Incident Boeing 737-33AQC F-GIXD, Monday 10 January 2011
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Date:Monday 10 January 2011
Time:
Type:Silhouette image of generic B733 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Boeing 737-33AQC
Owner/operator:Europe Airpost
Registration: F-GIXD
MSN: 25744/2198
Year of manufacture:1991
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Incident
Location:Montpellier -   France
Phase: Take off
Nature:Ferry/positioning
Departure airport:Montpellier-Méditerranée Airport (MPL/LFMT)
Destination airport:Toulouse-Blagnac Airport (TLS/LFBO)
Investigating agency: BEA
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
The crew took off from Montpellier runway 31R for a ferry flight bound for Toulouse-Blagnac. During rotation, the leading edge slats deployed from the intermediate position to the fully extended position. The left stick shaker activated immediately. The captain noticed an erroneous indication on the speed tape of his PFD. He observed no anomaly on the co-pilot's PFD, on the standby indicator and on the engine indicators. The slats returned to their initial position. Twelve seconds after being triggered, the stick shaker stopped. After analyzing the behavior of the systems, the crew decided to continue the flight to destination.

Conclusion

The triggering of the stick shaker when the aircraft rotated was due to the left angle of attack sensor being blocked by paint. The presence of paint results from inappropriate masking of the probe during the application of the paint. The post-site visit did not detect this anomaly.

Rules of the trade alone are not enough to guarantee safe painting operations. Indeed, the lack of a systematic procedure by aeronautical manufacturers, in terms of protection of external sensors during painting activities, and verification of their proper functioning at the end of the work, does not make it possible to ensure that these operations are take place in an adequate and homogeneous manner according to the workshops. Moreover, the training requirements relating to specialized personnel do not guarantee that the latter are aware of the potential impact of their activity on flight safety.

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: BEA
Report number: 
Status: Investigation completed
Duration:
Download report: Final report

Sources:

https://bea.aero/en/investigation-reports/notified-events/detail/activation-du-vibreur-de-manche-lors-de-la-rotation/

Location

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
04-Aug-2023 16:45 harro Added

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