFR SLP983

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: TSB
Report number: A16P0186
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year and 6 months
Download report: Final report




photo (c) Transportation Safety Board of Canada; near Winfield, BC; 15 October 2016; (CC:by-nc-nd)

photo (c) Transportation Safety Board of Canada; near Winfield, BC; 15 October 2016; (CC:by-nc-nd)

photo (c) Transportation Safety Board of Canada; near Winfield, BC; 15 October 2016; (CC:by-nc-nd)

photo (c) Transportation Safety Board of Canada; near Winfield, BC; 15 October 2016; (CC:by-nc-nd)

photo (c) Transportation Safety Board of Canada; near Winfield, BC; 15 October 2016; (CC:by-nc-nd)

photo (c) Transportation Safety Board of Canada; near Winfield, BC; 15 October 2016; (CC:by-nc-nd)

photo (c) Liam Allport; Kelowna Airport, BC (YLW); 13 October 2016

Revision history:


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