Accident Airbus A340-313X OH-LQD, Saturday 27 November 2010
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Date:Saturday 27 November 2010
Type:Silhouette image of generic A343 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
Airbus A340-313X
Registration: OH-LQD
MSN: 921
Year of manufacture:2008
Engine model:CFMI CFM56-5C4
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 272
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Location:Hong Kong-Chek Lap Kok International Airport (HKG/VHHH) -   Hong Kong
Phase: Take off
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Hong Kong-Chek Lap Kok International Airport (HKG/VHHH)
Destination airport:Helsinki-Vantaa Airport (HEL/EFHK)
Investigating agency: CAD Hong Kong
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
The incident occurred at night time during which FIN070 was cleared by ATC to taxi on Taxiway B westbound for departure on Runway 07L. When the aircraft was approaching the western end of Taxiway B, ATC cleared the aircraft for take-off on Runway 07L. The aircraft took the normal right turn at the end of Taxiway B towards Runway 07L but then took a premature right turn onto Taxiway A, a taxiway parallel to and in between the runway-in-use and Taxiway B. With the help of the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) provided in the Control Tower, ATC observed that the aircraft commenced take-off roll on Taxiway A. On detecting the anomaly, ATC immediately instructed the pilot to stop rolling and the aircraft was stopped abeam Taxiway A5, approximately 1400 metres from the beginning (western end) of Taxiway A.

The following causal factors were identified:

1 A combination of sudden surge in cockpit workload and the difficulties experienced by both the Captain and the First Officer in stowing the EFB computers at a critical point of taxiing shortly before take-off had distracted their attention from the external environment that resulted in a momentary degradation of situation awareness.
2 The SOP did not provide a sufficiently robust process for the verification of the departure runway before commencement of the take-off roll.
3 The safety defence of having the First Officer and the Relief Pilot to support and monitor the Captain’s taxiing was not sufficiently effective as the Captain was the only person in the cockpit trained for ground taxi.

Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: CAD Hong Kong
Report number: 
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 1 year
Download report: Final report


Revision history:

03-Dec-2010 13:50 harro Added
23-Dec-2010 15:11 harro Updated [Date, Time, Total occupants, Source, Narrative]
13-Jan-2012 14:17 harro Updated [Source, Narrative]
09-Apr-2021 15:26 harro Updated [Narrative, Accident report]
09-Apr-2021 16:43 harro Updated [Source]

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